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MAKING LAWS AND SAUSAGES:
A QUARTER-CENTURY RETROSPECTIVE ON
PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION CO. V. CITY OF NEW YORK

Gideon Kanner*

The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.'
[T]he life of the law is not logic, but expedience.2

INTRODUCTION

This Article does not seek to unravel the twists and turns of substantive legal
doctrine said to govern regulatory inverse condemnation law. Others have done so
in a fulsome fashion, and my own contribution to that subject may be found in an
earlier article Rather than parse the elusive substantive meaning of the Supreme
Court's opinions that have provided fodder for so many critical commentaries, I
inquire here primarily into how the courts got so important a subject so wrong.
Though I do so primarily from the point of view of a specialized lawyer trying to
understand what black letter rules, if any, govern this field of law, and how judges
came to rule as they did in the Penn Central case,4 I also believe that these legal
* © Gideon Kanner 2004. Professor of Law Emeritus, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
Editor, Just Compensation.Believing with Justice Douglas that legal commentators should
disclose their point of view (William 0. Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40
WASH. L. REV. 227, 228-30 (1965)), this is to note that in my 40-year-long practice, I have
typically represented property owners in eminent domain and inverse condemnation cases.
I acted as counsel for private parties and amici curiae supporting them in seven U.S. Supreme
Court regulatory takings cases.
The author gratefully acknowledges the generous help he received from colleagues,
lawyers, law professors, and economists, who are too numerous to mention here, but whose
knowledgeable and constructive critiques contributed to this Article.
' OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
2 Kisbey v. State, 682 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Cal. 1984) (Kaus, J.) (citing Ne Casek v. City
of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965)).
3 See Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court
Been Competent in Its Effort to FormulateCoherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB.
LAW. 307 (1998) [hereinafter Kanner, Hunting the Snark] (commenting on the inconsistencies and anomalies of regulatory taking law).
4 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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developments should be viewed from a broader, civic point of view as well. With
that in mind, I ask the readers to take a look with me at (I) how the quarter-centuryold Penn Central case arose, (ii) how it was decided as it wended its way through
four court levels, and (iii) how, in spite of its dubious provenance and inconsistency
with the Supreme Court's preexisting taking jurisprudence that has never been
overruled, to say nothing of the Court's lack of jurisdiction to decide it,5 it somehow
became the judicial "polestar" of regulatory takings law.6 The readers are invited
to make their own judgments as to whether, giving due regard to how the Penn
Centralcase was decided, it represents "landmark justice"7 or "economic lunacy,"8
to borrow the expressions of Penn Central'sadmirers and critics respectively.
A personal observation seems appropriate before proceeding. My Professor title
notwithstanding, I am, and throughout my forty-year-long legal career have been,
an appellate lawyer practicing in the field of eminent domain and inverse condemnation. I conceive my function to be knowing the law, imparting it to my students,
and bringing it to bear on a client's affairs when I act as counsel. I believe, naively
perhaps, that the primary job of appellate courts is to resolve controversies in a
principled fashion, and to provide society with precedents - rules that can be
comprehended and applied to control similar cases so that in future controversies
court rulings are reasonably consistent and the law need not be formulated all over
again in each new case. Judicial result-orientation in pursuit of trendy political or
ideological notions that may arise in a particular controversy, is counterproductive
because such notions change continuously as popular attitudes change, and as different judges pursue different results. At the very least, changes in the law decreed
by courts should be rooted in a thorough judicial knowledge of preexisting law and
an understanding of the impact of contemplated change on it. That, however, was
' Apart from the concerns expressed infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text, it also
bears noting that the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals, Penn. Central Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), neither discussed nor resolved any
issues of federal law which are indispensable for the exercise of jurisdiction by the U.S.
Supreme Court. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 144 (BNA, 6th ed.

1986).
6 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
For discussions of Penn Central's guiding principles, see Steven J. Eagle, Planning
Moratoria and Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court's Fairness Mandate Benefits
Landowners, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 501 (2004) [hereinafter Eagle, Planning];Marla
E. Mansfield, Tahoe-Sierra Returns Penn Central to the CenterTrack, 38 TULSA L. REv. 263
(2002); Gus Bauman, Lucas Limited andPenn Central Promoted,54 LAND USE L. &ZONING
DIG. (Jun. 2002).
' Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden, Landmark Justice: The Influence of William J.
Brennan on America's Communities, LAND USE LAW 3, 5-6 (Aug. 1988).
' Wiliam W. Wade, Penn Central's Economic Failings Confounded Taking
Jurisprudence,31 URB. LAW. 277, 282, 307 (1999) (criticizing the economic implications
of the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Penn Central).

2005]

MAKING LAWS AND SAUSAGES

not the case in the Penn Centralcase. Indeed, there is now reason to believe that the
revolutionary changes in takings doctrine wrought by the Supreme Court's Penn
Central opinion were unintended. The way things turned out, developments in
regulatory inverse condemnation law have become the antithesis of reasoned legal
reform.

Penn Central lacks doctrinal clarity because of its outright refusal to formulate
the elements of a regulatory taking cause of action, and because of its intellectual
romp through the law of eminent domain that paid scant attention to preexisting
legal doctrine. Its aftermath has become an economic paradise for specialized
lawyers, a burden on the judiciary, 9 as well as an indirect impediment to would-be
home builders, and an economic disaster for would-be home buyers and for society
at large. The vagueness and unpredictability of its rules, or more accurately the
"factors" deemed significant by the Court which declined to formulate rules, have
encouraged regulators to pursue policies that have sharply reduced the supply of
housing and are implicated in the ongoing, mind-boggling escalation in home
prices - a process that favors the well-housed rich and increasingly disfavors the
middle class, to say nothing of those lower on the economic scale who are still
climbing the rungs of the socioeconomic ladder.l1
Though efforts to depict regulatory takings controversies as a conflict between
property rights and the environment are common," and while environmental
9 See infra note 38 and accompanying text; RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME

101-06 (1966) (noting the pervasive judicial dislike for adjudicating land-use cases even at
that time). I can add to that my own, more recent, anecdotal experience of judges' hostility
to such claims, including privately voicing their dislike for "your kind of cases" as a retired
California Supreme Court Justice put it to me recently.
10A quarter century ago, speaking in the context of a regulatory taking case, California
Supreme Court Associate Justice William P. Clark, Jr., presciently predicted that extreme
judicial deference to local land-use regulations would inevitably lead to just such a socioeconomic cleavage among Americans. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 35 (Cal. 1979)
(Clark, J., dissenting), affd on othergrounds,447 U.S. 255 (1980). Since then, reality and
two Presidential Commissions on Housing have confirmed that this is exactly what has
happened. See infra note 206. As of this writing, the problem of providing housing for the
working class in California is approaching crisis proportions, with families doubling or
tripling up in single-family homes. William Fulton, Insight: Recent Home Price Escalation
Raises New "Affordable" Housing Questions, 19 CAL. PLANNING & DEV. RPT. 1 (2004). Nor
is the problem confined to California. See John Delaney, Addressing the Workforce Housing
Crisis in Marylandand Throughout the Nation, 33 U. BALT. L. REv. 153 (2004).
See Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (W.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926) (observing that the true purpose of zoning was to effect social and
economic segregation in zoned communities).
11 See, e.g., 8 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 14E.9 (Julius L. Sackman ed., 3d ed.

2004) [hereinafter NICHOLS]. For an exposition of my views on this subject, see Michael M.
Berger & Gideon Kanner, The Need for Takings Law Reform: A View from the Trenches A Response to Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 837 (1998)
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concerns can properly inspire regulation of land, they are too often used as camouflage for rent-seeking by established affluent suburbanites.' 2 All the talk about
protecting the environment notwithstanding, most recent land regulatory taking
cases that have been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, arose in the context of
housing construction that was impeded, or interdicted altogether, by the challenged
regulations in disregard of legislative policies favoring the construction of housing.
The basic law of regulatory takings is as easy to state as it has proven difficult
to apply by the courts. Because in modem theory property consists of rights rather
than things to which those rights attach, it is the destruction of those rights insofar
as their owners are concerned, whether by formal expropriation or confiscatory
regulations, that constitutes a taking.' 3 A regulatory taking is judicially recognized
when property regulations, as Justice Holmes famously but imprecisely put it, go
"too far" and impact on otherwise lawful attributes of private property ownership
and use to an unreasonable extent, so that its nominal owners are de facto left with
legal title, but little or nothing by way of benefits associated with property ownership - notably exclusive possession, use, or value. 14 As Justice Holmes colorfully
put it in his extrajudicial correspondence, the impact of the "petty larceny" of the
police power is something that owners of the regulated land have to endure.1 5 But
those owners should not have to endure damage inflicted by exercise of the police
power on the order of "grand larceny" effected by confiscatory regulations. Unfortunately, courts have failed to draw any sort of discernible line separating these two
degrees of regulation, shuttling unpredictably between competing doctrines and
producing conflicting results. Over thirty years ago, California's leading expert on
[hereinafter Berger & Kanner, Need for Reform]. See also BERNARD J. FRIEDEN, THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE (1979); JAMES V. DELONG, PROPERTY MATTERS:
How PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE UNDER ASSAULT - AND WHY YOU SHOULD CARE (1997);
WILLIAM TUCKER, PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE: AMERICA IN AN AGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM

(1983).
12 See FRIEDEN, supra note 11, at 119 (noting that many ostensibly environmental
controversies have little or nothing to do with genuine environmental concerns such as pollution, protection of genuinely endangered species, and the like).
13 See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (defining a
taking as the deprivation of property rights of the owner, rather than the physical seizure of
things or accretion of rights).

"4Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-16 (1922). In Mahon, the regulation in
question forbade the extraction of coal (owned by the Pennsylvania Coal Company) located
under the Mahons' house. Though the Mahons conveyed the right of surface support to the

coal company, they sought an injunction against coal mining under their land on the basis
of a statute enacted in order to prevent subsidence of the surface of land above mines. The
Court held that the injunction would amount to a taking of the coal. For a detailed (and
fascinating) description of the Mahon controversy and its historical context, see WILLIAM A.

FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLrrIcs 13-48 (1995).
'5 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND
HAROLD J. LASKI (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
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government liability, Professor Arvo Van Alstyne, described the pertinent decisional
law as "largely characterized by confusing and incompatible results, often explained
in conclusionary terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric."' 16 Little has
changed since then.
The major problem that bedevils this field of law is that an ideologically
fragmented U.S. Supreme Court has refrained from articulating usable rules that
might enable lower court judges and lawyers to make reasoned, analytical judgments
about the merits of their cases in a consistent fashion. Current law, relying on Penn
Central as its polestar, insists that the question whether a regulatory taking has
occurred is to be decided by the Supreme Court itself, not on the basis of articulated
legal doctrine, but rather on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. 7 The Court thus has it
that in reviewing lower court decisions in regulatory takings cases, it decides
controversies by making "factual inquiries"'" itself, thus conflating the roles of trial
and appellate courts, with predictably unfortunate results. Unsurprisingly, with so
fuzzy a standard of inverse condemnation liability, lower court decisions vary
unpredictably. 9
The Penn Central case arose out of the application of New York City's historical preservation law 20 to the ornate and widely admired Grand Central Terminal.
Because of the declining fortunes of railroads in the mid-twentieth century,
operation of the terminal caused the Penn Central Transportation Company (then in
bankruptcy along with a number of other railroads in the Northeast) to suffer an
operational deficit in the $1 to $2 million per annum range. Accordingly, Penn
Central sought to cure its cash flow problem by leasing the air rights above the
terminal to UGP, a lessee who intended to build a fifty-story office building in the
Arvo Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Searchfor Inverse
Condemnation Criteria,44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1970) [hereinafter Van Alstyne, Police
16

Power].

17 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. There are three exceptions to this approach. A
categorical taking occurs when there is a permanent physical invasion of the regulated land,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), or when the regulation deprives the property owner of all economically viable property use, Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), or where owners are required to convey property to
the government as a condition of development permit issuance, and the demanded property
lacks a nexus or is disproportionate to the public burdens created by private development,
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
18 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
19 See David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives
on PropertyRights Have Changedfrom Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal
Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523, 574 (1999) (surveying inconsistent
judicial approaches and concluding that "state (and some lower federal) courts are not
hearing (or not wanting to hear) the U.S. Supreme Court").
20 See J. Lee Rankin, Operationand Interpretationof the New York City Landmarks
PreservationLaw, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 366 (1971).
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2
air space above the terminal and pay rent to Penn Central. ' The original design of
the Grand Central Terminal contemplated such a construction, but it envisioned a
smaller building atop the terminal rising only twenty stories above it, which would
have made it tall by the 1913 standards of the day. Over a half century later, after
mid-Manhattan became a renowned skyscraper locale, Penn Central sought to build
a fifty-story building above the Terminal, which would be more in keeping with its
mid-twentieth century surroundings and with economic reality. However, the City's
Historical Preservation Commission, whose approval was necessary for alteration
of structures designated as historical landmarks, twice denied Penn Central's applications to do so, leaving deficit-ridden Penn Central with no available administrative
remedies and no choice but to sue on the theory that by thus forcing it to operate at
22
a deficit, the City denied it due process of law and de facto took its property.
Penn Central's case was straightforward: its Grand Central Terminal revenues
were below its expenditures, and the Historical Preservation Law which guaranteed
the regulated property owners a reasonable return on their property, defined that
23
return in terms of the excess of revenues over expenditures. Thus, because Penn
Central was receiving no net revenues from the terminal and was compelled by the
regulation to operate and maintain it at a deficit, it appeared to have an open-andshut legal case, subject to evidentiary proof.
But beyond such mundane accounting matters, the Penn Centralcase presented
the courts with a collision between an ideologically irresistible force (the desire of
the elites to preserve the widely admired Grand Central Terminal at no cost to the
City) and a constitutionally immovable object (the Fifth Amendment prohibition on
uncompensated takings). Nonetheless, it seems clear that, if analyzed in accordance
with the then-existing legal doctrine, 24 the Penn Central Transportation Company
presented a strong case of unconstitutional deprivation or regulatory taking of its

The precedent for this was the earlier construction of the high-rise Pan Am (now Met
Life) Building on the air rights above Penn Central's tracks, just north of the terminal. Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20,32 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (Lupiano,
J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 26 (noting that because Penn Central was the recipient of a partial real estate tax
exemption, no further administrative remedies were available under New York law).
23 Id. at 34-35 (Lupiano, J., dissenting) (quoting from the N.Y. CrIY ADMIN. CODE § 2071.0v[31[a]).
24 See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding that regulations that deny
property owners a reasonable return on regulated property are unconstitutional and invalid);
Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (N.Y. 1938) (finding confiscatory
regulations worse than outright uncompensated seizures because seizures at least relieve the
aggrieved owner of property taxes); see also Keystone Assocs. v. State, 333 N.Y.S.2d 27
(N.Y. App. Div. 1972), afftd, 307 N.E.2d 254 (N.Y. 1973). See generally Gideon Kanner,
Measure of Damages in Nonphysical Inverse CondemnationCases, 1989 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN (1989) § 12.02[2][f], at 12-18
through 12-20 (discussing the Keystone litigation).
21
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property when it showed to the trial court's satisfaction that it was being compelled
to sustain an ongoing deficit from the operation of the Grand Central Terminal a predicament that as a regulated common carrier, particularly one in bankruptcy,
it was not free to terminate by ceasing the money-losing operation. Yet, each of the
three appellate courts that reviewed the trial court judgment in favor of Penn Central,
found fault with the decision. Remarkably, each reviewing court based its respective
decision on matters entirely different from the ones considered and deemed decisive
by the other two appellate courts. In terms of legal doctrine, their respective opinions had precious little, if anything, to do with each other, thus illustrating not only
the old legal adage that hard cases make bad law, but as it turned out here, that they
can make no law at all that is worthy of the name.
The New York Appellate Division reviewed the accounting evidence presented
at trial and reversed the trial court judgment that favored Penn Central's submission.
It was a technical decision concerning valuation methodology applicable to properties subjected to regulations alleged to force their owners to operate at a deficit.25
Following that decision, the New York Court of Appeals largely ignored the issue
developed at trial and dealt with by the Appellate Division. Instead, without
affording the parties any advance notice or timely opportunity to be heard on this
point, it went off on an ideological frolic that, stripped to its essence, de facto
purported to supplant New York's law of property with a core feature of the failed
ideology of Henry George.26 George was a nineteenth-century pseudo-Marxist
crackpot who, in defiance of the American legal tradition and of the Constitution,
believed that it was a fundamental mistake to treat land as private property, and that
the government, not private property owners, should capture increases in land values
through the use of confiscatory taxation.27 He was an anti-Chinese bigot to boot.28
The New York Court of Appeals held that (contrary to settled constitutional
25 Penn Central, 377 N.Y.S.2d at
26 Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at

27-29.
1273; cf. Norman Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand

Central Terminal Decision: a Euclid for Landmarks, Favorable Notice for TDR and a
Resolution of the Regulatory/TakingImpasse, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 731, 739 n.37 (1978) (con-

ceding that the New York Court of Appeals wrote from a "neo-Henry Georgian perspective,"
based on George's "quasi-Marxist work," which overtly intended to take private property
without compensation; i.e., to allow "public rather than private interests to capture the land
value increments"); John J. Costonis, The DisparityIssue: A Contextfor the Grand Central

Terminal Decision, 91 HARV. L. REv. 402, 415-16 (1977) (fawning over the Court of
Appeals decision but noting that among the "daring strokes" used in the opinion was the
"evocation of the ghost of Henry George"); FISCHEL, supranote 14, at 50 (characterizing that
opinion as "redolent of the spirit of Henry George").
27 David Montgomery, Henry George, in 8 AM. NAT'L BIOGRAPHY 849, 850 (John A.
Garraty & Mark C. Carries eds., 1999).
28 Id. (George had it that the Chinese were "utter heathens, treacherous, sensual, cowardly
and cruel.").
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law) 29 property owners are not entitled to a reasonable return on their property, but
only to a return on that increment of the property's value said to be created by
private entrepreneurship,30 and denied them any right to a return on the increment
of value said by the court to have resulted from public influences, as if, in Professor
Fischel's apt words, "the Landmarks Preservation Commission were entitled to
appropriate to itself all of the advantages of civilization."'" On that basis, which
lacked any evidentiary, doctrinal, or precedential support (at least none were mentioned in the opinion), the New York Court of Appeals ignored the language of the
Landmark Preservation Law (which defined reasonable return in terms of excess of
revenues over expenses) and asserted that property regulations could make property
owners suffer an indefinitely ongoing deficit and yet, under the court's view of the
matter, be deemed to grant them a reasonable return. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals expressly conceded that in order to determine whether Penn Central was
being deprived of a reasonable return on the privately created component of its
property, the two elements of value it envisioned - the privately and publicly
created ones - would have to be separated, although, paradoxically, the court also
' 2
characterized them as "indistinguishable," and "inseparably joint. 1 Just how one
would go about distinguishing the indistinguishable, and separating the inseparable,
the court never took the trouble to explain.
In reviewing the Court of Appeals decision, the U.S. Supreme Court disregarded
the holding of the lower courts3" and held that Penn Central had not made out a case
of taking of its air rights over Grand Central Terminal - a subject never litigated
below. 4 As for the regulatory aspects of the controversy, the Supreme Court simply
disregarded modern urban reality and held that inasmuch as the Penn Central
Transportation Company was permitted to continue the same use of its land that it
had made for the preceding half century, that fact precluded a finding of a taking.
Though Penn Central had been twice denied permission to build in the air space
above the terminal, on the record before the Court, Penn Central was concededly
receiving a reasonable return and might yet obtain permission to build a smaller
See, e.g., Nectow, 277 U.S. 183 (holding that land-use regulations denying property
owners reasonable use of their property constitute an unconstitutional denial of substantive
due process).
30 Penn Central,366 N.E.2d at 1273, 1275.
31 FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 50.
32 Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1276.
33 Penn Central,438 U.S. at 121 n.23.
" Id. at 130, 135. In fairness to the Supreme Court, it must be noted that in its appeal
from the decision of the New York Court of Appeals, Penn Central abandoned the core issue
it had pressed below, conceding that it was getting a reasonable return on its property, and
argued instead that the regulation in question took its air rights above Grand Central
Terminal. Id. at 129-30. Nonetheless, why the Supreme Court departed from its usual
practice and noted probable jurisdiction to consider an issue that was never dealt with in the
lower courts is a mystery. See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
29
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building than what it had proposed, if it kept on trying to secure City permission to

build one.35 The Court also noted that under the challenged historical preservation
law, Penn Central had the option of transferring its development rights to other
properties, an option that - though inadequate as constitutional "just compensation" if a taking were to occur - mitigated its financial burdens.36
The fundamental flaw in the U.S. Supreme Court's Penn Centralopinion, which
transcended the opinion's other lacunae,was the Court's explicit refusal to articulate
the elements of a regulatory taking cause of action, pleading judicial inability to do
so, and claiming to make its decisions in this field by making ad hoc, factual, caseby-case inquiries.37 One finds it difficult to believe that the Court fully understood
what it was about, and how its at times baffling language addressed the issue at hand
with any degree of consistency with preexisting legal doctrine. If nothing else, by
embracing this ad hoc approach of examining each case on its own peculiar facts,
the Court de facto appointed itself a super zoning board of sorts that weighs facts
underlying the constitutional issues arising in each land-use regulation case brought
before it, not so much on the basis of broadly applicable legal doctrine as appellate
courts are wont to do, but rather by making "factual inquiries" into each particular
case under consideration, leaving one at a loss to determine what reliable legal
criteria are to be used to judge these factual determinations and what facts should
be decisive in trial. Paradoxically, in recent decisions, U.S. Courts of Appeals often
take the opposite view, and when it comes to regulatory inverse condemnation cases,
reveal their hostility to takings claims by proclaiming themselves to be opposed to
this approach, which some of them derisively call the function of a zoning "Grand
Mufti." 3 8 Yet, they routinely decide zoning and land-use cases that give rise to
" Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137; cf MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo,
477 U.S. 340, 350 n.7 (1986) (holding that though more than one application for building
permission may be in order, making repetitive applications and pursuing other unfair procedures is not required in order to achieve case ripeness for litigation claiming a regulatory
taking).
36

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137.

" Id. at 124. While all cases are ultimately decided on their proven facts, it is an
altogether different matter when the Supreme Court does not just look to facts found below,
but rather purports to make factual inquiries itself.
38 See Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529,532 (9th Cir. 1989) (repeating this
epithet disapprovingly); see also Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You
Can'tGet Therefrom Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudencein Takings Cases at
Long Last Reaches the Self-ParodyStage, 36 URB. LAw. 671,693 n.103 (2004) [hereinafter

Berger & Kanner, Shell Game!]. Further muddling this point, even as they rail against

deciding land-use takings controversies, federal courts experience no problems wielding the

authority of a zoning "Grand Mufti" when deciding constitutional claims in land-use cases
other than takings. Id. at 693 n. 102. Indeed, federal court adjudication of local land-use
regulations is so extensive that it has been the subject of treatises. See, e.g., DANIEL
MANDELKER ET AL., FEDERAL LAW OF ZONING (2004); STEVEN EAGLE, REGULATORY
TAKINGS, at chs. 7-9 (2d ed. 2001); see also Donald G. Hagman & Dean Misczynski, The
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constitutional issues other than takings, without voicing any such concerns. So far,
the Supreme Court has not addressed this irreconcilable judicial divergence of
approaches in adjudicating land-use cases. It too, freely decides non-takings zoning
and land-use cases without proclaiming itself to be "simply unable" to articulate
discernible legal doctrine.39
This de facto derogation of property rights has been in keeping with the judicial
trends that began in the 1930s in connection with the New Deal legislation, which
the Supreme Court eventually found constitutional, albeit only after the infamous
"switch in time that saved nine," and which ushered in an era of disparagement of
private property rights. It should be self-evident that for all the talk about the
0
importance of property rights in American law being in a state of decline, there is
more to this problem than just the stability of those rights in the abstract because
property rights cannot be conveniently pigeonholed apart from other fundamental
civil rights. As Judge Learned Hand put it, "[j]ust why property itself was not a
Our society sets great store by
'personal right' nobody took the time to explain.'
governmental power to
unleashing
that
so
individuals,
of
material achievements
the undermining
facilitate
extinguish property rights by regulatory fiat would greatly
of all civil rights and unduly enlarge governmental power. People whose economic
security can be snuffed out by unchecked governmental power over their property
are not likely to take politically unpopular positions.
What makes today's land-use takings controversies different from the regulatory
Quiet Federalizationof Land-Use Controls:Disquietudein the Land Markets, REALESTATE
APPRAISER Sept.-Oct. 1974; Michael M. Berger, Wet T-Shirts, Property Rights: A
ConstitutionalConundrum, L.A. DAILY J., May 11, 1994, at 7 (spotlighting the anomaly
whereby federal courts unhesitatingly involve themselves in zoning controversies involving
the constitutionality of regulations of property whose owners seek to put on "wet T-shirt"
contests involving buxom young women, an amusing but at best frivolous activity, but recoil
from similar involvement in cases where property owners seek to exercise their property
rights constructively to build badly needed housing, a land use that is highly favored by
congressional policy; see 42 U.S.C. § 1441).
" See, e.g., Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
4 See, e.g., James L. Oakes, "Property Rights" in ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56
WASH. L. REv. 583,584-86 (1981); Costonis, supra note 26, at 408-09. See FISCHEL, supra
note 14, at 251-52 (describing the NIMBY phenomenon that has resulted from the soaring
perception of importance of property in the form of family homes, and noting the species of
"property" that is being particularly disfavored is undeveloped land). I assume that my
readers are familiar with the significance of this acronym ("Not In My Back Yard") and
perhaps even with its successors: BANANA ("Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near
Anybody") and NOPE ("Not On Planet Earth").
41 Learned Hand, ChiefJustice Stone's Conception of the JudicialFunction,46 COLUM.
L. REv. 696, 698 (1946).
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battles of the 1930s is that many of today's land-use regulations that are at the
forefront of the takings issues do not arise from considered, broadly applicable
legislative enactments, but rather from ad hoc, whimsical decisions of unelected
land-use boards or commissions pursuing the parochial self-interest of well-to-do
local suburbanites who are already nicely housed, thank you very much, and who
are out to keep competing seekers of the good life from their upscale communities.
Also, though classified as performing a "legislative" function when enacting zoning
ordinances,42 the municipal government functionaries who usually make the many
decisions in individual land-use regulation cases are not legislators in the true sense
of the word; i.e., they are not elected officials who are concerned with regional or
even community-wide policy concerns. Many of them are petty, local, politically
appointed functionaries, some serving part-time, who often lack any planning or
legal background,43 who avowedly serve narrow local interests, and care not a whit
for sound, even-handed public policy" or for the laws that favor the construction of
new housing, particularly affordable housing, which they fiercely oppose at the
behest of their affluent constituencies. a5 Their focus is narrow, and they often deal
with one individual parcel at a time. The individual parcel owners are incapable of
availing themselves of a democratic corrective via the ballot box because of the
prohibitive cost and because the community at large is not interested in the confiscatory fate of one parcel, particularly when that fate is perceived as benefitting
members of that community at the individual parcel owner's expense. This enables
local regulators to curry favor with the many, at the expense of the few, and to shield
themselves from accountability that real, i.e., elected, legislators have to confront
come election time. This is precisely the sort of matter that should inspire judicial
sensitivity to the impairment of constitutional rights of the abused individuals. But
in fact, in spite of occasional bits of extravagant judicial rhetoric, the opposite is
true.'
These factors, though at first blush removed from the subject of historical preservation which lay at the core of the Penn Central controversy, actually form a
Arnell Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 568 (Cal. 1980).
See generally BABCOCK, supra note 9, at 19-40 (describing the layperson as decisionmaker).
42
13

44

Id.

Id. at 30-32; see also FRIEDEN, supra note 11, at 119-38 (describing the informal
alliance between wealthy suburbanites and environmental activists in opposing new home
construction); infra note 97.
46 Probably the best example of this phenomenon was the language used in Agins v. City
45

of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), affid on other grounds,447 U.S. 255 (1980) (exhorting

the importance of private property rights, but then in stunning disregard of California pleadings and remedies law formulating a holding that defied Supreme Court jurisprudence of
regulatory takings and deprived California property owners of any effective remedy in cases
of economically confiscatory regulations). Agins was overruled by FirstEnglishEvangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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cultural background against which all modem American land-use controls must be
viewed in order to arrive at an accurate perception of today's regulatory reality.
I.

PENN CENTRAL IN CONTEXT

As noted, in rejecting Penn Central's taking claim, the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion failed to articulate the elements of a regulatory inverse condemnation cause
of action. It only professed to be able to state "several factors that have particular
significance" in determining whether a regulation has gone too far, thus becoming
a de facto taking.47 These ad hoc factors were said to be (a) "the economic impact
of the regulation on the [property owner], 48 (b) "the extent to which the regulation[]
interferes with the owner's distinct investment-backed expectations," 9 whatever that
means,50 and (c) "the character of the government action"'" (noting unhelpfully that
a taking is more readily found when the interference with the owner's property is
physical)., 2 The Court gave no clue as to the meaning of the language used in the
formulation of these factors, what sort of evidence would tend to prove their existence, what weight to assign to each of them, and how they translate into a proper
inverse condemnation cause of action that, if proved, would entitle the aggrieved
plaintiff to relief as a matter of law. It seems plain that this formulation was not a
statement of law capable of straightforward application, but rather a vague delineation of an area in which individual judges of differing ideological persuasions
can roam at will before rendering subjective decisions as to whether a taking has
been shown. 3 As U.S. Circuit Judge James L. Oakes put it, "[Penn Central]juris
" Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
48 Id.
49 Id.

" See R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, GreatExpectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island Clarifythe Murky Doctrineof Investment-BackedExpectations in Regulatory Takings
Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449-50 n.3 (2001) (providing an extensive collection of

commentaries vying with one another in criticizing the vague "expectations" element);
Calvert G. Chipchase, From GrandCentralto the Sierras: What Do We Do with InvestmentBacked Expectations in PartialRegulatory Takings?, 23 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 43, 57 (2004).
5' Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
52 Id. at 124; see Steven J. Eagle, "Characterof Government Action" in Takings Law:
Past Present and Future, in INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED GOVERNMENT

LIABILITY 459 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, Apr. 22-24, 2004) [hereinafter Eagle,
Character].
" Though an economist rather than a lawyer, Professor Fischel hit the bull's eye when
he pointedly observed that
The fundamental flaw is that the Court gave no indication of the weight
that each criterion is to be given by a trial judge or jury. Attorneys with
clients need rules better than "the character of the government action"
and "the extent of the diminution of value." Such criteria are like
saying that aggregate consumption is a function of income, wealth, and
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prudence permits purely subjective results, with the conflicting precedents simply
available as makeweights that may fit pre-existing value judgments ... ,,'4 The
California Supreme Court foreshadowed this unfortunate development in the law
when it observed, some three years before the Penn Central decision, that judicial
characterizations of regulations as takings or as legitimate exercises of the police
power are merely the courts' shorthand way of labeling the results."
There is now good reason to believe that in deciding the Penn Centralcase, the
Supreme Court misapprehended the importance of the issues before it as well as of
its decision, and it simply did not understand the revolutionary impact of its
holding. 6 This may only be a part of a larger pattern of the Court's reluctance to
provide the consumers of its output with reasonably clear-cut rules57 that would
enable them to settle their controversies by compromise, or to resolve their lawsuits
efficiently. Under Penn Central'svague, multi-factor approach one cannot reliably
tell what "the law" is, and how it applies to the controversy at hand without first
taking years to let judges have a go at it on an ad hoc basis in each of the many
factual variants of regulatory impositions on rights of private property ownership.
That may be a mode of dispute resolution likely to find favor in the court of King

the interest rate, and then telling someone to use that information alone
to forecast the consumption component of GNP next year.
FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 51.
14 Oakes, supra note 40, at
613.
" HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 237,247 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904
(1976).
56 See Looking Back on Penn Central: A PanelDiscussionwith Supreme Court Litigators,
15 FORDHAM ENVTI. L. REv. 287 (2004) [hereinafter Transcript] (containing a transcript of
a roundtable discussion including counsel who argued Penn Central in the Supreme Court,
and former clerks for Justice Brennan, author of the majority opinion, and Justice Rehnquist,
author of the dissent). The panel members provide an acute insight into what transpired as
the controversy wended its way through the Supreme Court. They make clear beyond quibble
that counselfor both sides had their own agenda whose core feature was to disassociate their
submissions from Chief Judge Breitel's intellectually disastrous opinion for the New York
Court of Appeals. Id. at 295-96. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E2d
1271 (N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Justice Brennan's clerk "thought Justice
Brennan was making some modest efforts to bring a little content to an area of the law that
was.., then quite formalist and in disarray," Transcript, supra, at 307, but did not think that
the Penn Central case was especially important, id. at 295. Neither did Justice Stewart's
clerk. Id. at 307. At the time of the decision, the participants did not think the case was
important enough to be discussed by them in this fashion twenty-five years later. Id. at 295.
Lois Schiffer, head of the Justice Department litigation section, thought it was a "ho hum"
case. Id. at 294.
" Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme Court?,51 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 686
(1990); see, e.g., Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164-65
(1980) (concluding with an admonition that its holding was case-specific and not intended
to control similar future controversies in the takings field).
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Solomon, 58 but it isn't law that is consistent with the common law tradition of stare
decisis.59 Under the Penn Central approach, lawyers are unable to ascertain which
facts of the controversy will prove to be the operative, much less decisive, nor the
prospective likelihood of litigational success or failure. They are thus handicapped
when trying to advise clients, plan contemplated litigation, and marshal evidence
likely to satisfy judges.
In the absence of discernible rules, this legal regime encourages litigation, but
makes it a "rich man's game" de facto available only to owners of property that is
sufficiently valuable to justify the protracted litigation process, and who can afford
huge legal bills (or whose cases are occasionally sponsored on a pro bono basis by
organizations with an interest in the subject), but places ordinary property owners
beyond the ambit of constitutional protection. It has been aptly said that these days,
to pursue a regulatory taking case, one has to have ten years, a million-dollar litigation budget, endless patience, and bulldog-like tenacity. 60 To paraphrase Thomas
61
Hobbes, one could say that this type of litigation is often nasty, brutish, and long.
In this climate of uncertainty and prevailing judicial hostility to claims of regulatory
takings, government lawyers usually resist even meritorious claims, playing the odds
and counting on the courts' propensity to rule in their favor for sometimes unarticulated, ideological, or fiscal reasons. 62 This judicial approach, along with the
See 1 Kings 3:16-28 (relating King Solomon's adjudication over custody of a baby).
9 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1179
(1989) ("Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of
knowing what it prescribes.").
60 In the past quarter century, property owners have had few Supreme Court victories,
only one of which affirmed an award of just compensation. City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999). To accomplish that feat, Del Monte Dunes had to go through
five years of administrative proceedings involving five proposed development projects of
varying sizes and nineteen plot plans, plus two federal trial court proceedings (including a
jury trial) and two federal appeals before reaching the promised land of Supreme Court
adjudication. In the lower courts, land owner victories are few and far between, even on
egregious facts. In California, a state renowned for its litigiousness and harsh land-use
regulations, there has not been even a single reported regulatory (non-physical) taking case
in which the property owners prevailed. In the one California case that may appear to have
done so, the taking was actually physical because, in addition to the administrative mistreatment of the owner, the City also fenced him out of his own property. Ali v. City of Los
Angeles, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 827 (2000).
58

61

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 84 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1651).

See infra note 174 and accompanying text. At times, such belief by advocates for the
government proves to be misplaced, so that the government too can suffer from uncertainty
in the law. See, e.g., Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.)
(upholding government liability for a regulatory taking of coal deposits, with the final
settlement figure, including interest and attorneys' fees, totaling $200 million), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 952 (1991); see George W. Miller, The Odyssey ofWhitney Benefits: What a Long,
Strange Trip It's Been, 1 REAL PROP. RTs. LmG. RPTR. 11 (1995).
62
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procedural complexity developed by the courts in the last two decades, de facto
treats judicial inefficiency and lack of uniformity in the law as virtues. We can only
speculate why the Supreme Court has been proceeding in this fashion, but the end
product of its unpredictable decision making and its aversion to formulation of
reliable rules capable of guiding people as they try to go about their lives without
litigation, or facilitating litigation efficiently, is there for all to see.
As noted, we confront here a residue of the New Deal philosophy of the 1930s
when the country, racked by the Great Depression, turned ideologically leftward,
and the U.S. Supreme Court departed from preexisting law because it felt the imperative to replace freedom of contract and sanctity of property with new preferred
values: the protection of fundamental rights and protection of insular minorities.63
I see no point in debating here the historical adventures and misadventures of New
Deal legislation in the courts, but these things must be mentioned because one
cannot fully appreciate the current state of pertinent American law without bearing
in mind these historical events that have reshaped American judges' attitudes toward
property rights when such rights conflict with government regulations.
Even if one agrees with the excesses of the ideologically driven New Deal
regulations, it is important to keep in mind that the problems of the Great
Depression that inspired its far-reaching regulatory regime no longer prevail, and
neither does the justification for perpetuation of the 1930s-style regulatory climate.
Yet the influence on the law by the regulatory vision of that bygone era persists in
spite of the legal maxim holding that "[w]hen the reason of a rule ceases, so should
the rule itself."' In the decades that have elapsed since the Great Depression, world
events have unmasked the ineffectiveness and counterproductiveness of the Marxist
notions that informed much of the 1930s legislative and regulatory era.65 However
much one may admire the constructive aspects of social legislation of the New Deal,
there seems to be little doubt that as to some issues, the courts of that era threw the
baby out with the bathwater, in the sense that in retreating from the earlier substantive due process regime of active judicial supervision of economic legislation,
they unduly and unnecessarily derogated private property rights to an extent that

See Eagle, Planning, supra note 6, at 471. It is difficult to see why individual property
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights are not deemed fundamental, personal rights. See Hand,
supra note 41 and accompanying text. Indeed, it was judicial protection of property rights
in the context of eminent domain that gave rise to the modem selective incorporation
doctrine, whereby fundamental, selected provisions of the Bill of Rights are deemed incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus made binding on
the states. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897). See generallyWaltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,701-02 (1970) (Douglas, J., dis63

senting) (providing a concise description of that development in the law).
64

65

§ 3510 (West 1997).
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
CAL. CIV. CODE
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was unwarranted even then, and that may have made matters worse. 66 In other
words, they went from one extreme to another.
In today's prosperous American society, property ownership by individuals has
become widespread to an unprecedented extent, and is therefore in greater need of
protection from governmental overreaching than it was in the 1930s because it
affects greater numbers of politically less powerful people. Though many of these
people may think they have the upper hand in today's land-use regulation climate,
in which local zoning officials kowtow to them, no one knows what tomorrow will
bring and what pressures may be brought to bear on their property interests by a
growing population, increasingly shut out economically from home ownership,
demanding its perceived due. It is one thing for government regulators of that
bygone era to invoke policy and, borrowing Teddy Roosevelt's colorful phrase,
confront the excesses of "malefactors of great wealth"67 by regulating large
economic forces in order to protect the broad public weal in times of economic
crisis. But it is quite another matter to force individuals to live under a regulatory
regime in which the law can forbid ordinary persons to build a home for their
families unless they first submit to an at times nightmarish regulatory process. Such
a process requires the issuance of multiple discretionary permits, which can stretch
over a period of years or even decades, and which is at times transparently
administered, not to advance good planning and protect the environment, as claimed
by the regulators, but to exclude newcomers from desirable communities, denying
land owners their constitutionally secured property rights, and expanding
government regulatory powers in the process.68
66 See JIM POWELL, FDR'S FOLLY: How ROOSEVELT AND His NEW DEAL PROLONGED
THE GREAT DEPRESSION (2003); cf. Carolene Prods. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4

(1938). Even if one agrees with the notion that a historical imperative justified the Court's
embracing of a laissez faire attitude toward pervasive regulations, it was hardly necessary
for the Court - at a time when the Great Depression was ending - to assert in the infamous
Carolene Products footnote 4 that it was largely abrogating constitutional protection of
property rights in favor of personal rights and those of "insular minorities." I fail to see how
the two are mutually exclusive - how protection of the rights of minorities is in tension with
private property rights. Aren't members of minority groups just as much in need of
protection of their property rights as those of the majority? And by what legitimate reasoning
can it be said that members of a majority are to be deprived of a full measure of their
constitutional rights? Are we to take it that one has to present some sort of "politically
correct" socioeconomic provenance before one can invoke protection of the Bill of Rights?
67 See Mr. Roosevelt's Speech at the Laying of the Corner Stone of the Pilgrim Memorial
Monument, Provincetown, Massachusetts (Sept. 14, 1907), cited in Guido Calabresi,
Forwardto The Supreme Court, 1990 Review, 105 HARV. L. REV.80, 130 n.163 (1991).
68 See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997) (Agency requiring
an octogenarian, wheelchair-bound widow to sell her minuscule (circa 180 square feet)
transferable development rights in a nonexistent market before being able to seek judicial
relief for denial of her right to build a home.); see also Healing v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 27
Cal. Rptr. 2d 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (describing a seventeen-year regulatory nightmare that
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No doubt, judges understand that to downgrade property rights to a subconstitutional status outright would place those rights at the mercy of regulators and
engender unacceptable political consequences. Such a paradigmatic shift would
likely precipitate a political storm that they are not eager to confront, so those of
them who disfavor property rights have been doing the next best, or more accurately, worst thing: keeping the law uncertain and surrounding the enforcement of
property rights with an at times impenetrable conceptual, verbal, and procedural
thicket that can serve to delay interminably, or even deny altogether to aggrieved
parties the enforcement of their federal constitutional rights without ever reaching
the merits of their submission of violation of theirfederal constitutional rights, in
any court - a problem that emerged in 1997, and is still not fully understood even
by most lawyers, but one beyond the scope of this Article. 69
Thinking in broader terms, it seems plain that what is afoot is more than a series
of legal disputes over specific land-use issues, and much more than the familiar
wooden scenario of "developer vs. the environment," often mispresented by press
coverage of these events as the controversy.7 ° In fact, much of the real controversy
has been between the housing "haves" and the "have nots.''71 Paradoxically, we face
a historical cultural clash - a process of erosion of individual property rights and
an ongoing downgrading of the institution of private property vis-a-vis the

befell an individual seeking to build a home for his family); Ron Russell, After 17 Years,
Dream Home Is Still That - Just a Dream, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at B 1; RICHARD F.
BABCOCK & CHARLES L. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REvISITED 241-42 (1985) (describing
how the California Coastal Commission singled out the best, most environmentally sensitive,
award-winning single-family housing project in the state for particularly harsh treatment in
order to aggrandize its power, the motivation of the Commission functionary in charge being

that "[i]f he could lick Sea Ranch, he could beat any proposal"). Then there is the wretched
Agins saga in which it took Bonnie Agins (plaintiff in the Agins case) some thirty years of
administrative applications and litigation before she was permitted to build a house on her
land. Charles Gallardo, After 29 Years, Tiburon House Going Up: Home OK'd but Notfor
OriginalFamily, MARIN INDEP. J., Oct. 1, 1997, at 1; see also Philip Hager, Courting a
Dream: 20-Year Fightto Build Tiburon Home Not Over Yet, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1996, at

A3, available at LEXIS News Library, L.A. Times File.
69 See Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038,1041-42 (8thCir. 2003) (acknowledging that the Supreme Court created such an anomalous remedial regime, but declining
to address it), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 825 (2003). For a concise description of the problem,
see generally Kanner, Hunting the Snark, supra note 3, at 360.
70 See generally Gideon Kanner, Lucas and the Press: How to Be PoliticallyCorrecton
the Takings Issue, in AFTER LUCAS: LAND USE REGULATION AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY
WITHOUT COMPENSATION 102-24 (David L. Callies ed., 1993) (discussing the shortcomings

of the media coverage of the takings controversy).
"' For all the disputations over the environment, endangered species, and clean water,

over half of the Supreme Court regulatory takings cases involving controversies over land
arose from frustrated efforts of landowners to build new housing.
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government,7 2 which occurs even as the proprietary status of an existing singlefamily home is reaching "sacred cow" proportions. From there it is but a short step
to legitimizing public demands by the elites, who deem their own desirable suburban
home turf secure, such as that preservation of environmental values as perceived by
them, to say nothing of maintaining the agreeable ambiance of their tony suburbs,
be accomplished by forcing owners of undeveloped land or of historical structures
to maintain them unchanged at their own expense, with the public enjoying the
resulting enhanced levels of amenities but contributing nothing to the cost of preservation and maintenance of the land or landmarks in question. In other words,
commandeering the use other people's property to suit one's forcefully articulated
but often self-serving notions of environmental values or preservation, is seen as a
civic virtue in spite of the hardship this can inflict on owners of the regulated land,
and the obvious constitutional problems it engenders.
I find the current judicial attitude unfortunate because legally protected property
rights of all citizens, if nothing else, have made American housing and standard of
living the envy of the world, and have added to our perceptions of individual
freedom. This is consistent with historical experience that stability of land titles
protected by a reliable rule of law is indispensable to the social stability of society
as well. As Professor Reich put it: "property performs the function of maintaining
independence, dignity and pluralism in society.... Indeed, in the final analysis the
Bill of Rights depends on the existence of private property. '73 Legally protected
property rights enable all Americans, not just the wealthy ones, to advance in life,
not only materially but in other ways as well. As those who demand an improvement in the lives of the poor incessantly remind us, the name of the game is wellpaying jobs, good housing, and better financed education, leading to more secure,
more affluent, and generally better lives. In a word: property. In fact, it is ordinary
people of modest means who are more in need of reliable legal protection of what
property they own than the rich and powerful who take care of their own interests,
thank you very much, no matter who is in office. It is also the former, not the latter,
who are currently suffering from an acute housing shortage that has kited the median
California home prices to $465,160, due in large measure to supply-limiting effects

"2In his extrajudicial expressions, Charles Breitel, Chief Judge of the New York Court
of Appeals and author of the Penn Central opinion, employed disparaging phrases such as
"so-calledproperty rights" of the "so-calledowner," and "so-called private interests." Nat'l
Conf. of State Legislatures & N.J. Law Revision & Legis. Serv. Comm'n, Proceedingsof
the Seminar,TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 1977, at 86, 113, 129
[hereinafter TDR Conference] (emphasis added); see also Jon M. Conrad & Dwight H.
Merriam, Compensation in TDR Programs:Grand Central Terminal and the Searchfor the
Holy Grail, 56 U. DET. J. URB.L. 1, 5 n.17 (1978) (providing more readily accessible, but
selective, quotations of Chief Judge Breitel at that conference).
3 Charles A. Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964).
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of land-use regulations.74
The intellectual dishonesty implicit in the prevailing regime of land-use
regulations is revealed when one reflects on the fact that under California law, to
take a common example, each community must have a general plan and that plan
must have a housing element providing for construction of affordable housing.75
Zoning, in turn, must conform to the general plan. Though not concerned with
regulation of individual parcels through zoning, a similar broad housing policy is a
part of federal law as a matter of plainly articulated congressional enactment.76 Lip
service is assiduously paid to the dire need to construct affordable housing, and
crocodile tears are regularly shed in public over the plight of members of the
working and increasingly the middle classes that are increasingly denied adequate
housing. But anyone trying to build new housing, particularly affordable housing,
in a desirable community will instantly feel the wrath of the affluent NIMBYs. 77 As
a leader of a homeowners' group in the upscale community of Encino in the San
Fernando Valley put it: "People say we're against everything .... But we're only
against 99% of everything. 78 It is thus no coincidence that extreme proposals to
curb private property rights in America have come not from left-wing proles, but

7' Gregory J. Wilcox, Homes' Biggest Leap: CaliforniaMedian Price Hits Stratosphere
with 26.5% Bounce, L.A. DAILY NEWS, June 26,2004, at 1, availableat 2004 WL 58345238;
see also FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 218-52 (discussing the causal relationship between severe
land-use regulations and the cost of housing); Delaney, supra note 10, at 170 (discussing the
rising cost of housing as a national problem).
" See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65302(c), 65580,65581 (West Supp. 2005). Section
65580(d) imposes an obligation on state and local governments to facilitate the improvement
and development of housing that meets "the housing needs of all economic segments of the
community" - a legislative mandate observed as often in breach as in adherence. See also
Michael M. Berger, So Far,State's Housing Plan Has Been All Yak, No Shack, L.A. Daily
J., Mar. 2, 2005, at 6.
76 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000).
" Gideon Kanner, When NIMBY Craziness Goes Bananas, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, at
B 11, availableat LEXIS, News Library, LA Times File (relating the NIMBY opposition in
the San Fernando Valley to just about any new local project); see supra note 40 (defining
NIMBY, BANANA, and NOPE).
A recent survey has it that "skyrocketing home prices" have finally persuaded Americans
to favor construction of more affordable housing in their neighborhoods. Haya El Nasser,
Most Back Affordable Housing Next Door,USA TODAY, May 24, 2004, at Al, availableat
LEXIS News Library, USA Today File. It remains to be seen to what extent the survey was
sound and the survey respondents were candid. See also Campbell Robertson, As Housing
Costs Rise, Nimbyism Is Slipping,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,2005, at Al, availableat 2005 WLNR
1273407 (noting a brain-drain on New York's Long Island, as young people, unable to afford
local housing, move elsewhere).
78 Iris Schneider, Homeowners of Encino Are "Only Against 99% of Everything", L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1991, at B5, available at LEXIS, News Library, LA Times File (quoting
Gerald Silver, member of the Homeowners of Encino board).
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from some of the most influential and wealthiest individuals in the country.79 Thus,
it is no surprise that wealthy suburbanites rely heavily on zoning and other land-use
laws to keep competing seekers of the good life out of their communities."0 As
Richard F. Babcock, the late dean of the nation's land-use bar, put it, the conservative inhabitant of a fashionable suburb "regards the zoning ordinance as an
essential weapon in his battle with the forces of darkness."'"
In light of these factors, it seems appropriate to examine the prevailing climate
of land-use regulations as it has influenced the new understanding of property rights
and has affected terms of public discourse, before plunging into the details of judicial decision making in the Penn Centralcase. These factors, as well as the judicial
culture of eminent domain law, have to a great extent shaped the prevailing inverse
condemnation jurisprudence in a negative way and were felt in the Penn Central
adjudication.
II. THE GUARDIAN OF ALL OTHER RIGHTS 82 MEETS THE AMERICAN

NIMBY

Paradoxically, one major reason why the professed downgrading of property
rights in the abstract has had the success it has, even in the rhetoric of homeowners,
lies in an indirect and unintended consequence of widespread home ownership in
America, the enormous economic benefits it has conferred on homeowners, and the
resulting impact on popular attitudes. One of the motivating factors behind the
familiar NIMBY phenomenon is the widespread, and so far correct, perception that
the purchase of a [suburban] home (the more expensive, the better) in a desirable
area has been a sure path to wealth in one's old age. 3 It turns out that the fast"' See Gladwin Hill, Authority over Land Use Is Termed a Public Right, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 1973, at 1 (reporting the decision of a federal task force on land use, headed by
Laurance S. Rockefeller, and composed in part by prominent bankers and amajor developer,
"recommending that henceforth 'development rights' on private property must be regarded
as resting with the community rather than with property owners"); see also ELLEN FRANKEL
PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 26-28 (1987). But see Richard A. Walker
& Michael K. Heiman, Quiet Revolution for Whom?, 71 ANNALS ASS'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS
67 (1981) (providing critical a left of center perspective on these developments).
8o See, e.g., Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
SI BABCOCK, supra note 9, at 21.
82 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT (1998); see also Tom

Bethel, The Mother ofAll Rights, REASON, Apr. 1994, at 41 (criticizing the absence of civil
liberties in Middle Eastern countries that do not protect private property by a rule of law).
83 To illustrate with a personal example, in 1968 1bought a suburban home in a respectable, upper-middle class (but hardly posh) San Fernando Valley neighborhood for $68,500.
In 1989, by then in a fixer-upper condition, it sold for $575,000, a sum exceeding the listing
price by $25,000. The buyer remodeled it and placed it on the market for over $900,000.
Today, when the median home in California goes for $465,160, houses in that neighborhood
sell for prices well into the seven figures. See Wilcox, supra note 74.
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talking, suede-shoe real estate salesmen of the 1950s were right: buying a family
home turned out to be a great investment for one's old age. Few other investments
(certainly none that are available to people of ordinary means) have come close to
the leveraged return provided by family homes, and no others simultaneously
provide investors with a tax shelter and enable them, along with their families, to
live comfortably in their investment even as its value grows exponentially."
Whether consciously or intuitively, people are keenly aware of the effects of the
law of supply and demand, with the result that they (or at least those of them who
already own desirable homes) see limiting of the supply of new homes in their
neighborhoods as a positive thing because it increases housing prices and kites the
equities in the homes they already own. Accordingly, under the banner of "slow
growth" or even "no growth," they vigorously oppose the construction of more
housing in better communities, particularly if the proposed new homes are expected
to be marketed below the prevailing neighborhood prices or value perceptions.
Those already owning desirable homes have been reinforced in their attitudes not
only by the awesome recent rise in housing costs, 85 but also by the realization that
elected local politicians who set zoning and land-use policies, readily knuckle under
to their demands, irrespective of whether those reflect good planning or good law.
With the passage of time, once the no-growth ethic took hold, that attitude has
spread to encompass opposition to the creation of new commercial facilities as well,
usually by people who are already well housed and have all the material goods they
care to consume, and do not wish to be disturbed by more traffic in their neighborhoods. Unwholesome short-term economic self-interest has thus supplanted

In California, it was not just a "rising tide lift[ing] all the boats" but an explosion in
home prices that "blew all the boats out of the water." FScHFL, supra note 14, at 234. Even
those suburban "little boxes" that were derided in the 1950s by social critics as "ticky-tacky"
and sold at the time for under $10,000, no money down, are today fetching well over a
quarter of a million dollars. John M. Broder, 50 Years Later,a Still-ProudSuburb Is Starting
to Fray,N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2004, at A16 (reporting that modest, 800 to 1,100 square foot
houses in Lakewood, a working-class community in the Los Angeles basin, that originally
sold in the range of $7,575 to $8,525, are now selling for over $300,000). Even after inflationary effects are taken into consideration, home ownership has thus provided lower-middleand working-class homeowners of the last generation with undreamed-of nest eggs for their
retirement. Economically, the "ticky" turned out to be anything but "tacky."
" To state the obvious, homes are usually bought on time and paid for in installments,
so that if, for example, a $100,000 house doubles in value to $200,000, that is a return of
100% on its original cost. But if, as is common, the house was bought with 10% (or $10,000)
down, that means that its owners enjoy a ten-fold increase in their equity. Let's see ordinary
citizens beat that in the stock market, using a largely risk-free, tax-advantaged investment
strategy that also provides them with housing.
85 In May 2004 alone, California median home prices shot up by 26.5%. Wilcox, supra
note 74.
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86
community values, and rules supreme when it comes to land-use controls. Add to
7
that the frequently abject judicial deference to decisions of land-use regulators and
what you get is a prescription for the perpetuation of a prevailing attitude whereby
those who would exercise their property rights by developing land, if only to
provide badly needed housing, are "bad," while those who oppose any new development for any reason, thus perpetuating a growing housing shortage, are "good,"
legislative policy declarations to the contrary notwithstanding.
Apart from purely economic benefits all this bestows on the NIMBYs, it also
adds to perceived exclusivity of their communities and thus adds a social snobbery
motivation that has fueled widespread political resistance to home construction,
8
often based on ostensible environmental or preservationist concerns and on sometimes contrived displays of ideological hostility to property rights, as rhetorical
weapons. It is not uncommon that wealthy individuals whose annual incomes are
well into the six figures, and who live in million-dollar suburban homes, publicly
9
oppose new housing in their communities," using slogans (typically deploring the
imminent despoliation of the environment by "greedy developers' quest for profits)

One distressing aspect of this situation is that children of upper-middle-class suburbanites living in pricey homes, stand little or no chance of living in dwellings that even
approach the level of amenities of their parents' homes, and in many cases stand no chance
of living in their parents' communities where they grew up. Upscale communities are deliberately zoning themselves so as to exclude families with children. Laura Mansnerus, Great
Haven for Families but Don't Bring Children,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at Al.
87 As two renowned land-use lawyers, and knowledgeable commentators put it: "In
California, the courts have elevated government arrogance to a fine art." BABCOCK &
SIEMON, supra note 68, at 253.
8 See Gideon Kanner, The Case of Environmental Overachievers,L.A. TIMES, June 25,
2000, at B 19, available at LEXIS, News Library, LA Times File (commenting on local
environmentalists' habit of invoking the discovery of an extinct flower that, according to
them, would miraculously come back from the dead and be found on the sites of proposed
developments in various San Fernando Valley locations). Possibly the all-time records for
such nonsense were established when a group of self-styled local environmentalists demanded that city regulators declare a local service station and car wash in their Studio City
neighborhood a "cultural monument." Bob Pool, Attempt to Save Carwash Is Scrubbed by
LA. Panel, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1989, pt. 2, at 1. Topping that one, was a neighborhood
demand for the designation of a vacant parcel of land in the San Fernando Valley as a "historical site" because on it a renowned Hereford stud bull, named Sugwas Feudal performed
his procreative feats. Tracey Kaplan, Is Site HistoricorJustBumSteer?, L.A. Times (Valley
edition), Feb. 6, 1993, at B3, availableat LEXIS, News Library, LA Times File.
89 See, e.g., Michael M. Berger, A Step Down: Critics Who Killed Ahmanson Ranch
Development Ignore DireHousing Need, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 7, 2003, at 6 (commenting on
how local environmentalists, led by prominent show business personalities, enthusiastically
celebrated their success in killing a proposed 8000-unit housing project in an area where
homes are in short supply).
86
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that might be at home at a Marxist rally.'
Many of these "environmental
pretenders," as the late UCLA Professor Donald G. Hagman was fond of saying, are
motivated not by their desire to protect the environment or save the mythical
hexasyllabus ant, but rather by their desires to enhance their lifestyles and boost the
value of their homes 9' that, in the ongoing climate of restrictions on development of
housing, have escalated in price to levels undreamed of a short time ago, thus
enabling home owners to prosper at the expense of land owners. 92
The cultural, political, and economic forces discussed above have engendered
a set of prevailing attitudes among society's elites and its politically potent haves
whereby selfish disregard of constitutionally protected property rights of the
political have-nots can masquerade as communal virtue. Name your land-use
poison - congestion, sprawl, conversion of farmland, traffic, "McMansions," or
whatever - and the increasingly prevailing notion is that once the regulatory
objective said to prevent or mitigate those effects is identified (and somehow it
always translates into "slow growth" or "no growth" or "let them build elsewhere"),
the process of regulation can proceed accordingly, in disregard of its economic and
social cost. This is particularly so when that cost can be imposed on third parties
that are either disfavored, and as such demonized (i.e., "greedy developers"), or
unrepresented altogether in the decision-making process (i.e., would-be home buyers
who do not as yet live in the regulated community and thus have no say in the
matter).
We are moving toward a regime in which the right to build on one's land is by
degrees becoming so enfeebled that in some cases it de facto ceases to exist, except
to the extent it is created on an ad hoc basis by the issuance of some sort of
government entitlement. Thus, in furthering this approach, California courts took
the extreme position that building on one's land is a government-conferred
privilege, not a right.93 This regime has given rise to a situation in which otherwise
90 My favorite example of this phenomenon was the amici curiae brief filed in Agins by
a Los Angeles homeowner group whose turf encompasses the likes of Beverly Hills, Bel Air,
Brentwood, Malibu, and similar posh communities (and whose members disproportionately
include business tycoons, movie stars and other show business personalities, successful
professionals and all sorts of millionaire entrepreneurs), that gratuitously deplored, of all
things, profits that were not in issue in that case. Brief of Amici Curiae Federation of Hillside
and Canyon Associations, Inc., and Brentwood Community Federation at 28-29, Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (No. 79-602).
91 See FRIEDEN, supra note 11, at 119.
92 FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 218-52 (pinpointing constrictive housing regulations as a
causative factor enabling a de facto transfer of wealth from owners of undeveloped California
land to owners of developed land).
" E.g., Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685, 691 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) ("Development is a privilege, not a right."). The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987). Notwithstanding
Nollan, when I rose to address the California Supreme Court seven years later, on behalf of
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sensible, moral and civic-minded individuals have convinced themselves that it is
right and proper for them to demand that neighboring land owners be denied their
property rights without recompense in order to assure greater wealth and a better
lifestyle for themselves, but who take umbrage when similar regulations are applied
to themselves.94 It is common that captains of industry who publicly rail against
intrusive government regulations of their businesses, are fierce supporters of draconian property regulations when it comes to their own posh, exclusive, tree-shaded
suburbs. 95 Babcock wryly notes that wealthy inhabitants of exclusive suburbs hold
a belief that "free enterprise reigns supreme - as long as the enterprise is exercised
somewhere else."96 Conversely, suburban liberals whose hearts profess to bleed for
the plight of the disadvantaged, ordinary folks who are ill-served by prevailing
housing opportunities, can likewise instantly bare their fangs and go to the political
barricades to keep low (or even lower) cost housing out of their communities .9 It
is common that during municipal hearings on applications for the issuance of
development entitlements, would-be builders of new housing face jeering crowds
of aroused suburbanites opposing the development.
From this prevailing attitude regarding property rights, it is only a short step to
embracing the belief that compensation for regulatory takings must be denied across
the board because if awarded, even in egregious cases, this would give legitimacy
to the position of would-be builders, and provide financial disincentives to municipalities, discouraging them from holding the line against the dreaded new
development. This attitude is usually camouflaged with much high-minded talk
the landowner in Henslerv. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043 (Cal. 1994), thefirst question
from the bench was a challenge to the owner's right to build, on the stated grounds that doing
so in California is a privilege, not a right.
4 Consider the instructive case of multi-billionaire and self-styled environmentalist,
Wendy P. McCaw (ex-wife of wireless telephone tycoon Craig McCaw), who bought a $9.1
million beachfront estate in Santa Barbara's exclusive Hope Ranch area, only to find her
property subjected to stringent California Coastal Commission regulations as in Nollan, an
experience that transformed Ms. McCaw from an environmentalist into an outspoken
property rights advocate. James Rainey, BillionaireBattles Authorities on Access to Beach,

L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 2000, at A3.
9'BABCOCK, supra note 9, at 21; see Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use an
Alternative Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 79-80 (1981).
96 BABCOCK, supra note 9.

See id. at 28-30. Thus, when the Rouse Company, a major national developer,
proposed to build affordable new homes in Howard County, Maryland, planning to sell them
in the mid-$200,000 range, the proposal met with fierce opposition, with local regulators
demanding that the new homes sell for at least $320,000. Scott Wilson, In Howard,
17

Community Battles the Company That Built It, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1997, at B 1; see Gideon
Kanner, A Developer's CommunitarianIdeals Bite Back, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 12, 1998, at A 19

(finding irony in the fact that the founder of the Rouse Company served on the Rockefeller
committee that had earlier recommended that private development rights should become
public); supra note 79.
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about protecting the environment, and with arguments that communities must be
able to govern themselves with innovative regulatory schemes.9" Closely related is
the argument that courts must defer to local regulatory powers in order to refrain
from "chilling" municipal regulators whose creativity would be assertedly stifled if
legal relief were available for effective redress of constitutional violations of rights
of disfavored land owners." The fact that these regulatory excesses tend to chill
constitutional rights of land owners does not appear to have penetrated the
consciousness of judges buying into this argument, or perhaps more accurately, they
simply don't care. The frequently discernible and even occasionally articulated
subtext in such assertions is that these "innovative" regulations can be used to
engage in de facto social and economic discrimination that flows from their tacit
(and sometimes not so tacit) exclusionary attributes.' 0 Of course, such sentiments
cannot be openly voiced in today's cultural and legal climate, particularly when they
have racist overtones,' so a suitable camouflage had to be devised. In a word:
environment. Writ large.
Wealthy suburbanites whose lifestyle, energy consumption, housing, and
commuting habits are the very antithesis of being environmentally desirable, are at
the forefront of the fight to raise the economic and social drawbridges that guard
entry into their communities, on the asserted grounds that they are only protecting
the environment when in fact what they are about is protecting their own agreeable
upscale lifestyles even when their proposed regulation has adverse environmental
consequences. 0 2 They, or at least those among them who reflect on the future,
98 See Michael M. Berger, Is an "Innovative Scheme" a New Label for Confiscating

Private Property?,51 L.A. BAR J. 222 (1975).
" See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 30 (Cal. 1979), affd, on othergrounds,447
U.S. 255 (1980), overruled by First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
100 See Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974).
101 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). For an
acute insight into this problem compare Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922
(Tex. 1998) (upholding the town's large-lot zoning as desirable community planning), with
Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp. 2d 526, 533 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (finding that the
same zoning law constituted an illegal, invidiously racially discriminatory device, amounting
to, in the court's blunt words, a sign reading "niggers keep out"). How an invidiously discriminatory, unconstitutional land-use scheme can constitute valid regulations, no one has
explained.
'02 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (approving a large-lot zoning as
retarding the "ill effects of urbanization"). But the Court overlooked the obvious fact that
such land-consuming large-lot zoning, far from retarding urbanization, promotes sprawl and
has other environmentally undesirable consequences, such as an inefficient infrastructure,
increased traffic with a consequent increase in air pollution, and frustration of efficient mass
transit. The Court thus confused environmental values with a high level of suburban
amenities - the two are not the same, and often stand in tension with each other. See infra
note 204.
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surely must realize that a populous country like the United States, whose growing
nine-figure population tends to cluster in areas near its coasts, cannot provide land
for housing in the form of individual homes indefinitely, and that high - or at least
higher - density housing has to be constructed for our growing population in better
communities as well as in the downscale ones.'0 3 Nonetheless, they do their best to
protect the privileged position they have carved out for themselves, from what they
perceive to be an onslaught of competing seekers of the good suburban life.
By now this is all a relative matter. Such rent-seeking behavior has spread from
upper-crust communities to the better middle-class suburbs whose inhabitants have
seen market values of their homes soar into the high six figures and have drawn the
obvious conclusion that what's good for the rich folks should be every bit as good
for them. As California's late Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk once wrote,
"[n]o one has ever devised an ordinance to preserve an urban ghetto or crowded
central city environment; it is always to protect the outer city, the suburb, the middle
or upper class housing development."' 4 Just so.

1II. THE BRITISH ARE COMING!
But what does all that have to do with the Penn Central saga? Directly,
nothing - indirectly, everything. The Penn Central controversy was a reflection
of a popular attitude inspired by a movement of the American elites, seeking to
institutionalize the above trends by de facto transplanting to America a system akin
to the British Town and Country Planning Act, adopted in 1947 by the Labor
government, under which land could not be put to new uses without "planning
permission" granted by the government, and increases in its value were to be taxed
away.'0 5 This was an avowed act of uncompensated expropriation that the British
Parliament could accomplish by fiat because the United Kingdom lacks a written
constitution forbidding uncompensated property takings by the government.
Needless to say, the Act as originally enacted was a failure in Britain.106
In the United States, an effort was made in the early 1970s to import the
regulatory aspects of the British system. In 1973, the grandly named Federal Task
Force on Land Use of the Citizens Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality
103

See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, The Egregious Invalidity of the Exclusive Single-Family

Zone, 35 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIGEST 4, 8 (1983).
"30Stanley Mosk, Findinga Directionfor Our Environment,BARRISTER, Spring 1976, at

16, 18.
105 Arthur Shenfield, The Mirage of Social Land Value, APPRAISAL J., Oct. 1976, at 523,
525 (describing the 1947 Town and County Planning Act and its provision requiring "planning permission").
06 Deprived of the fruits of entrepreneurship but still facing its risks, British land owners
largely ceased to build needed improvements. Id. at 526-27, 529; see PAUL, supra note 79,
at 54-55 (1987).
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unveiled its report which proposed that thenceforth development rights in the United
States should no longer be deemed private but rather resting with the community;
i.e., they would become public.'l 7 Because of its openly expropriative features, this
proposal faced obvious problems, not the least of which was constitutional.
Unsurprisingly, it met with resistance. It is important to keep these background
facts in mind because much of the public controversy on this subject has been
successfully directed by the "police power hawks" toward assertions that it is rooted
in the activities of the "property rights movement" said to oppose reasonable
environmental regulations.' My perception has been that reality is to the contrary;
that the property rights movement arose as a reaction to draconian regulations of
private property.
Historically, it was widely and correctly believed in the United States that the
right to build on one's land, subject to reasonable regulations, was a well-established
private property right. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court eventually reaffirmed that
right in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.'°9 Proponents of this brave, new
regulatory scheme were, of course, smart and well informed and they understood
that an attempt to replicate the main features of British law in the United States
would run into constitutional problems under PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v. Mahon."o
And so, an overt effort was launched to get the Supreme Court to overrule Mahon.
The spearhead of this effort took the form of a commissioned book, The Taking
Issue, written by three knowledgeable Chicago lawyers, as a candid effort "to assist

107 Hill,

supra note 79; see FRIEDEN, supra note 11, at 122-24;

PAUL,

supra note 79, at

56-57.
108 See, e.g., 8 NICHOLS, supra note 11, § 14E.10[2]. For an egregious example of this
polemical approach, ascribing to the "property rights movement" positively conspiratorial
attributes, see Douglas T. Kendall & Charles E. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical
Assessment of the ProgressSo Far,25 B.C. ENvTL. AFF.L. REV. 509 (1998), charging that
a conservative cabal, under the intellectual leadership of [former] Attorney General Edwin
Meese and Professor Richard Epstein, is out to scuttle environmental protection laws. Why
Meese, Epstein, and their cohorts would want to expose themselves to toxic substances,
breathe polluted air, and have their children drink contaminated milk, the authors never
explain. Nor is it readily discernible why during his tenure as U.S. Attorney General, Meese
consistently filed amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court, supporting the regulators and
opposing property owners complaining of confiscatory regulations. See Gideon Kanner, Hot
Air and PoliticsMasqueradeas Legal Studies, NAT'L. L.J., July 20, 1998, at A2 1; see also
Gideon Kanner, Is America About to Be Poisoned?,DETR. LEGAL NEWS, May 18, 1995, at
10 (commenting on bizarre assertions that those seeking takings legislation were out to
legalize the dumping of cyanide into drinking water); Berger & Kanner, Need for Reform,
supra note 11, at 865 nn.113-14.
'0 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987).
10 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that when property regulations go too far they
become a taking).
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government officials and attorneys. ' .. The book made a splash upon publication,
but eventually the U.S. Supreme Court rejected its core proposal (to overrule
2
Mahon) in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis," where the Court
considered a regulatory scheme similar to that in Mahon, but, though the regulation
was upheld, the Court distinguished Mahon without overruling it. This denied the
"police power hawks" their fondest wish, and made it necessary for them to find a
new way of end-running Mahon. Enter Charles Breitel, Judge (later Chief Judge)
of the New York Court of Appeals, whose theories led to the Penn Centraldecision
and are discussed in Part XII.
Ideas have consequences, and the appeal of the "land socialist" ethic, as well as
of the avowedly socialist British approach to American elites, by degrees engendered an ideological and political atmosphere in which disparagement of private
property rights became so common that positively embarrassing public arguments
against land development of all sorts began to be publicly made by seemingly
3
intelligent people, descending at times to a farcical level."1 In this atmosphere,
land-use law began to be treated as something not to be lived by, but something to
be changed to suit the perceived exigencies of the moment. Whatever "the law"
1i 4
or it can quickly
may appear to be, it can be twisted beyond recognition,
"' FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE, at v (1973). Curtis Berger characterized
Bosselman as the key spokesman for the "land socialists" school that sees land ownership
as a privilege, believes that fee simple ownership gives no one an absolute right to develop,
and sees zoning benefits as an expression of community grace which the community can
remove without compensation. Curtis J. Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use
Controversies:A Reply to ProfessorCostonis, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 815 (1976).
112 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
13 See BABCOCK, supra note 9, at 33-36 (quoting a farcical transcript of a zoning
hearing). Closer to home, a few years ago some entrepreneurs opened two posh restaurants
not far from my home, one in Studio City and the other in Toluca Lake (within walking
distance of Bob Hope's home), only to be confronted at the permit hearings by agitated
neighbors opposing the issuance of permits to the restaurants on the grounds, inter alia, that
their largely affluent, middle-aged patrons would get drunk and urinate on the lawns of
nearby homes. David Wharton, Battle of the Bistro, L.A. TIMES (Valley edition), Sept. 25,
1988, at B4, available at LEXIS, News Library, LA Times File.
See also Stephen J.L. Page, In My FormerLife as a Seagull, WALLST. J., Dec. 27, 1994,
at A16. In reporting his misadventures in applying for permission to build his home in
Northern California, the author was confronted with the following statement by one of the
zoning functionaries at the hearing: "In my former life as a seagull, I was flying up and down
the California coastline and saw your house built shaped as a seashell, rather like a Nautilus
seashell, built out of driftwood and feathers, with the aperture facing out to sea." Id. Mr. Page
was eventually permitted to build a 1900 sq. ft. home on a 47,000 sq. ft. lot in which he had
invested $1.4 million - a grotesque underimprovement on a lot that size and cost. Id.
"4 Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972) (holding that
a statute explicitly requiring environmental impact reports before public projects could
proceed, applied to private ones as well, even though the statute contained no such
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metamorphose to frustrate land owners' perfectly legal plans to build in a way that
their neighbors disapprove of, usually with judicial acquiescence." 5 When, as is
often the case today, property owners cannot tell exactly what enforceable rights of
user attach to the land that they hold title to and pay taxes on, the status of property
rights as being constitutionally protected erodes." 16 Even vocal, leading supporters
of the current regulatory climate admit that the land-use regulation process frequently involves pervasive delays and is replete with abuses that are "ubiquitous, vicious
and devoid of any resemblance to procedural due process.""' In this atmosphere it
should not be surprising to see regulatory decisions that occasionally impose on the
regulated to an extent that de facto deprives them of economically viable use of their
land, thus giving rise to non-physical takings claims.
I am hardly alone in voicing concerns about the unreliability and severity of the
land-use regulatory regime and the incoherence of the Supreme Court's takings
jurisprudence dealing with its constitutional aspects. It was the late Norman
Williams, a renowned, government-minded land-use treatise author (whose substantive views were at odds with mine) who harshly criticized the state of judgemade law: "the Court has succeeded in destroying what predictability has
existed." 8 It was Williams who coined the colorful but apt term "gastronomic...
jurisprudence" - i.e., whatever feels right in a judge's gut.' 9 Williams had much
company; commentators have not been kind to the judges' handiwork in this area
of the law, and for the past two decades law journals have been full of harshly
critical assessments of the state of regulatory takings law, written by authors
favoring as well as disfavoring far-reaching land-use regulations.

provision). The court achieved a semantic sleight of hand by arguing that private projects
requiring permits are "public" because issuing a permit is a public act. Id.
"' See William C. Haas & Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th
Cir. 1979) (implicating state and local regulations in federal court litigation). The case
exemplifies how "[tihe California [Supreme] court changed the legal rules so that any number of parties could stop a given development up to the moment at which it was physically
improved." FISCHEL, supra note 14, at 251; see also Robert I. McMurry & Gideon Kanner,
Shootout at Warner Ridge, L.A. LAWYER, Jan. 1995, at 24 (describing how an attempt to
build a perfectly legal mid-rise office building on appropriately zoned land was frustrated by
local NIMBY objections); Warner Ridge Assocs. v. City of Los Angeles, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 306
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991). In spite of this ruling in favor of the developers, they lost their financing due to the long delay, and eventually lost their property by foreclosure.
16 See Michael M. Berger, To Regulate or Not to Regulate - Is That the Question?, 8
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 253, 265-67 (1975).
117 Norman Williams, Jr., R. Marlin Smith, Charles Siemon, Daniel R. Mandelker, &
Richard F. Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193, 242 (1984).
These authors were at the time the cr~me de la crime of the regulation-minded land-use bar.
"8

NORMAN WILLIAMS JR., AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 5A.17, at 168-69 (rev.

ed. 1988).
"9 Id. § 5A.02, at 136.
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In sum, like the liberated contents of Pandora's box emerging into the world, the
unfortunate attitudes toward other people's property have entered popular thinking
and have become the prevailing sociopolitical reality that has seeped into pertinent
jurisprudence. As a student of mine once observed, judges come from the
privileged, well-housed socioeconomic classes that have been among the principal
beneficiaries of this state of affairs, so it should not be surprising that they view the
prevailing regulatory regime favorably. Thus, extreme land-use regulations not only
impact the housing market, but they also engender broader attitudes and economic
consequences, and set a cultural tone.12 Once it becomes the norm that private
property rights are to be disfavored, notwithstanding the constitutional protection
ostensibly extended to them, the impact on prevailing attitudes is felt beyond just
housing. Without a doubt it was felt in the Penn Centralsaga, in the form of Chief
Judge Breitel's conviction that property owners abused by confiscatory regulations
should not be entitled to compensation for their economic losses, but limited only
to an economically ineffective judicial declaration that the regulations are invalid.12'
IV. OUT OF THE "DARK CORNER OF THE LAW" -

THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF

EMINENT DOMAIN AND INVERSE CONDEMNATION

Eminent domain has historically been "the dark comer of the law," as Lewis
Orgel put it a half century ago.'22 There were few condemnations in the early days
of American independence, and much of the governing law's substantive content
was formed during the corrupt Robber Baron era of the nineteenth century, particularly in railroad construction. 23 At the time, for all their overreaching, railroads
J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 226-28 (1993).
121 See infra note 232. Contra San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
120 DENNIS

621, 649 n. 14 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (charging Chief Judge Breitel with tampering
with the language of Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)). Justice Brennan's nominal dissent
actually represented the views of the majority of the Justices. Justice Rehnquist, though
voting with the majority in this five-four decision to dismiss the owner's appeal as being
from a non-final judgment, prefaced his concurring opinion with the statement that were it
not for the lack of finality of the judgment, he would have no problem in agreeing with most
that was said in Justice Brennan's dissent favoring the compensation remedy in regulatory
takings cases. Id. at 633. Justice Brennan's views were later adopted by the Court in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
122 2 LEWIS ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMiNENT DOMAIN § 249 (James
C.
Bonbright ed., 2d ed. 1953).
123 William G. Bryant, Eminent Domain - Its Use and Misuse, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 259
(1970); Henry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by
Government: The United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232 (1973). For a vivid
description of railroad condemnation practices in pre-Civil War Ohio, see 1 JOHN SHERMAN,
JOHN SHERMAN'S RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS IN THE HOUSE, SENATE AND CABINET

81-82 (1895) (describing how unsophisticated farmers were induced to give land to the
railroads in the often unrequited hope that railroads would bring prosperity). What Sherman
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enjoyed judicial favor because they were perceived as harbingers of progress ana
prosperity, deserving of government subsidies and favored treatment by both legislatures and the judiciary, which provided it by imposing various limitations on
condemnees' measure of compensation when their land was being taken for railroad
rights of way. For some reason, ever since, this judicial attitude took root. Judges
in eminent domain cases have been reluctant to acknowledge changes in society, and
12 4
resistant to reforms that took place in other areas of the law.
But the basic, pervasive problem in eminent domain law is that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly intoned assorted bromides to the effect that the law of just
compensation "evokes ideas of 'fairness' and 'equity, '125 and that judicial awards
must provide a "full and perfect" monetary equivalent of what is taken from the
condemnees, and restore them to the same economic or "pecuniar[y]" position, as
the court put it, that they would have been in had there been no condemnation.' 26
But in the event, the Court has conceded that the law of eminent domain is not fair
but "harsh," 2 7 that the judicially-defined compensation standard of fair market value
does not encompass elements that would be considered in voluntary market
transactions, 128 and that therefore, as the California Supreme Court put it, the
benign-sounding but misleading judicial rhetoric notwithstanding, condemnees
did not tell his readers was that as a result of its largesse toward the railroads, the State of
Ohio incurred huge debts. Bryant, supra, at 267. In California, there was a "revolving door"
between railroad management and the California Supreme Court, whereby individuals freely
moved from managing one to adjudicating in the other. See, e.g., KEVIN STARR, INVENTING
THE DREAM 200 (1985).
124 See Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an EraofRedevelopment, 67 YALE L.J.
61, 66-67 (1957); infra note 130. Thus, in the midst of the huge federal highway construction
program that transformed the country under the 1956 Federal Aid Highway Act and was
generously funded by a gas tax scheme unheard of in the nineteenth century, the California
Supreme Court borrowed language from People v. Gianni, 20 P.2d 87, 89 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1933) (citing Levee Dist.No. 9 v. Farmer,35 P. 569 (Cal. 1894)), overruledby Valenta
v. County of Los Angeles, 394 P.2d 725, 727 (Cal. 1964), and absurdly asserted that it was
its duty to keep condemnation awards down because otherwise, if condemnees were to receive compensation for their demonstrable economic losses, an "embargo" on public projects
would have to be declared in California. See also City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646
P.2d 835, 846 (Cal. 1982) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (asserting on the basis of
nineteenth-century law that the California Supreme Court's constitutional interpretation
powers were so modest that it lacked the authority to disagree with the legislative determination that a taking was for a public use, in spite of the fact that under hornbook law the
interpretation of constitutional terms is a judicial prerogative).
125 United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950).
126 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
127 United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,382 (1945); see Thomas W. Merrill,
Incomplete Compensationfor Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 110, 111 (2002) ("The most
striking feature of American compensation law - even in the context of formal condemnations or expropriations - is that just compensation means incomplete compensation.").
128 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6 (1949).
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129
cannot expect to be fully compensated for their demonstrable economic losses.
The law of eminent domain has failed to develop and progress over the years,
in the way other areas of the law have, 3 ° thus inspiring a highly respected, knowledgeable commentator to characterize it as "a mass of obtuse decisional law that is
only occasionally relieved by judicial common sense, pragmatism and candor."' 31
Eminent domain law has been the subject of few defenses but much criticism by
legal commentators, both scholars and practitioners, of all ideological persuasions.' 32

Cmty. Redevelopment Agency v. Abrams, 543 P.2d 905, 909, 915 n.9 (Cal. 1975)
(explaining that a party buying into the courts' "panoramic" promises of fairness and indemnity in eminent domain cases only betrays "a fundamental misunderstanding" of the law).
129

See Emerson G. Spies & John C. McCoid, II, Recovery of ConsequentialLosses in
Eminent Domain, 48 VA. L. REv. 437, 449-51 (1962) (noting that "[in other areas of the
130

law... recovery for consequential loss has become routine and is regularly expanding");
Comment, supra note 124, at 66-67.
Arvo Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation:A Legislative Prospectus,8
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 4 (1967). The cited article was a part of a series of studies by
131

Professor Van Alstyne, California's leading expert on government liability, performed for
the California Law Revision Commission that at the time was considering reform in the law.
This Commission effort, insofar as it related to inverse condemnation law, was a failure and
no legislative recommendations ensued from it.
132 By way of only a small sampling of the criticism heaped on the courts' handiwork in
eminent domain, where liability to pay "just compensation" is conceded, legal commentaries
have consistently focused on the raw injustice produced by prevailing judge-made rules. See,
e.g., Michael R. Klein, Eminent Domain: JudicialResponse to the Human Disruption,46 J.
URB. L. 1 (1968) (commenting on the rampant undercompensation of condemnees); Curtis
J. Berger & Patrick J.Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An Empirical Look into the

Practicesof Condemnation,67 CoLuM. L. REv. 430 (1967) (recognizing that condemnation
"often occasioned losses.., that the substantive law of damages [does] not reach"); James
Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensationas a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 1277 (1985); D. Michael Risinger, DirectDamages: The Lost Key to Constitutional
Just Compensation When Business PremisesAre Condemned, 15 SETON HALL L. REv. 483

(1985); Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme CourtExpropriationLaw, 1962 SuP. CT. REv. 63, 106.

Of late the field of eminent domain law has received an additional wave of criticism
because of judicial deformation of the law that increasingly allows takings of private property, not necessarily for any "public use" as specified in the Constitution, and as that term
might be understood by intelligent English-speaking people, but overtly for the financial
benefit of private parties with clout in city hall, who are the beneficiaries of widespread use
of eminent domain that wrests unoffending private property from its unoffending owners, in
order to turn it over at subsidized, below-market prices (sometimes gratis) to redevelopers
who go on to build purely private, profit-making enterprises such as shopping malls, car
dealerships, industrial plants, and even gambling casinos on the specious theory that doing
so is incidental to the public purpose and that it will cause a trickle-down effect providing
an economic "public benefit" deemed synonymous with "public use." Comment, The Public
Use Limitation on Eminent Domain:An Advanced Requiem, 58 YALEL.J. 599 (1949); James
W. Ely, Jr., Can the "DespoticPower" Be Tamed? Reconsideringthe Public Use Limitation
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My favorite bit of acerbic prose came from the pen of Edward L. Lascher, the late
dean of California's appellate bar and a popular columnist in the California State
Bar Journal, who characterized the law of eminent domain as "a maniacal backwash
of American law whose rites are performed by appropriately cast acolytes."' 33
As the tidal wave of condemnations swept across the country in the 1960s, in
connection with redevelopment programs and federally-financed highway construction, liberal commentators, though generally supportive of government intervention
in urban economies, deplored the mass undercompensation and mistreatment of poor
people being displaced by government bulldozers,'34 while their conservative counterparts, in addition to voicing similar concerns, were also alarmed about erosion of
private property rights. 35 All criticized the widespread unfairness being visited en

on Eminent Domain, 17 PROBATE & PROP. 30-31 (Nov./Dec. 2003) (criticizing government

uses of eminent domain to promote the interests of powerful private developers); Laura
Mansnerus, Note, Public Use, Private Use and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58

N.Y.U. L. REV.413 (1983) (positing that "municipalities seeking economic advantage or
reprieve [employ eminent domain law] on behalf of private enterprise in return for the
promise of jobs [or] tax revenues"). The problem with the above approach is that it provides
incentives to tax-hungry officials of downscale cities to enter into improvident or corrupt
deals with redevelopers. See Ronald Smothers, So Many Towns, So Many Temptations,N.Y.

TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at 25, availableat 2005 WLNR 2975382. Even at its best, this process
tends to transmogrify democracy into a form of plutocracy: those wealthy individuals or
corporations who can prognosticate to the satisfaction of congenial municipal functionaries
that they can put the subject land to a more profitable use than its rightful owners, may obtain
it cheap or even cost-free by government force. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 843
A.2d 500 (Conn.), cert.granted, 125 S.Ct. 27 (U.S. Sept. 28,2004) (No. 04-108) (considering whether condemnation of private property for economic development meets the public
use test).
Recently, there has been some judicial resistance to the overreaching of these "new
Robber Barons." Note, however, that on September 28, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Kelo v. City ofNew London, to consider the issue whether condemnation
of private property for so-called economic development meets the constitutional public use
test. Stay tuned. Southwestern I11.
Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., LLC, 768 N.E.2d 1 (111.)
(holding that a parking lot at an automobile racetrack is not a legitimate public use), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 880 (2002); Wayne County v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)
(holding that the county's proposed condemnation met statutory requirements but failed
constitutional requirements of public use for private development); 99 Cents Only Stores v.
City of Lancaster, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (enjoining condemnation for a
private Costco store), appeal dismissed, 60 Fed. App. 123 (9th Cir. 2003); see Aaron v.
Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2004). For an insight into the egregious facts of Aaron,
see Aaron v. Target Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
133 Edward L. Lascher, Lascherat Large, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 36, 38 (1975).
'3 See, e.g., Charles Martin Sevilla, Asphalt Through the Model Cities: A Study of
Highways and the Urban Poor,49 J. URB. L. 297 (1971).
"' MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER (1964); PAUL, supranote 79, at 31-34;
BERNARD FRIEDEN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: How AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES (1989).
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masse on people in the path of these projects, who were abused and undercompensated as their property was taken. 3 6 In spite of fierce opposition by the notorious
"highway lobby," Congress eventually responded by enacting the Uniform
Relocation Assistance Act in 1970,13' but the Act's modest remedial effects have
been palliative rather than structural. Though an improvement over past practices,
the Act is largely a toothless tiger because it denies condemnees the right to sue to
enforce its provisions.' The problem of widespread undercompensation in eminent
domain is still with us today.' 39
In spite of these mild legislative changes, there is still much to be concerned
about how eminent domain is being employed and litigated, not the least of it being
the problem that its profligate use on behalf of private interests (notwithstanding the
constitutional requirement of "public use") encourages municipalities to use it not to create public works - but to pursue tax revenues they hope will be generated
by private businesses that are the primary beneficiaries of these brave, new condemnations. This goes on even as judges absurdly assert that the private economic
benefits expected from such projects to their private promoters are merely
"incidental" to the greater public good. At times, municipalities waste huge amounts
of public money on public as well as transparently private projects, some of which
fail, or even if successful, do not live up to the economic hopes voiced at their
creation."4 After all, whether funded with municipal or private funds these are
entrepreneurial endeavors dependent on future private profits and as such are subject
to market risks and failures. The emerging pattern shows that many of today's
136

Uniform RelocationAssistance andLandAcquisitionPolicy:Hearingon H.R. 386 and

Related Bills Before the House Comm. on Pub. Works, 90th Cong. (1968) (making clear the

extent of undercompensation that often took the form of acquisition prices below the
condemning agencies' own appraisals); see PAUL, supra note 79, at 29-37; Berger & Rohan,
supra note 132.
117 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1994).
138 42 U.S.C. § 4602 (1994).
139 Systematic studies are hard to come by, but practitioners' experience supports this conclusion. Condemnees' lawyers typically charge clients a fraction of any judgment awarded
over and above the condemnor's offer or evidence. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.09(1)©
(West 2005). It follows inexorably that either condemnees' lawyers are magicians (they're
not; trust me) or government appraisals are often defective and can be rebutted in court. A
recent expos6 by the Salt Lake Tribune found that of landowners who decline state offers for
their properties and litigate their cases, eight of ten recover more than the state offers, and
those on the average receive forty-one percent more than the state offers. Ray Rivera,
UDOT: FairDeals or Land Grabs?,SALT LAKE TRm., Oct. 24, 1999, at Al, available at

LEXIS, News Library, Salt Lake Tribune File; Ray Rivera & Dan Harrif, UDOTAppraisals
Lose In Court, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 24, 1999, at A9, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Salt Lake Tribune File.
"4 See infra note 142; Worms in the Big Apple-And Elsewhere,JUST COMPENSATION 11
(Feb. 2004) (commenting on the failure of several major redevelopment projects that resulted
in nine-figure losses to the would-be condemnors, with little or nothing to show for it).
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condemnations for redevelopment mostly benefit private, not public interests, 4 ' and
regularly turn out to cost much more than anticipated, not because of overcompensation of condemnees, but because of the inherent cost of the projects, poor
planning, or outright mismanagement. 4 This is obviously a subject whose pursuit
would take us far afield from the present discussion, and therefore cannot be
explored here to the extent it deserves.
Notwithstanding the vigor, consistency, and plain merit of criticisms by scholars
and practitioners, these views have had at most a modest impact on the unsatisfactory judge-made eminent domain law. Judges who in other fields of law stress
the need for periodic judicial reinterpretation of the law to match changed social
conditions, and who glory in their function as social reformers, 4 ' by and large
'41DANA BERLINER, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVEYEAR STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSES OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2003),
availableathttp://castlecoalition.org/publications (last visited Feb. 5,2005); Dean Starkman,
Condemnation Is Used to Hand One Business Property of Another, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2,
1998, at A1, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Wall St. J. File; see also John Gibeaut, The
Money Chase, 85 A.B.A. J. 58 (Mar. 1999).
142 The paradigmatic example and current champion of such overruns is Boston's
underground freeway, the "Big Dig," which was estimated to cost $2.6 billion, but has
already consumed $14 billion. Fox Butterfield, In Big Dig Town, a Solution Adds Confusion,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,2003, at A14, availableat 2003 WLNR 5225626. Close behind is New
York City's $109 million fiasco that occurred when the city set out to condemn land for the
new NYSE headquarters. Charles V. Bagli, 45 Wall St. Is Renting Again Where Tower Deal
Failed,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2003, at B3, availableat 2003 WLNR 5171078. In addition there
is the Los Angeles Belmont Learning Center debacle, where a high school on which the Los
Angeles Unified School District has spent some $217 million, was later discovered to have
been constructed on top of an old oil field that seeps methane, making the center unfit for use
as a school. Edward J. Boyer & Janet Wilson, The Methane Down Below, L.A. TIMES, July
30, 1999, at B2. Similarly, the twenty-year-old Los Angeles's North Hollywood redevelopment project has gone through over $117 million with little to show for it. Patrick McGreevy
& T. Christian Miller, Heady Plans, Hard Reality, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at Al; see
Marcia Slacum Greene et al., D.C. Revitalization Promised,Not Delivered, WASH. POST,
Feb. 24, 2002, at Al; Marcia Slacum Greene et al., Risky Ventures, Little Accountability,
WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2002, at Al; see also infra note 450 (describing a $100 million
municipal fiasco whereby in the 1970s the City of Los Angeles acquired over 17,000 acres
for a new municipal airport in Palmdale, California, but was never able to establish one).
"' E.g., People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880,887 (Cal. 1972) (forcefully asserting that when
social conditions change, it is the courts' "mandate of the most imperative nature" to change
the law accordingly); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969) ("[T]he judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need for keeping legal principles
abreast of the times."); see Leonard M. Friedman, The Courts and Social Policy, 47 CAL. ST.
B.J. 558, 563 (1972) (The presiding Justice of the California Court of Appeals writing that
the Constitution takes the side of the individual "against the ponderous demands of the
collective state."); Mathew 0. Tobriner, Can Young Lawyers Reform Society Through the
Courts?, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 294, 298 (1972) (Associate Justice of the California Supreme
Court calling for a "social 'revolution'," no less, to be worked through the courts at the behest
of young lawyers - a group about as ill-equipped to reshape society as can be imagined.).
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retreat from that position and shirk their responsibility to keep the law of eminent
domain in harmony with changing social and urban conditions, and consistent with
the legal doctrine prevailing in other fields of law. The law they apply in today's
cases of mass displacement of urban populations is not much different than the law
they applied when condemnations were rare and mostly impacted vacant land or
individual farms, causing few incidental losses. From time to time, in evident
recognition of the economic and moral deficiency of their handiwork, judges
ritualistically assert that the concededly unsatisfactory state of eminent domain law
should indeed be rectified, but they suggest that task to be legislative,' 44 even though
the black-letter rule formulated by the courts themselves is that it is the courts, not
145
legislatures, that are primarily in charge of formulating rules of compensability.
An egregious example of such judicial nonfeasance was the absurd assertion by the
California Supreme Court, at the time probably the most activist court in the nation,
that it lacked "institutional competence" to rectify the concededly unsatisfactory rule
denying compensation for loss of business goodwill in eminent domain, even as it
expressly recognized that there had been great changes in urban conditions since the
early-twentieth-century days when the court formulated its no-compensation rule,
and that in its modem application this rule caused a disproportional share of the cost
of public works to fall on small business people, in disregard of the constitutional
policy of spreading the cost of public works on the society that benefits from them.'46
County of Los Angeles v. Ortiz, 490 P.2d 1142, 1147 nn.8-9 (Cal. 1971) (opining that
recovery for litigation expenses in eminent domain cases should be set by the legislature);
Town of Los Gatos v. Sund, 44 Cal. Rptr. 181, 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965) (suggesting that
recovery for moving expenses be sought from the legislature); City of Los Angeles v. Allen's
Grocery Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 88, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (conceding that the judge-made law
is not as it should be, but suggesting that the legislature should rectify it). Note, however, that
when the shoe was on the other foot, and the plain language of a controlling statute
(regarding accrual of interest) favored the condemnee because of the condemnor's extreme
delay in paying for what it took, the California Supreme Court had no trouble coming up
with the ingenious notion that the legislature could not have intended to say what it plainly
said, and proceeded to rescue the condemnor from the statutory consequences of its own
grossly dilatory conduct. People v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 996 P.2d 711, 716-17 (Cal. 2000);
see also United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973) (In another case where the shoe was
on the other foot, the Court had no trouble invoking the idea of fairness to justify condemnation of range land for less than what its owner could obtain in the market.).
' Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1925) (holding that the
courts are supreme in establishing the minimal constitutionally required compensation);
Joslin Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 675-76 (1923) (stating that legislatures may
enact more generous rules that set compensation above the constitutional minimum which
is set by the courts); accord Redevelopment Agency of Burbank v. Gilmore, 700 P.2d 794,
799 (Cal. 1985).
146 Cmty. Redevelopment Agency v. Abrams, 543 P.2d 905, 916 (Cal. 1975); cf.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (holding that the Just Compensation
Clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole").
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The bottom line of it all, that is pertinent to the topic at hand, is that the history
of eminent domain law has engendered and perpetuated a judicial culture whereby
property owners' rights and their claims to genuinely just compensation for conceded takings of their property are viewed with suspicion at best and hostility at
worst, and in spite of occasional expansive, benign-sounding judicial prose, these
rights and claims are narrowly construed. This culture extends afortiori to inverse
condemnation cases where, as noted, government liability is contested rather than
conceded and compensation is not budgeted for.
Thus, unsurprisingly, the law of inverse condemnation, the "flip side" of eminent
domain,14 7 is a moral, intellectual, doctrinal, and procedural disaster area. Where
private property is taken extralegally, forcing the owners to take the initiative and
sue for their just compensation if they mean to receive any relief - things have
gone beyond all reason. 48 Here, particularly where the taking is said to be effected
by government regulatory acts that stultify economically viable uses of private
property, thus effecting its de facto taking, the courts have created a legal regime of
intellectual anarchy, 149 in which they shuttle willy-nilly from one jurisprudential
approach to another and produce candidly ad hoc decisions in ways that suit their
predilections and ideological preferences of the moment. 50 In this regime, property
owners can be abused, not only by overzealous regulators whose at times grotesque
contentions have become a fixture of American government, but also byjudges who
require relief-seeking land owners to perform costly and time-consuming but
ultimately absurdly useless acts,' 5 ' making them wander from court to court at great
14 There are significant differences between direct and inverse condemnation. See, e.g.,
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687,711-12 (1999) (explaining that a condemnation action is initiated by the government and liability is conceded, but an inverse
condemnation action is initiated by an aggrieved property owner and liability must be
established); see also Breidert v. S. Pac. Co., 394 P.2d 719, 721 n.1 (Cal. 1964) (Insofar as
compensation is concerned, "[t]he principles which affect the parties' rights in an inverse
condemnation suit are the same as those in an eminent domain action.").
148 Shocking as this may be to persons untutored in the dark arts of eminent
domain law,
the courts have held it to be constitutionally permissible for government agents acting without notice or any legal process to seize private property and say to the dispossessed owner
"sue me." Stringer v. United States, 471 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1973). Note that Stringer
was decided two years after the enactment of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act that
ostensibly forbids such practices. 42 U.S.C. § 4651(4) (1994).
141 Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
39 (1985).
"' HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 542 P.2d 237, 247 (Cal. 1975)
(conceding that judicial conclusions finding an act to be a proper exercise of police power
or a taking of property are merely the judges' "shorthand method of indicating the result").
...See Shelter Creek Dev. Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d 375, 380 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that seeking just compensation from a federal court for a regulatory taking required
the aggrieved landowner to seek a nonexistent permit from a local regulatory body that was
forbidden by state law to regulate the activity in question); Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818
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52
expense in search for promised relief that is revealed as not available in the end.'
The root of this doctrinal and moral hash is the courts' professed inability (but
more likely, unwillingness)'53 to exercise a modicum of intellectual self-discipline
and to provide some reasonably clear-cut basic rules on a consistent basis that would
enable landowners who complain of egregious violations of their constitutional
rights to state a cause of action, to present their cases to courts on the merits on
manageable evidence, and to receive reasonably prompt and efficient adjudication
of their claims. But that has not been the case. On the one hand, judges fear that the
articulation of clear-cut rules likely to provide reliable relief, if only to genuinely
54
aggrieved landowners in egregious cases, will be too costly, 1 but on the other hand
judges are by and large smart and they understand that denying such relief
altogether, as has been urged by the "police power hawks," will impair not only
important property rights but other rights and liberties as well - and eventually lead

F.2d 1449, 1455 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that prior to seeking judicial relief for a regulatory
taking of her land, a septuagenarian farmer's widow would have to become a developer, and
prepare and submit for City approval a development plan for a sixty-five-acre tract of land
(a remnant of her and her late husband's defunct dairy farm), even though the City had
designated her land as unbuildable open space). Though the futility doctrine excuses the
performance of futile acts, the Kinzli court stood it on its head by holding that to show futility
the owner would have to perform the futile act rather than be excused from doing so. Id.
152 Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 1995) (claiming a regulatory taking
forbidding construction of a single-family home on a forty-acre parcel). The claimants were
told, after an adverse state court decision, two federal trial decisions, and two federal appeals,
that their federal constitutional claim would not be heard on the merits in either state or
federal court. For other such litigational sagas that rival Dickens's Bleak House, see Berger
& Kanner, Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 883 n.171.
' I find it hard to believe that highly intelligent judges who routinely parse and interpret
the complexities of convoluted commercial transactions, as well as complex tax, antitrust,
and other arcane laws, are abruptly struck incompetent to do likewise in the conceptually
relatively straightforward field of inverse condemnation law, where they proclaim themselves to be simply "unable" to lay down any black-letter rules. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
"5 See, e.g., Charles v. Diamond, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 1305 (N.Y. 1977) ("Open-ended
liability would inhibit the enactment of needed, but constitutionally borderline legislation.");
Langley Shopping Ctr. v. State Roads Comm'n, 131 A.2d 690, 693 (Md. 1957) (expressing
a desire to avoid requiring "the state to pay through the nose"); Hensler v. City of Glendale,
876 P.2d 1043, 1054-55 (Cal. 1994) (voicing concerns that local resources may be unable
to pay inverse condemnation judgments if federal rules were to be followed in California).
See generally Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 24 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (fearing "swollen awards" compensating for business losses); United States v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 385 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring in part) (fearing
"swollen verdicts" compensating for moving expenses). See also People v. Symons, 357 P.2d
451, 454-55 (Cal. 1960) (asserting a judicial duty to keep condemnation awards down to
prevent an "embargo" on public projects). In fact, in spite of this unfounded judicial "parade
of horribles" none of these fanciful apprehensions materialized.
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to disagreeable political repercussions. For as Justice Potter Stewart astutely
observed, property does not have rights. People have rights, and their rights in
property are interrelated with their personal liberties, so that neither can have
meaning without the other.'55 The merit of Justice Stewart's bon mot becomes selfevident when one reflects on the fact that there are no societies in the world where
a high degree of personal and political liberties does not correlate with a high degree
of economic freedom. Even Communist China has recently amended its constitution
to provide for protection of property rights in an effort to maintain its rising prosperity. 56
' And to the extent one might want to put the exercise of private property
rights in tension with environmental concerns, the cold fact is that societies that
respect property rights and protect them by a reliable rule of law have also evolved
the most advanced schemes of environmental protection and remediation, whereas
societies that do not respect those rights - notably but not exclusively the former
eastern bloc - suffer from severe environmental degradation as well as low levels
of personal liberty.
Notwithstanding the shopworn judicial jeremiads about impending fiscal doom
that is sure to follow if genuinely fair compensation were to be provided to aggrieved property owners, no evidence supporting them has been presented and none
of the dire judicial prophecies have materialized. Nor, to give away the punch line
of this Article, was the public unable to pay for the preservation of Grand Central
Terminal, even though New York City's assertedly threadbare financial condition
was an avowed motivation of the New York Court of Appeals and to a lesser extent
of the U.S. Supreme Court in ruling against Penn Central's constitutional claim.'57
Contrary to such judicial apprehensions, the historical record is clear that when
public projects are cancelled, it is not because of the excessive cost of private
property acquisition,' 58 but rather because of environmental concerns,' 59 NIMVIBY
"' Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972); see RICHARD PIPES,
FREEDOM (2000). For a collection of historical expressions stressing the
importance of property rights in securing personal liberty, see J. David Breemer, What
PropertyRights? The CaliforniaCoastalCommission's HistoryofAbusing LandRights and
Some Thoughts on the Underlying Causes, 22 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 247, 281-82,
n.205 (2004).
"16 Joseph Kahn, ChinaMoves to ProtectProperty,but the Fine PrintHas a Caveat,N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23,2003, at Al, availableat 2003 WLNR 4632704 (reporting on constitutional
amendments providing for protection of property rights in Communist China).
'.. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 109 n.6. As for the New York Court of Appeal, see infra
note 324 and accompanying text.
"' Of course, there have been rare cases in which condemnors bit off more than they
could chew and had to abandon some condemnations. The best comparatively recent
example was the attempt by the California Department of Transportation (DOT) to condemn
the Los Angeles landmark Union Station for a thrifty $20 million, only to find itself confronted with a judgment for $84,700,000. DOT then prudently abandoned the condemnation,
but only after paying $994,424 for the owners' litigation expenses. See also Times-Mirror
PROPERTY AND
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62
16
opposition,' 60 political considerations, 1 assorted condemnors' illegalities,
mismanagement on the part of the government, 16 3 or widespread community

Co. v. SuperiorCourt, 44 P.2d 547 (Cal. 1935), where in a stunning example of bad judgment, the City of Los Angeles sought to condemn the Los Angels Times headquarters
building and printing plant for a new City Hall site, only to find itself unable to pay the
judgment when the court found that the huge printing presses and other pieces of equipment
owned by the Times were fixtures and as such would have to be paid for along with the
building. See also City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 25 P.2d 826 (1933). Unable to pay the
judgment, the City turned over the Times parcel to the more affluent State of California for
a new state building, but still built its landmark City Hall a block away, where it stands until
this day, thus demonstrating conclusively that there was no lack of money for the new city
hall, only that at first the City's arrogant but improvident reach exceeded its financial grasp.
The State building was damaged beyond repair by an earthquake in the late 1960s and had
to be demolished. Its site has ever since been sitting vacant and unused and a new state
building was built elsewhere. So much for government economy.
159 See infra note 162.
160 A noted recent example

was the attempted widening of the 101 Freeway in the San
Fernando Valley at its interchange with the 405 Freeway, which is badly needed to relieve
massive congestion. After announcing its decision to do so, the State Department of
Transportation retreated ignominiously in face of protests of the local population. See Sharon
Bernstein et al., Freeway Builders Run into Wall of Politicsand Protests, L.A. TIMES, May
23, 2003, at Al; Caitlin Liu, Panel Submits Scaled-Down Plansfor 101, L.A. TIMES, May

24, 2003, at B3; Caitlin Liu, Valley's Silver Bullet Hits Mark, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2003, at
B 1 (noting that freeway congestion continues unabated for reasons that have nothing
whatsoever to do with the cost of right-of-way acquisition); see also William Fulton, The
GnatcatcherFollies, CAL. LAW., May 1995, at 43 (vividly describing local environmentalists' efforts in Orange County, California, to stop construction of a badly needed local
highway); infra note 164.
161 Tom McClintock, Self-Inflicted Gridlock, CAL. POL. REV., May/June 2004, at 13
(California state senator recounting how at least six freeways in Southern California were
cancelled on the basis of political decisions of Governor Jerry Brown's administration.).
62 See the endless judicial saga that arose from the State's wholesale violation of environmental and relocation assistance laws that was interdicted by the fedral courts. Keith v.
Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (granting injuncion against State), affdsub nom.,
Keith v. Cal. Highway Comm'n, 506 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975); 501 F. Supp 403 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (ordering attorneys' fees); 618 F. Supp. 1132
(C.D. Cal. 1985) (granting injunction against State); 643 F. Supp. 37 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
(ordering attorneys' fees), afftd, 784 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1986); 644 F. Supp. 1312 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (ordering additional attorneys' fees); 644 F. Supp. 1317 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (ordering
attorneys' fees for supplemental complaint), affd, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 813 (1989); 833 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming initial action against State);
965 F. Supp. 1337 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (granting injunction against State); 960 F. Supp. 1448
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (granting defendant-State's motion for exhibit modification), rev'd, 118
F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1997).
See, e.g., Charles v. Bagli, Doubts Rise on New Site for Big Board, N.Y. TIMES, June
6, 2000, at B3; Michael Wilson, Study Finds Steady Overruns in Public Projects, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2002, at A14; see also Beth Barrett, Building Up Debt: Redevelopment
13

20051

MAKING LAWS AND SAUSAGES

resistance.' 64 Indeed, when condemnees challenge takings on the grounds that
condemnors lack the funds to complete their overly ambitious projects, they are
rebuffed by the courts. 65 To do justice to this unfortunate subject would take us far
afield from the present topic, and its discussion must be saved for another day.
Suffice it to say that condemning agencies have regularly wasted huge amounts of
money on projects that never left the dock, or that after their initiation proved to be
veritable public money-shredding machines.
Given the judicial laissez faire attitude toward condemnors whose profligacy
and inefficiency is thus encouraged, it is incomprehensible that judges stubbornly
cling to their unjustified fears that if the Just Compensation Clause is liberally
construed and demonstrable economic losses imposed on condenmees are made
compensable that the public fisc will be depleted, particularly when juxtaposed with
the fact that reality has not been kind to such judicial gazing into the clouded crystal
Agency Facing $40 Million Shortfall, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 14, 1998, at 1, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Daily News File; Patrick McGreevy, CRA Works on Plan to Avert
Bond Default, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1999, at B1.
164 Three well-known instances of community oppositions are the San Fransisco "freeway
revolt," the New York grassroots opposition to a Westway, and the South Pasadena resistance to the extension of the 710 Freeways. Richard Winton, Freeway Extension Foes
Show U.S. Transit Chief Their Outrage,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1997, at B5; M. L. Gunzburg,
TransportationProblems of the Megalopolitan, 12 UCLA L. REV. 800, 809-10 (1965)
(describing Los Angeles freeway plans and their eventual cancellation resulting from
opposition from the impacted affluent areas); see also Gideon Kanner, What to Do Until the
Bulldozers Come? Precondemnation Planningfor Landowners, 27 REAL EST. J. 47, 54
nn.21-22 (1998) (listing examples of governmental takings for unsuccessful projects, none
of which resulted in compensation for condemnees).
"' For a classic object lesson, see Benevolent & Potent Order of Elks v. City Councilof
Lawrence, 531 N.E.2d 1233, 1234 (Mass. 1988), which held that property owners in a
redevelopment area lacked standing to challenge the financial ability of the redevelopment
agency to complete its project. After the City acquired the area at a cost of millions,
Benevolent & Potent Order of Elks v. Lawrence Redevelopment Auth., 604 N.E.2d 715,717
(Mass. App. Ct. 1992), the redevelopment project failed. Matthew Brelis, Emerson College
Likely to Stay Put, BOSTON GLOBE, June 2, 1990, at I (Metro Sec.); Lawrence Loses $4.6M
More in Land Taking, BOSTON HERALD, May 18, 1994, at 22. Also see, In re Condemnation
by Penn Township, 702 A.2d 614 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997), and In re Redevelopment Planfor
Bunker Hill UrbanRenewal Project,389 P.2d 538 (Cal. 1964), both rejecting condemnees'
arguments that the cost of the proposed condemnation would be excessive, and allowing
condemnation to proceed. For additional judicial misadventures where, acting in the name
of saving the state money, the California Supreme Court facilitated the incurring of some
$100 million in losses self-inflicted by the California Department of Public Works which was
in the habit of condemning excess land but then was unable either to use it or sell it, see
Gideon Kanner, Developments in the Right-to-Take Law, 2002 INST. ON PLANNING, ZONING
& EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.03[5], at 2-40 n. 107. For commentary on cases where the courts
permit condemnation even where it appears that the proposed public project cannot be built,
see Thomas J. Posey, This Land Is My Land: The Needfor a FeasibilityTest in Evaluation
of Takingsfor Public Necessity, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1403 (2003).
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' This is afortioriwhen one reflects on the fact that in other areas of law,
ball. "66
notably but not exclusively torts and civil rights, courts routinely and frequently
hand out large, multi-million dollar judgments against the government, without
voicing fears that the public treasury will be emptied. Quite the contrary, outside
of eminent domain, judges hold that imposing liability on government entities and
functionaries is sound public policy because it provides an incentive to public
officials to act responsibly. 167 Why that reasoning is not deemed equally true in
eminent domain, where the government receives a quid pro quo for what it pays, and
damages are limited by the value of the taken land and do not include any
subjective, open-ended damages as in tort cases, the courts have not explained.
Besides, even on the faulty judicial premise, if genuinely just compensation to
condemnees would indeed bid fair to impose undue financial burdens on the
government, that would only be a concession that government projects are overly
ambitious, or more egregiously in the case of takings for redevelopment, that private
redevelopers are being spared the true cost of doing business, and are being enriched
at the expense of indigenous home and business owners. More important, if these
judicial concerns have any validity, that would only mean that the government is
living beyond its means and that, from a constitutional point of view, huge uncompenated losses are being inflicted on individual condemnees in the name of "just"
compensation. Why economic losses that would be intolerable for the government
in spite of its vastly superior resources and its ability to spread the cost on society
at large as a quid pro quo for benefits conferred on it, somehow become tolerable
when inflicted on individuals, has gone without an explanation - at least an
explanation likely to survive either economic or moral scrutiny. Finally, in eminent
domain cases, unlike others, when land is acquired, the government receives a quid
also People v. Symons, 327 P.2d 451 (Cal. 1960) (expressing fear that condemnation awards would create an "embargo" on public projects). But see Gideon Kanner,
Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 765,
166 See

786 n.101 (1973) [hereinafter Kanner, Condemnation Blight] (providing state budget data

indicating that in the 1960s the California Department of Public Works was accumulating
annual surpluses of over $100 million). Even now, when California is suffering from a
financial crisis, the Department of Transportation enjoys an available and unspent $2 billion
fund. Virginia Ellis, Davis'RoadFundingPlan Criticized,L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at A3.

Notwithstanding the availability of highway construction funds, the freeway approval
process is interminably delayed by environmental reviews and public protests. See Hugo
Martin, Open Roads Languish on the Drawing Board, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2001, at B2

(listing environmental protection laws and the NIMBY syndrome as causes for delays in
construction); Hugo Martin, Roads Mired in Review Gridlock, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2001,
at B 1 (reporting the availability of $1.8 billion in road construction funds, even as "environmentalists vow to oppose any drastic shortcuts" in the process of environmental review); see
also infra notes 450-56.
167 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980) (using judicial compen-

sation awards as an "incentive for officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of
their actions to err on the side of protecting citizens' constitutional rights").
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may "talk a good game" in political speeches about protecting property rights, but
70
As
when push comes to shove, are reluctant to impose costs on the government.
the late Bert Burgoyne, a distinguished Detroit condemnation lawyer was fond of
saying: "Liberal judges don't believe in private property rights, and conservative
judges don't believe in making the government pay. So between them you have a
The upshot is that aggrieved property owners' regulatory
hard row to hoe."''
72
takings cases are extremely difficult to win, even on egregious facts,' and their
litigational fate may turn as much, or more, on the personality, ideology, and idiosyncratic sense of justice of individual judges presiding over their cases, as on the
legal soundness of their submission. Though this is unfortunate, it is not surprising,
given that in the regulatory taking field decisions are often made on the basis of
vague formulations of law and on multiple-factor balancing tests that in application
allow judges to rule whichever way they want. Even in the absence of such
convenient intellectual camouflage devices that enable judges to rule as they please
while maintaining a faqade of following the law, many judges have over the years
de facto ruled on the basis of their undisclosed notions of what the results should be
by their lights. 7 3 An acute insight into this reality was provided by Texas Supreme
Court Justice, Nathan Hecht, when he observed at a continuing legal education
program on eminent domain:
These cases are fundamentally not so much about the words of
the constitution, or words of statute, or what the science of
accounting and appraisal say should be considered in the assessment of value - not so much about those things as it is
about a deep-set policy question of what is the public going to
pay for and what is the individual going to be stuck with. And
that does not come 74through the cases of course; rarely are they
that blunt about it. 1
o Gideon Kanner, Who's In Charge Here?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 25, 2002, at A20.

Interviews with author.
Horror stories abound, but my favorites are Yardarm Restaurantand Rainey Brothers
Construction.City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc., 834 So.2d 861 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2002) (denying compensatory relief to property owners driven into foreclosure and
bankruptcy by a lengthy series of harassing municipal illegalities); Rainey Bros. Constr. Co.
v. Memphis & Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment, 967 F. Supp. 998 (W.D. Tenn. 1997)
(denying relief for a construction permit cancelled unlawfully in mid-construction in
conceded violation of local law and of the Constitution).
"' Robert Kratovil & Frank J. Harrison, Jr., Eminent Domain - Policy and Concept, 42
CAL. L. REv. 596, 599 (1954) ("These policy factors.., are usually left undisclosed or
concealed behind a veil of concept." (citing Bacich v. Bd. of Control of Cal., 144 P.2d 818,
823 (Cal. 1943))).
14 Videotape: CLE International, Program on Eminent Domain, Aug. 12-13,1999, Austin,
Tex., Video Tape #2 (copy on file with author). If the Constitution, statutes, and appraisal
evidence are to be disregarded in favor of an undisclosed "deep set policy," how can the
171
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With this judicial attitude afoot in direct condemnation cases in which government liability for takings is conceded and budgeted for, and where for its money the
condemnor by definition receives a quid pro quo at its judicially-determined fair
market value, it requires little imagination to understand what things can be like in
inverse condemnation where government liability is fiercely denied, and a victory
for the landowners portends unbudgeted and unanticipated government expenditures. Keeping the law uncertain thus provides judges who are hostile to property
owners' submissions with the option of denying compensation when their ideology
or their idiosyncratic notions of government economy are threatened, or granting it
when their personal ideas of right and wrong are offended.T' Thus, in Penn Central,
the Supreme Court provided a basis for such a lawless regime by asserting that it
"quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when
'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons,""' 6 and that in adjudicating taking claims the Court is given to
engaging in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."'77

courts rationally determine just "what the individual is going to be stuck with?" That
approach does not leave much to go on other than the seat of the judicial pants. While Justice
Hecht's blunt candor may provide a welcome insight to practitioners as to how laws and
sausages are really made, it is hardly supportive of the legitimacy ofjudicial decision making
in eminent domain cases.
"' Justice Stevens's voting pattern provides an example. Since 1978 (when he joined
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central), Justice Stevens has always voted for the
regulators in inverse condemnation cases. But in 1999, in City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1989), he was evidently so offended by the overreaching government
conduct that he changed sides. In that case, the City regulators had the would-be developer
submit five successive applications, and nineteen plot plans, only to conclude in the end,
after five years of costly administrative proceedings, that nothing could be built on the 37.6acre, beachfront subject property. For details of that litigation, see Michael M. Berger,
Vindicating the Rights of Private Land Development in the Courts, 32 URB. LAW. 941,
991-94 (2000). The City argued that this process was perfectly proper under California law,
and not even subject to judicial review. The Justices were aghast. For a criticism of the
reasoning employed by the City in the Del Monte oral argument, see Eagle, Planning,supra
note 6, at 500.
176 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; cf. Oakes, supra note 40, at 613 ("[J]urisprudence
permits purely subjective results, with the conflicting precedents simply available as makeweights .... ."); Richard Miniter, You Just Can't Take It Anymore, 70 POL'Y REv. 40, 44
(1994) ("Takings law 'is really the antithesis of law... every case is its own law,"' quoting
Loren Smith, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.).
"' Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124 (overlooking the effect of the Supreme Court's "factual
inquiries" on the ability of lower courts to follow precedent).
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V. JUDGING OR GOVERNING?

To begin with, the factual-inquiry approach used by the Supreme Court, though
consistent with the "Grand Mufti" mode of judging so despised by the U.S. Courts
of Appeals, runs counter to the Supreme Court's long-standing, clearly articulated
policy'78 and even on its own premise suffers from three major flaws. First, to the
best of my knowledge the Court has not been asked to come up with a "set formula"
in inverse condemnation law, any more than it provides "set formulas" in other
fields of constitutional law. Ironically, in other areas of the law, the Court has at
times retreated from the ad hoc mode of adjudication after trying it. The best known
example is the Court's retreat from the case-by-case approach to adjudicating
obscenity. The process whereby the Court at first made its decisions as to what was
obscene on a case-by-case basis, by actually viewing the allegedly obscene motion
pictures, and its eventual retreat from such ad hoc adjudication to the customary
appellate decision making (i.e., reviewing factual jury determinations for their
correctness as a matter of law, not fact), is vividly described in the best-selling book
The Brethren.'79 At least in obscenity cases the Justices could look at the pictures
in question and readily make a judgment as to their obscene nature vel non, thus
giving rise to Justice Potter Stewart's famous bon mot of "I know it when I see it."'' 8
But in land-use controversies that deal with complex matters that are usually far
afield from those known to the Justices and regularly considered by the Supreme
Court, there is at the very least a substantial question (to put it politely) as to
whether the Justices, or their clerks who have no practice experience, possess
sufficient backgrounds to make such judgments on the basis of "factual inquiries.''.
I feel fully justified in making this criticism because in going through Justice
Blackmun's papers at the Library of Congress, I came across a marginal note in his
own handwriting, relating to the Williamson County case, stating "I am not sure I
182 He didn't. 8 3
fully understand this case.'
Second, such an overtly ad hoc decision-making regime is antithetical to a rule
of law."14 We properly think of law as a set of coherent rules that govern the
178 United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925) ("We do not grant a certiorari to
review evidence and discuss specific facts.").
179 BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 192-94, 198-204 (1979).
"' Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
181 See Kanner, Huntingthe Snark, supra note 3, at 339-40, 343-45 (providing instances
of Supreme Court assertions that are grossly at variance with prevailing land-use reality).
182 The document in question is an untitled, hand-written outline by Justice Blackmun,
prepared for Williamson County Post-Argument Conference, Library of Congress Madison
Building Manuscript Room (copy on file with author); cf Kanner, Hunting the Snark, supra
note 3, at 325-31 (explaining the deficiencies of the Williamson County opinion as land-use
law).
183 See Kanner, Hunting the Snark, supra note 3, at 325-3 1.
"84 My favorite example that makes this point is a comparison of Kaiser Aetna and
PruneyardShopping Center.Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holds that
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conduct of people and institutions, that lawyers can explain to clients, and that
enable citizens to ascertain which of their expectations are enforceable, and which
courses of action on their part are legal vel non. We also think of the legal process
as providing an imperfect but substantially impartial resolution of factual disputes
by trial courts, with appellate courts reviewing those decisions for their legal
correctness. It is these perceptions of the law and its administration that engender
respect for the judiciary among citizens and assure judges of the high standing they
have historically enjoyed in American society. But to say that "the law" is
unknowable without first engaging in a lengthy and costly multi-year litigation
process that leads to ad hoc results arrived at after the court of last resortfirst makes
'factual inquiries" years after the trial has been completed, is to say that there is
no law worthy of the name. Under this legal - or perhaps more accurately,
lawless - regime, parties commencing litigation have no way of knowing exactly
what to plead or what to present by way of evidence - assuming they ever get to
the stage of evidence presentation. Nor can they tell what legal arguments to make
as their cases wend their way through the courts.'85 Thus, as discussed elsewhere
in this Article, in Penn Central, the New York Court of Appeals decided issues that
bore no resemblance to those tried and reviewed in the trial court and the Appellate
Division respectively, while the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with issues never tried
nor considered by either of the two lower state appellate courts. How are lawyers
to prepare for that?
Moreover, precious few citizens can afford years or decades of protracted, costly administrative proceedings followed by multi-tiered litigation, followed by efforts
to obtain review by the Supreme Court which turns away a vast majority of
petitioners by peremptory denials of certiorari. This state of affairs and the cost
associated with it, de facto puts most American property owners beyond the ambit
of constitutional protection insofar as their property rights are concerned. As this
owners of a private commercial marina that was subject to a public navigation servitude
could exclude members of the public authorized by the government to enter it); Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that the owner of a private shopping
center, in which the government had no interest, could not exclude strangers who wanted to
enter the mall not to shop but to circulate petitions). See Kanner, Hunting the Snark, supra
note 3, at 320-22.
185 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002). On appeal, the case was remanded by the U.S. Court of Appeals to the trial court
three times - not counting the fourth Ninth Circuit opinion that was reviewed on the merits
by the U.S. Supreme Court. The litigation lasted longer than the lifetimes of some fifty
plaintiffs. But after twenty years of litigation, it turned out that engaging in this latter day
version of Dickens's Bleak House was unnecessary because the Supreme Court held that the
facts were undisputed and only an issue of law was involved. Id. at 307. See Michael M.
Berger, Tahoe-Sierra: Much Ado About What?, 25 U. HAW. L. REv. 295, 295 n.4 and
accompanying text (2003) [hereinafter Berger, Much Ado] (discussing the Ninth Circuit
opinion); see also Gideon Kanner, Rolling the Dice with Ambrose Bierce, 54 LAND USE L.
& ZONING DIG. 12 (June 2002).
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goes on, anomalies, abuses, injustices, and conflicts of decision proliferate in the
lower courts, as is the virtually unanimous judgment of legal commentators of all
ideological stripes.' 86 Thus when the Supreme Court goes into the business of
making ad hoc factual inquiries on a case-by-case basis instead of resolving legal
issues in accordance with broadly applicable legal doctrine, that judicial approach
de facto transforms American common law - to borrow Justice Frankfurter's tart
imagery - into the law of a Kadi sitting under a tree and dispensing idiosyncratic
' Such a system of decision making may be
justice by the seat of his pantaloons. 87
appealing to those who crave individually tailored justice, but it is unworkable
because it subverts equality of treatment of litigants, as well as the core idea of stare
decisis whereby courts are obliged to follow precedent, thus assuring that litigants
of today will receive the benefit of the same law as litigants of yesterday. Besides,
more important, there is a dearth of people capable of making such Solomonic
judgments with any degree of consistency and fairness. After all, there was only one
King Solomon and he was divinely inspired - something that cannot be said about
the American judiciary.
Third, the unrestrained ad hoc approach suffers from another, practical problem.
Factual ad hoc inquiries have to be made in virtually every case of every kind, but
that hardly justifies the notion that they are to be made by appellate courts which
lack the time,'88 the litigational tools, 8 9 and the institutional competence to make
them. The usual pattern in American law, therefore, is that ad hoc factual decisions
are made by juries (duly instructed on the applicable law), 9 ' or by judges acting as
'86For a sampling ofthe vast critical literature on this subject, see Callies, supranote 19,
at 523 n. 1. For an extensive collection of harshly pejorative assessments of judicial handiwork in regulatory taking law, particularly its ripeness attributes, by commentators on both
sides of the issue, ranging from "worse than mere chaos," through "inherently nonsensical,"
to "a fraud or hoax on landowners," see Berger & Kanner, Shell Game!, supra note 38, at
702-03.
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
As former Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, Frederick W. Hall, aptly
observed, appellate courts have to handle cases in a "rapid fire" fashion - "a professor can
take five or six years to think about something that an appellate judge has to decide in thirty
days." TDR Conference, supranote 72, at 77. Today's appellate reality was captured by the
title of U.S. Circuit Judge John C. Godbold's article, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes:
Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 Sw. U. L. REV. 801 (1976). See also Gideon Kanner,
"Holy Shit, I'm Going to Write the Law oftheLand", 1 GREEN BAG 2D 425,429-31 (1998)

[hereinafter Kanner, Holy Shit].
' In arriving at their decisions, local trial judges presiding over land-use controversies
not only have the advantage of being able to judge the credibility and skills of expert
witnesses, but they also know "the lay of the land," are usually acquainted with local
government and business practices, and can question witnesses, call for additional evidence,
appoint their own experts, and view the subject property. Appellate judges can't.
90 And speaking of juries, though the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 actions involving claims of regulatory takings may be entitled to a trial by jury on
fact-bound issues going to liability, I am not aware of any cases (apart from Del Monte Dunes
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triers of fact. The appellate courts then accept the facts as found at trial, and limit
their decisions to review of the legal principles in issue (whether substantive,
procedural, or evidentiary) that flow from the factual decisions made at trial. This
is not to say that appellate courts are to act as wooden automatons interpreting but
not making law, as conservative polemicists are wont to put it. Rather, acting in the
best common law tradition, appellate courts may properly inform their decisions by
sound public policies that are adhered to by their society, recognize and correct their
own errors in earlier cases, as well as modify and adjust the decisional law in an
incremental fashion to take account of unanticipated legal issues, novel factual
situations, and changes in society. But as is now evident because of the revelations
of Justice Brennan's former clerk, even as the Supreme Court revolutionized the law
in Penn Central, it did not think that it was making any innovations in the law.'
What the New York Court of Appeals did in the Penn Central case provides a
paradigmatic insight into much that is wrong with American inverse condemnation
law in particular, and increasingly with American judge-made law in general,
namely, a judicial confusion between adjudication of disputes whose principled
resolution may produce new rules of law for the guidance of future litigants facing
similar problems, and deliberate acts of judicial governance that look to the parties'
controversies as mere fodder for judicial innovation, with convenient "rules" being
invented ad hoc to reach ideologically desirable results. Machiavelli taught us that
to be effective, governance has to be unprincipled at times.' 92 That is why in a free,
democratic society, those who would govern have to be tethered by the electorate
to the ballot box to make sure they do not stray too far from the bedrock values held
by the society they purport to serve. Law, on the other hand, has to be highly
principled and consistently applied if it is to retain popular respect, which is
indispensable to the courts' stature and effectiveness, particularly in the long run.
That is why the judiciary has to be impartial and independent - both economically
and ideologically - and why its decisions have to adhere to discernible, principled,
and carefully husbanded legal doctrine as opposed to results demanded by trendy
ideologies or the appointing authority's political preferences.' 93 But judges cannot
itself) where the courts have actually afforded plaintiffs in takings cases a trial by jury on the
issue of liability. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
191 Transcript, supranote 56; see TDR Conference, supranote 72, at 115 ("[A] court in the
best common law tradition moves with very small halting steps." (quoting Penn Central)).
Yet this did not inhibit Chief Judge Breitel and his colleagues from taking the revolutionary
step of ostensibly supplanting New York's property law with Henry George's failed economic
theories that were not supported by evidence or raised by briefing touching on that subject.
192 See NICCoL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Angelo M. Codevilla, ed. & trans., Yale
Univ. Press 1997) (1515).
"' Jean Guccione, Davis' Remarks Have Judiciary Seeing Red, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 2,
2000, at 1 (reporting that California's then Governor Gray Davis announced that judges
appointed by him would have to rule his way or face a blacklisting when it came to higher
court appointments).
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have it both ways without doing damage to their stature in society. To invoke
William Safire's colorful but insightful commentary on efforts to perform inconsistent functions, you can be a bagel or a doughnut, but if you try to be both, you're
toast. 194 Or, as U.S. Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski aptly put: "When we act like poli'
ticians, we can expect to be treated like politicians."195
Appellate courts are confined to the trial record before them, made in contemplation of the prevailing substantive law as understood by the parties and trial
judges, not the law as it might be perceived several years thence by ideologicallyminded appellate judges eager to reshape society in accordance with their vision.
Appellate courts are unaided by expert testimony when the need arises to consider
facts that (though adequate for purposes of the trial court's decision) may not have
been fully developed at trial so as to enable a judicial venture into the wild blue
yonder of policy making and governance. Amicus curiae submissions that in theory
are supposed to aid the appellate courts in such matters, are often largely partisan
arguments supporting one side or the other, 196 and while they may occasionally alert
the courts to matters that may not have been mentioned or fully developed by the
parties, or can otherwise supply helpful arguments, 97 they are no substitute for
educating appellate judges in the subtleties of problems facing them and the likely
impact on the regulated activity by the contemplated judicial ruling that may not be
discernible to people without deep expertise in the field under consideration.' 98
Doing so at the U.S. Supreme Court level is well nigh impossible, given the time
and briefing limitations imposed by the rules. Which is why it is particularly
important that at that lofty level, the issues be properly developed below and
delimited for Supreme Court consideration so they can be addressed by the parties
as well as by the court, without the Justices drifting off in the proyerbial rudderless
boat on the uncharted sea of ad hoc result-orientation. Finally, appellate court
decisions arrived at ad hoc but without a thorough understanding of the gritty
realities of land-use practices from which the problem of the moment arose, may
only engender more problems than they solve. The prevailing "ripeness mess" is a
194 William Safire, Bagels vs. Doughnuts, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999, at A31.
'9'United States v. Burdeau, 180 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski,J., dissenting).

See, e.g., Nat'l Org. For Women, Inc. v. Schneider, 223 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000)
(finding that lack of direct interest and unique perspective is sufficient grounds to deny
requests for permission to file arnicus curiae briefs); United States v. Gotti, 755 F. Supp.
1157 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying leave to file an amicus brief because "the parties are well
represented" and "joint consent of the parties to the submission by the amicus is lacking").
117For example, Justice Brennan's famous expression, "After all, if a policeman must
know the Constitution then why not a planner?" in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting), originated in the
argument contained in an amicus curiae brief in that case, Brief of Amicus Curiae National
Association of Manufacturers at 15-16 (No. 79-678).
' Paul M. Barrett, Justices Duck Weighty Business Issues, CriticsCharge,WALL S-T. J.,
Oct. 5, 1993, atB1.
196
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prime example. 99
By degrees all of this raises the painful question whether what the Court has
been doing in this area bears the stamp of legitimacy, or is only a costly, cruel
ideological game that, whether intentionally or not, can mock the aggrieved parties
who are being deprived of their property rights by increasingly harsh land-use
regulations but are then told by lower court judges that whatever it is that they seek
by way of securing judicial relief is the wrong way to go about it. 200 Note that by
saying this I address not only the substantive results of litigation, which have
problems of their own, but even more strongly the process. One should be able to
present one's claim of federal constitutional violation to a federal court and receive
a reasonably expeditious win or lose response on the merits without having to spend
decades wandering through administrative proceedings, followed by multiple
lawsuits in the state courts, only to be told at the end that the federal claim, though
valid, will not be heard on the merits in either court system.20'
To add insult to injury, modem land-use regulations that have fueled much of
this litigation often fail to serve the public interest, but rather are frequently imposed
by local entities serving parochial interests 2 and not the cause of good planning
or protection of the environment. As Professor Orlando Delogu put it: "There is no
good faith, no forbearance out of respect for the constitution or a larger sense of the
term 'general welfare.' There is only parochialism - in appropriate legal language,
an abdication of larger responsibilities, and a misuse of police power."2 3 Local
9 See Berger & Kanner, Shell Game!, supra note 38, at 702-03; Michael M. Berger,
Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3 WASH U. J.L. & POL'Y
99 (2000) [hereinafter Berger, Bait & Switch]; see also Kanner, Hunting the Snark, supra
note 3, at 328-31, 342-45. See Callies, supra note 19, at 538 n.87, for an extensive collection

of criticisms regarding the "ripeness mess."
200 See, e.g., Berger & Kanner, Needfor Reform, supra note 11, at 875 n. 146, 883 n.171
(providing examples of property owners involuntarily cast in the role of latter day Flying
Dutchmen, doomed to wander the seven seas forever - here doomed to wander through a
multiplicity of courts - to no purpose); Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v.
Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 284 (4th Cir. 1998) (commenting that the case before
it had "already passed through procedural purgatory and wended its way to procedural hell").
201 Sandy Creek Investors, Ltd. v. City of Jonestown, 325 F.3d 623, 626 (5th Cir. 2003)
(Case removed from state to federal court, and there dismissed for lack of federal
jurisdiction.); Anderson v. Charter Township of Ypsilanti, 266 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2001)
(Case filed in state court, then removed to federal court, then state issues remanded to state
court and federal action stayed; following completion of state court litigation, case dismissed
by federal court.).
202 FRIEDEN, supra note 11; see also Melville Branch, Sins of City Planners,42 PUB. AD.
REV. 1 (1982); Rodney L. Cobb, Land Use Law: Marredby PublicAgency Abuse, 3 WASH.
U. J.L. &POL'Y, 195 (2000) (staff attorney for the American Planning Association); Williams
et al., supra note 117, at 242 (conceding that often regulatory actions are "ubiquitous, vicious
and devoid of any resemblance of procedural due process").
203 Orlando F. Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 36

ME.L. REV. 261, 288 (1984).
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regulators often advance the exclusionary interests of affluent and influential
NIMBY suburbanites who get to enjoy their agreeable lifestyles, thank you very
much,204 while people on the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder are
increasingly hard put to find a roof over their heads" 5 as increasingly draconian
land-use regulations restrict the supply of housing.2 6 Much of this problem is the
direct result of an overly deferential judicial approach to land-use regulation that,
apart from legitimate, nuisance-based provisions said to justify it, has from the
outset tended to serve as an exclusionary device, that even at its birth was correctly
perceived by an intellectuallyhonestjudgeas ameansofeffecting socialandeconomic
segregation, 7 and to a significant extent has done so ever since, overtly and
covertly. Thus, most recently, in the Tahoe-Sierra case, the Supreme Court held
against ordinary people's right to build single-family homes on their small lots
above Lake Tahoe, while at the same time, commercial construction is booming on
the shores of South Lake Tahoe, and wealthy, influential individuals like Michael
Milken, Mike Love of the Beach Boys, and heirs to the Singer sewing machine
fortune are building large, multi-million dollar palatial waterfront mansions, without
hindrance from the authorities. 0 8
But whatever the motivation behind judicial attitudes, as the late Arvo Van
Alstyne put it some thirty years ago, this field is characterized by "confusing and
During my years as a teacher of Land-Use and Eminent Domain law, I was frequently
amused by the incredulous reaction of my well-to-do students from posh parts of town, when
they learned to their amazement that an environmentally desirable community relies on
compact, multi-family housing and mass-transportation. These factors are environmentally
superior to large homes requiring a large and less-efficient infrastructure, thus frustrating the
use of mass transit. The absence of mass transit in turn requires higher energy consumption
per person and causes commuter traffic congestion as well as urban sprawl. The confusion
on the part of these bright young people, between a high level of amenities and environmentally desirable conditions was all too apparent and it reflected values with which they had
been inculcated.
205 See Allison B. Cohen, The Middle-ClassHousingSqueeze, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004,
at KL ("[T]he median California home price in January was $405,725, the middle-class
dream of homeownership is moving out of reach for many."); Wilcox, supra note 74 ('The
median price of a California home soared 26.5 percent in May to a record $465,160."); cf.
FISCHEL, supranote 14, at 218-52 (analyzing the impact of land-use regulations on California
housing costs and criticizing the lower courts' refusal to interdict unreasonable regulations).
206 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING 177-81 (1982); REPORT OF
2"4

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1991).

"NOT IN MY BACK YARD" -

REMOVING

207 CompareAmbler Realty Co. v. Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924) (invalidating
the zoning ordinance in question and observing that the ordinance contributes to class
segregation), with Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,394 (1926) (containing, in the
midst of the decision by Justice Sutherland, an out-of-the-blue vigorous diatribe denouncing
the apartments and their inhabitants). Res ipsa loquitur.
208 Eric Bailey, Lake Stays Blue but Criticsof PanelSee Red, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2002,
at B5; see Berger, supranote 185, at 323-24.
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incompatible results, often explained in conclusionary terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric."'
If anything, things have grown worse since Van Alstyne
wrote. 210 In the aftermath of Penn Central'sformulation of its three-part test, which
was followed a couple of years later by the different Agins two-part test,21 1 some
lower courts, notably in California and New Jersey, have seized on the multi-factor
approach and have transmogrified it into vague ten-part tests that impose enormous
evidentiary burdens and large litigation costs on the relief-seeking plaintiffs but
enable trial judges to reach whatever results they want in any particular case.21 2 Yet,
whether a two-, three-, or ten-part test is the norm, that intellectual bucket of smoke
is now "the law" that is said to govern most regulatory taking claims; i.e., those
other than physical seizures and intrusions, and deprivations of all viable economic
use of the regulated property. In short, to put it in scriptural terms, for the past
quarter century the landowning citizens of this country have been asking the U.S.
Supreme Court for intellectual bread, but the Court gave them doctrinal stone.
The bottom line of it all is that the Supreme Court has more or less given up on
giving the country good, reasonably clear takings law and is trying its hand at caseby-case governance instead. Unfortunately, it lacks the time, the resources, the
knowledgeable personnel, and in the end, the competence to do a good job of it.
VI. WHAT HATH PENN CENTRAL WROUGHT?

Though this Article goes on to examine the litigational process as the Penn
Central case wended its way through four court levels, its primary concern is
directed to the following questions:
(i) Was the case ripe for judicial review, i.e., did the courts
have jurisdiction to entertain it on the merits?
209

Van Alstyne, supra note 16, at 2.

2,0

In spite of the enormous rise in the extent and intensity of land-use regulations in the

last quarter century, the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed only one - count 'em, one - taking
case in which aggrieved property owners were awarded compensation below, and this on
facts so egregious that the Justices of both ideological wings were visibly shocked during
oral argument. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999). But after the Del
Monte Dunes decision came down, the Monterey City Attorney was quoted as saying: "Will
it change anything? No." Kristi Belcamino, Monterey Loses Long Court Battle, HERALD
(Monterey County), May 25, 1999, at A1O.
21 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that a regulation is a
taking if (a) it "does not advance a legitimate state interest," or (b) "denies the owner
economically viable use of his land").
212 See Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860-61 (Cal. 1997);
East Cape May Assoc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Pres., 693 A.2d 114, 128-29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1997).
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(ii) Was the state court decision sufficiently final to confer
appellate jurisdiction on the U.S. Supreme Court?
(iii) Given the prevailing rule that appellate courts of last resort
do not consider issues that had not been properly raised and
litigated below, was it a proper case for either New York
Court of Appeals or U.S. Supreme Court review?
(iv) Last and most distressing, did the New York Court of

Appeals decide this case in good faith?
As shown presently, based on a clear historical record and a substantial body of

settled law, the answers to these questions are in the negative, although I find the
ripeness part puzzling because (a) in setting out to develop its property, Penn
Central had applied for the necessary building permission, not once but twice, thus
carrying its permit application process to its point of finality as required by
21 3
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, and then (b) sued in the state

courts, seeking just compensation. Why that would not make the case ripe under the
4
Williamson County Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank" rule that imposes
only these two ripeness conditions and does not require pursuit of administrative or

non-monetary judicial remedies,215 has not been explained, even though both the
Supreme Court and lower courts have asserted after the fact that Penn Central was
216

unripe.
17
Also, in light of San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, it seems
clear that when the Penn Central decision of the New York Court of Appeals
concluded with an order allowing the plaintiff to present additional proofs on
remand to the trial court, 218 that left the litigation short of a final judgment, and thus
23 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (holding that a landowner's quest for the administrative finality
required for ripeness may have to be performed twice).
214 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985) (holding that an as-applied federal taking claim is not
ripe until after the property owners (a) have carried the administrative quest for necessary
permits to its final conclusion (which does not require pursuit of either administrative or
judicial [non-monetary] remedies), and (b) have sued for just compensation in the state
courts).
215 Id. at 192-93.
216 Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 735 n.9 (1997); see also RGoshen LLC v. Village of Goshen, 289 F. Supp. 2d 441, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding but not explaining why - Penn Central was unripe).
217 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (holding that where a trial court's finding that a taking occurred
is reversed and remanded, for a new trial, that procedural posture fails to meet the finality
requirement of U.S.C. § 1257 and thus the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction).
2"8 Penn Central,366 N.E.2d 1271, 1279 (N.Y. 1977). I must confess here to considerable
confusion on my own part. I do not understand how the New York Court of Appeals could
say that the Appellate Division'sjudgment ordering that the case be dismissed was affirmed,
and yet the affirmance of that order of dismissal was to be followed by another trial in the
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not subject to review by the U.S. Supreme Court on the merits for lack of finality.
In fairness to the Court, San Diego was not decided until 1981, whereas Penn
Central was reviewed in 1978, but that does not change the fact that this was a
matter of jurisdiction, which the Court either had or didn't have. San Diego, being
the most recent case on point is thus controlling, and it unmasks, albeit retroactively,
the U.S. Supreme Court's Penn Centraldecision as having been rendered by a court
lacking jurisdiction. This jurisdictional error on the part of the Court was hardly
unprecedented; when similar judicial errors occurred in the past, the Court has held
that cases decided by it without jurisdiction to do so, lack precedential authority." 9
Therefore, in spite of its current iconic stature in the decisional law of taking jurisprudence, Penn Central is a non-case - a decision rendered by a Court without
jurisdiction on two counts (lack of finality and lack of ripeness), and as such of no
precedential authority. Yet, except for rare cases of categorical takings, Penn
Centralis now said to be the polestar - The Law of the Land. 2
Be that as it may, and whatever its jurisdictional shortcomings, the Penn Central
opinion de facto worked a watershed change in eminent domain doctrine.
Unfortunately, in handing it down, the Court paid scant attention to preexisting
law 22' and to litigational practicalities of the rules - or perhaps more accurately,
non-rules - it formulated as it went along. As one commentator put it, "[w]ith this
[Penn Central] case, the Supreme Court jumped back into the land use arena.
Unfortunately, it landed on its head. 2 22 Another well-informed commentator who
form of a presentation of additional evidence going to the core issue of whether a taking
occurred.
If the retrial was not to be an elaborate charade with a preordained result, the trial court
would have to be empowered to reach the same conclusion as it did originally, that a taking
had occurred. Otherwise what would be the purpose of such evidentiary presentation in the
trial court after remand? If any of my readers can enlighten me as to how it is possible for
an appellate court to affirm a judgment of dismissal and yet remand the case for another
evidentiary trial, I would appreciate the help. See Costonis, supra note 26, at 417 (characterizing this aspect of the Court of Appeals decision, with understatement as "christening a
search for the Holy Grail," and referring to future courts' grappling with this problem as a
"quixotic task").
Of course, as Judge Breitel explained later, Penn Central had been sent off on a wild
goose chase. TDR Conference, supra note 72, at 147 ("[Penn Central] couldn't show very
much about it," because coming up with the respective public-private breakdown figures
would be "meaningless" and "You are going to be choosing an arbitrary figure.").
219 United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952).
220 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
221 This brings to mind an old appellate lawyers' joke involving the following exchange
between a lawyer arguing a case and an appellate courtjustice: "JUSTICE: But counsel, isn't
controlling law contrary to your submission? COUNSEL: It wasn't, Your Honor, until you
spoke."
222 GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAND AND THE SUPREME COURT 52 (1998) (criticizing the
Penn CentralCourt for providing an "atheoretical set of tools that were difficult to apply").
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strongly favors unfettered government regulations, observed that
[T]he Penn Centraltest... is so vague and indeterminate that
it invites unprincipled, subjective decision making by the courts.
The [Penn Central] three-factor test (which may only be a twofactor test) does not provide any clear direction of how to decide
regulatory takings cases, inviting judges to decide based on their
own personal values.223
One surmises therefore that, putting the best face on it, and believing that the Court
could not have intended to destabilize the law so dramatically, the ineluctable
conclusion is that the Court did not fully understand either its own preexisting
jurisprudence, or the enormous departures from it that the Penn Central opinion
wrought, nor the obstacles to effective and efficient adjudication it was erecting.
This much is no longer subject to serious argument, because of the recent candid onthe-record concessions of the participants in the Penn Central litigation - both
advocates and the Justices' clerks - that they did not understand Penn Central to
be a very important case.224
To make matters worse, it is certain that the U.S. Supreme Court's Penn Central
opinion was drafted in haste. The case was argued on April 17, and the opinion
filed on June 26, 1978. This timing suggests that it was a product of the notorious
end-of-the-term crush of opinions being rushed to completion before the end of the
Court's term on June 30.225 As such it was unlikely to be an exemplar of thoughtful
John D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-Factor Test Ready for History's
Dustbin?, 52 LAND USE & ZONINo DiG. 3, 7 (2000).
224 Transcript, supra note 56, at 294 (describing the cases as a "ho hum case"); id. at 295
(remembering thinking the case was important "but less important than a lot of the other
cases that we had that term").
225 Cases that are argued during the Court's term, beginning on the first Monday in
October, are decided by the end of that term. Thus, the end of the term has been described
as the "dog days." EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 26 (1998). There occurs the endof-term crush, as clerks and Justices work to beat the clock and complete the still-undecided
or incomplete opinions in cases argued earlier in the term. This is not to say that no work is
done on parts of opinions before oral argument, but such efforts cannot come together, so to
speak, as final, coherent judicial products until after oral arguments are heard. Only then do
the Justices decide whether to affirm or reverse, which of them will be assigned to produce
the majority opinion and the dissent, and how the opinion draft(s) must be modified to gain
the assent of all Justices concurring in them.
At the time Penn Centralwas handed down, the Court was deciding cases on the merits
at the furious rate of 135 per year. The Supreme Court 1977 Term, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 137
(1978). Do the arithmetic, bearing in mind that the Court files no opinions for three months
out of the year, that a year has only 365 days, or fewer than 250 working days, and that in
addition to opinion writing, the Justices have to attend to a variety of administrative,
professional, and ceremonial functions during the term, meet to consider petitions for
223
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reflection and detached analysis, to say nothing of the fact that its issues fell into an
area of the law that at the time was very rarely considered by the Court, which
justifies the surmise that the Justices were not well acquainted with the subject of
their decision (having considered no land-use/takings cases during the preceding
decade), so that this was precisely the kind of case that warranted considerable selfeducation, reflection, and self-discipline by the decision makers, which it did not
and could not receive, given its timing.
What we thus seem to have on our hands is a case of the proverbial
jurisprudential giant standing on feet of clay. In an evident effort to reach the
desired result - insuring the preservation of Grand Central Terminal as a historical
landmark without compensation for the denial to Penn Central of economically
viable use of its property - the New York Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme
Court disregarded or ran roughshod over just about every rule that stood in their
way, and made up ad hoc rules as they went along, without an attempt to integrate
them into the preexisting fabric of the law. In a classic illustration of the old saw
that hard cases make bad law, Penn Centralmade very bad law indeed. It failed in
virtually every way a case can fail, jurisdictionally, procedurally, as well as substantively. Ironically, for all its transparent result-orientation, the Penn Central
decision also failed to produce the results on the ground that were advanced in the
courts as justification for the City's legal position.226
certiorari, hear oral arguments, consider motions and emergency petitions in death penalty
cases, etc. That does not leave much time for reflection and thoughtful analysis of the, at
times, difficult issues and novel language of the opinions. As Justice Brennan's clerk put it:
"[I1t was like sleepwalking." Transcript, supra note 56, at 301 (reporting that the Penn
Central opinion was written - or "came together" as he put it to me in our telephone
conversation in February 2004 - in a series of three all-nighters during the Memorial Day
weekend). The draft was then delivered to Justice Brennan for his review and comments at
5:30 a.m. on the morning of Memorial Day. He returned the marked-up opinion to his clerk
on Tuesday of the Memorial Day weekend. Id. at 302.
This end-of-the-term intellectual high-pressure atmosphere makes it unlikely, to put it
politely, that the detailed language of opinions being rushed to completion, whether by the
Justices, or as is far more likely, by their clerks, can possibly receive the thoughtful reflection
they deserve. A novel phrase in a Supreme Court opinion that gives rise to uncertainty and
much subsequent litigation may thus not be a considered formulation of legal principle, but
rather a fortuitous choice of words made by a harried clerk pounding away at a word
processor in a midnight effort to beat the end-of-the-term deadline, while wrestling with an
unfamiliar subject and accommodating changes demanded by his or her Justice as well as the
concurring Justices. As for the Justices (and their clerks) who are not authoring a particular
opinion but concur in it even as they attend to the burdens of writing their own opinions,
there is a legitimate question as to how well, or possibly whether, they are able to become
fully acquainted with the details and subtleties of the law being expounded in this fashion.
See generally Kanner, Holy Shit, supra note 188, at 430-31. See also Kanner, Hunting the
Snark, supranote 3, at 344-45 (discussing the outright blunders that can occur towards the
end of the Court's term).
226 See infra note 438.
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VII. THE BACKGROUND

The problem originated in New York Chief Judge Charles Breitel's conviction
that government regulators should not be required to pay for regulatory takings of
private property. He first expressed that view in his dissent in Keystone Associates
v. State, 7 where he argued that when a confiscatory statute fails to provide compensation for temporary denial of use of private property, it is unconstitutional and void,
but nonetheless provides no basis for a judicial award of compensation to the
aggrieved owners. Judge Breitel reasoned that because uncompensated takings are
illegal, no compensation can be awarded because that would make the taking legal,
so the aggrieved owner should only be entitled to a judicial declaration of invalidity
of the regulation. He was right on his premise (that only uncompensated takings are
illegal) but wrong otherwise.22 He failed to confront the pragmatic problem that
arises when the government regulations are not merely abstractly illegal but in
application inflict irrevocable economic harm on the regulated owner, so that by the
time they are declared invalid by the courts, the owner has already suffered
irreversible economic losses.229 Judge Breitel's Keystone Associates dissent thus
failed to address the thrust of Keystone's submission, namely, the problem arising
when plaintiff-landowners seek compensation for a temporary taking that has
230
His
already occurred, causing substantial economic harm while in existence.
307 N.E.2d 254 (N.Y. 1973) (awarding damages to a property owner for rents
irrevocably lost when a law delayed development of the subject property, thus functioning
as a temporary taking); see also Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 (N.Y. 1976).
228 The validity of a regulation and the inquiry whether, though valid, it effects a taking
of property, are two distinct issues. Kaiser Adtna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979);
Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 n.3 (1932) (finding the lack of compensation, not the
taking, illegal and awarding just compensation as the aggrieved landowner's sole remedy);
accord Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984); Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689, 691 (1981) (holding that damages are preferred to injunctive
relief, particularly against the government); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682, 703-04 (1949) (explaining the reasoning for preferring damages to injunctive
relief against the govemment); see also Hurley, 285 U.S. at 104 (warning that courts should
not dictate to the executive branch of government what it may or may not do when the
Constitution specifies a remedy).
229 See Gideon Kanner, Measure of Damages in Nonphysical Inverse Condemnation
227

Cases, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN

§ 12.02[2][f] (Carol J. Holgren ed., 1989) (exploring the valuation litigation in Keystone
Assocs. v. State, 307 N.E.2d 254 (N.Y. 1973)).
230 Keystone Assocs. v. State, 307 N.E.2d 254 (N.Y. 1973) (Breitel, J., dissenting); cf
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (holding that where a
violation of a citizen's civil rights has already occurred, damages are the only practical
remedy, because under these circumstances it is "damages or nothing"); see also Owen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980) (holding that damages are "a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees").
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approach would have made invalidation without more an idle act in many cases
because it would only tell the regulators "You shouldn't have done it," but would
otherwise provide no realistic relief for the period of denial of viable economic use
of the plaintiff's property and of the loss of income that would have been generated
by the property in the interim.23 The fact that the illegality of the regulation may
be established later, and the property's reasonable use may be then prospectively
restored to the owner by court decree, free of the illegal restraints on its use, does
not remedy the irreversible economic harm already inflicted in the interim.
Judge Breitel eventually persuaded his colleagues to accept his no-compensation
approach in Fred F. French Investment Co. v. City of New York.232 In French,
Breitel convinced his brethren that Justice Holmes did not actually mean "taking"
when Holmes wrote in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that a regulation that goes
too far will be recognized as a taking.233 Rather, French held in a bit of revisionist
history that Justice Holmes used the word "taking" as a metaphor when what he
really meant was deprivation of property without due process of law. While over
a half century had elapsed between Mahon and French, during which Holmes's
views had been analyzed and dissected by numerous courts and eminent scholars,
no one else had argued that Holmes had spoken metaphorically. Nonetheless,
Frenchproceeded on the theory that because the Due Process Clause lacks the Just
Compensation mandate, relief under a substantive Due Process theory would be
limited to a declaration of invalidity of the regulation.234 Of course, this was a mistaken notion, for two reasons. First, under the equitable cleanup doctrine, where
injunctive relief is granted, the courts also provide complete relief by awarding
damages for the harm inflicted before the issuance of the equitable non-monetary
remedy.235 Second, because violations of the Due Process Clause are every bit as
unconstitutional as violations of the Just Compensation Clause, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 provides for a remedy at law for violation of all constitutional rights,236 one
In Keystone Associates, a State statute temporarily forbade the demolition of the old
New York Metropolitan Opera House, which its new owners meant to replace with a modem
building. When the statute was declared unconstitutional, the owners sued on a temporary
taking basis, and recovered just compensation for denial of use of its property pending
invalidation of the statute. Keystone Assocs., 307 N.E.2d 254.
232 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
233 Id. at 385; cf Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ('The general rule at
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking.").
234 French, 350 U.S. at 385 (denying damages and finding that "declaratory relief' is the
proper remedy).
235 For a discussion of the doctrine, see State ex rel. Leonardi v. Sherry, 137 S.W.3d 462
(Mo. 2004).
236 Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1128-29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,488 U.S.
868 (1988)
(remanding case for trial on the merits on a substantive due process theory); Herrington v.
Sonoma County, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,489 U.S. 1090 (1988) (awarding damages for confiscatory land-use regulations on a substantive due process theory); see
231
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is hard put to fathom how the New York Court of Appeals intended to deny
landowners any compensatory remedy because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to actions
of state and local officials and municipalities. In any event, Judge Breitel' s historical revisionism was short-lived. Justice Brennan, surely no rock-ribbed defender
of private property rights, shot down Breitel's theory in San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. v. City of San Diego,2 37 where he bluntly charged the New York Court of
Appeals with tampering with the language of Mahon.238
The remarkable thing about Breitel's short-lived intellectual "metaphor" caper,
and the associated excursion into substantive due process as a basis for judicial
invalidation of economic property regulations, was that, though not expressly recognized at the time by most of its proponents, this would have de facto revived the
moribund doctrine of Lochner v. New York2 39 that is usually highly disfavored by the
very people who support far-reaching economic regulation of property. Yet neither
20
the New York Court of Appeals nor others who endorsed this reasoning took note
241
of this anomaly.

also Kenneth B. Bley, Substantive Due Processand Land Use: The Alternative to a Takings
Claim, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFER
DoLAN AND LUCAS (David L. Callies ed., 1996) [hereinafter TAKINGS].
237 San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 649 n. 14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with the majority's failure to recognize the primacy of the compensation remedy in
regulatory takings cases). But see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (adopting Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas &

Electric).
238 See San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 655 n.22 and accompanying text (Brennan,

J., dissenting) (explaining why mere invalidation was inadequate by quoting a California city
attorney who boasted that under the no-compensation approach, illegal regulations could be
reenacted, causing everyone to start all over again).
239 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern
Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation,76 B.U. L. REv. 605, 608-09
(1996); Norman Karlin, Back to the Future:From Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U. L. REv. 627,
631 (1988); Comment, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due
Process Reconsidered, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1363 (1990).
24 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), affd on other grounds
447 U.S. 255 (1980), overruled by First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of

Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 491-95 (1981) (arguing that the usual hierarchy of remedies
241

whereby damages are preferred to specific relief should be obverted in inverse condemnation
cases and replaced with a due process analysis with invalidation as the sole remedy).
Remarkably, that article, authored by a highly qualified scholar, failed to discuss the Lochner
implications of its argument, or even to cite any U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with
remedies in general or remedies for takings in particular.
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VIII. THE PENN CENTRAL CONTROVERSY

Though recited in great detail in the U.S. Supreme Court opinion, the core
operative facts underlying the Penn Central controversy were straightforward.242
The rise in highway transportation and the consequent decline in railroad usage by
degrees caused the Penn Central Railroad to become insolvent, and to file for
bankruptcy. 43 As a public carrier that served the densely populated Northeast
Atlantic Coast area, the railroad could not just shut down its money-losing operations, and had to continue operating while in bankruptcy. As a result, Penn Central
found itself subject to an operational deficit. In 1969, it experienced a $1,165,470
deficit from the operation of the Grand Central Terminal (which had been leased to
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority), and that deficit figure rose to
$1,902,467 by 1971.244 In short, Penn Central was locked into an ongoing deficit
operation, with no relief in sight. The solution Penn Central came up with was to
increase revenues from its property by leasing the air rights above the Grand Central
Terminal to UGP Properties, which planned to construct a fifty-story office building
directly above the terminal, not unlike an earlier such effort that resulted in the
construction of the Pan Am (now Met Life) high rise office building on Penn
Central's air rights above its underground tracks, somewhat north of the terminal
itself.

245

However, the ornate Beaux Arts Grand Central Terminal building had been
designated by the City of New York as a historical landmark, and under New York's
Landmark Preservation Law it could not be altered without City permission. 246 To
obtain such permission, Penn Central submitted two successive plans for the
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107-15. In spite of its detailed dissection of the lower
courts' decisions, the Penn Centralopinion does not accurately depict the trial court's ruling.
That court did not base its decision, as asserted in a footnote, on the ruling that "any
regulation of private property to protect landmark values was unconstitutional." Id. at 119
n.20. Rather, its decision was based on the economics forced on Penn Central that compelled
it to operate indefinitely at a deficit.
243 See Gideon Kanner, Development in EminentDomain:A Candle in the Dark Comer of
the Law, 52 U.DET. J.URB. L. 861, 861-72 (1975) (commenting on Blanchette v. Connecticut
GeneralInsuranceCorps., 419 U.S. 102 (1974), known as the RegionalRail Reorganization
Cases, which dealt with other takings ramifications of railroad bankruptcies that included
Penn Central).
244 See Penn Central, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 33 (Lupiano, J., dissenting) (detailing Penn
Central's financial obligations under its lease of Grand Central Terminal to the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority as amounting to $4,500,000 a year for five years, and $2,000,000
thereafter).
245 Id. at 32 (noting the similarity between the UGP plan and the Pan-American Building
(now Met Life Building) built on Penn Central's air rights over its tracks just north from
Grand Central Terminal).
246 N.Y. Crrv ADMIN. CODE § 25-305(a)(1) (LEXIS through 2004 legislation).
242
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proposed new building. It retained the services of the renowned architectural firm
of Marcel Breuer & Associates which at first came up with a design that later
became known as Breuer I. It would not alter the concourse and it was in keeping
with the original designs for Grand Central Terminal that contemplated the
construction of an office building over the present terminal. 41 The Breuer I design
called for a taller building than what had been originally contemplated when Grand
Central Terminal was built, and it concededly would have improved access to the
terminal and to the subway. 48 The Landmarks Commission denied approval for
Breuer I on subjective aesthetic grounds, claiming that the proposed new building
would "'reduce the Landmark itself to the status of a curiosity." 249 Penn Central
then submitted another design, known as Breuer II. The Commission disapproved
that plan as well, commenting adversely on the fact that it would do away with the
terminal's fagade.2 "' At this point another property owner could have sought
administrative relief. However, under New York law Penn Central could not pursue
this form of relief because entities receiving partial exemption from real estate taxes
(as did Penn Central) are not allowed to avail themselves of that option. At this
point Penn Central did the only thing it could: it sued, challenging the
constitutionality of the Landmark Preservation Law on the grounds that as applied,
the law was a taking, and a denial of due process and of equal protection.,,,
IX. THE TRIAL COURT DECISION

Applying traditional law, the trial court concluded that Penn Central had been
thrust into a position where it would have to suffer an ongoing deficit in the
operation of the Grand Central Terminal for the indefinite future.252 This, found the
trial court, amounted to a taking because it deprived Penn Central of economically
viable use of its property and imposed economic hardship on it.25 3 Accordingly, the
247

JESSE DUKEMINIER &JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1067-68 (1988) (containing pictures

of Penn Central's proposed designs by Marcel Breuer).

248 See Penn Central, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 31 (Lupiano, J., dissenting).

Id. (Lupiano, J., dissenting).
Id. (Lupiano, J., dissenting).
251 Id. at 33 (Lupiano, J., dissenting).
252 AccordAverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 15 N.E.2d 587,592 (N.Y. 1938) (observ249

250

ing that forcing property owners into a predicament where no economically viable use could
be made of their land would be worse than outright confiscation because confiscation would
at least relieve them of having to pay property taxes and bear other economic burdens of
ownership).
253 Penn Central, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 33; see Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183

(1927) (holding a zoning ordinance that prevented the owner from receiving a reasonable
return on his property to be unconstitutional); Keystone Assocs. v. State, 333 N.Y.S.2d 27
(App. Div. 1972), aff'd, 307 N.E.2d 254 (N.Y. 1973) (awarding compensation for a temporary regulatory taking for temporary denial use of the Manhattan Metropolitan Opera House).
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trial court found the Landmarks Law unconstitutional as applied to the tJrana
Central Terminal. As related by the subsequent Appellate Division's majority opinion, the reason for the decision was the economic hardship the regulation imposed
on Penn Central, the lack of a compensatory remedy provided by the Historical
Preservation Law, and the inadequacy of relief by tax rebate. Actually, the trial
court's findings were quite a bit more extensive. 4 The Appellate Division's
assertion that the trial court's decision rested on the idea "that the authorities
empowered to make the [historical landmark] designation may do so but only at the
'
expense of those who will ultimately have to bear the cost, the taxpayers"255
did not
accurately depict the trial court's ruling. That court found, not only that Penn
Central had been forced to suffer an operational deficit, but that the terminal was
"deteriorating at a substantial rate," imposing an annual maintenance cost on Penn
Central of $1,278,135, as well as that ongoing operation of the terminal would
continue to generate an ongoing deficit that had to fall on Penn Central. 56 That was
a far cry from simply asserting that the expense of historical preservation should
always have to be borne by the taxpayers. The core ruling of the trial court was thus
based on the economic hardship imposed on Penn Central that deprived it of
reasonable, beneficial, and economically viable use of its property.
The trial court severed the part of its decision finding liability from the
compensation phase that would follow later, unless the City successfully appealed
the trial court's liability decision.
X. THE NEW YORK ESTABLISHMENT "GOES TO THE MATTRESSES"
While everyone with an interest in the Penn Central case knows that the City
appealed from the trial court's judgment and eventually prevailed, comparatively
few people are aware that the City almost threw in the towel after losing in the trial
court. Putting aside for the moment the novel decisions of the New York Court of
Appeals and of the U.S. Supreme Court, which then still lay in the future, it was
clear as the dust settled on the trial that on the basis of the then existing law, the trial
court had ruled correctly. However sliced, the core fact was that Penn Central
showed by uncontradicted evidence that it had been locked into an ongoing deficit
operation, and thus had proven its case, whether one applies what later became the
New York Appellate Division's majority view, or Justice Lupiano' s dissent. Either
way, the cold fact was that Penn Central had been forced into an ongoing, indefinite
deficit condition, leaving open only the quibble as to whether the annual deficit was
$1,902,467 as contended by Penn Central, or $1,089,672, which would have been
Penn Central, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
Id. at 33. (Lupiano, J., dissenting).
256 Id. (Lupiano, J., dissenting) (citing operation at a deficit as a factor in the lower court
ruling).
254
255
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the figure arrived at under the evidentiary criteria laid down in the Appellate
Division's later majority opinion. As correctly noted in the New York Appellate
Division dissent, the difference between these two figures had no impact on liability
because, either way, Penn Central was being forced to operate Grand Central
Terminal at a loss. It thus appeared that - given the definition of "return" in the
Historical Preservation Law as the excess of revenues over expenses - Penn
Central would prevail on appeal as it had at trial because the presence of the deficit
was incontestable and Penn Central's "return" under the historical Preservation Law
was negative.257
Evidently, the City must have reflected on these realities, concluded that
discretion would be the better part of valor, and largely decided not to appeal the
trial court's judgment. The City was already deeply operationally and financially
involved in the restoration and operation of the Grand Central Terminal, and
intended to acquire it, thus making it advisable for the City to bite the bullet, comply
with the trial court's judgment, or more likely, settle with sorely pressed Penn
Central on advantageous terms. Thereby both parties would achieve what was
salvageable from this confrontation. Indeed, Penn Central had offered to settle on
terms whereby it would waive its claim to damages if the City would not appeal the
trial court's decision, thus allowing Penn Central to proceed with its construction.
Unsurprisingly, the City's lawyers thought that compromise along these lines was
feasible and that a settlement could be worked out.258
The impetus to appeal came from outside the New York City government,
notably from New York's Municipal Arts Society which Babcock and Siemon aptly
'
These social "heavy
characterize as a "'big-name' prestigious organization." 259
hitters" were joined by Jackie Onassis, and later by the likes of Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan. Their full-blown publicity campaign was professionally handled
gratis by J. Walter Thompson, the large, highly regarded advertising and public
relations agency. Babcock and Siemon relate that by the time it was over, everyone
at J. Walter Thompson agreed that their effort in this case generated more footage
and print than anything the people at this top-tier advertising and public relations
firm had ever seen in their lives. The New York Establishment put on a full-court
press to persuade, if not intimidate, Mayor Abe Beame to override the recom257
258

Id. at 34-35 (Lupiano, J. dissenting).
BABCOCK & SIEMON, supra note 68, at 59-76 (describing the events surrounding the

settlement negotiations).
As fully credentialed "police power hawks," Babcock and Siemon opposed compensation for regulatory takings, and used the discussion of the Penn Central case in their
book as a departure point for criticizing the compensation remedy, quarreling with Justice
Brennan's San Diego Gas & Electric dissent, which favored compensation for regulatory
takings. Nonetheless, in spite of these polemical departures, the chapter on the Penn Central
case in the Bacock and Siemon book is rich in little-known factual details about the behindthe-scenes struggles that preceded the City's decision to appeal, and about what followed.
259 BABCOCK & SIEMON, supra note 68, at 65.
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mendation of the city attorney, and have the City appeal from the trial court s
judgment holding the historical preservation law unconstitutional as applied to the
Grand Central Terminal. 2 The effort was successful. The Mayor overruled the
Corporation Counsel and announced that the City would appeal from the trial
court's judgment. It was a triumph of high-society clout over legal analysis, but the
way things are in the real world, when high-society speaks, mere mayors listen, and
perhaps so do the courts.
I urge the readers to read this chapter in The Zoning Game Revisited for
themselves, and thus gain a better understanding of how large, how professional,
and how sophisticated this effort was. The people behind this propaganda campaign
were not satisfied with just getting the City to appeal and letting the appellate
process take its course. Later on, when the Penn Centralcase was before the U.S.
Supreme Court, they organized a publicity campaign that extended far beyond New
York and culminated in organizing a whistlestop train trek that went to Washington
through New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland. They named their
train "The Grand Central Express.' 261 It received huge amounts of publicity, and its
promoters' avowed purpose was "to whip up emotions. 262
Did the members of the New York Establishment actually believe that their
publicity campaign would sway the Supreme Court Justices? One would like to
believe that they respected the Justices too much for that. But the Justices are
human and sometimes things are not quite what they appear to be from the vantage
point of a high school civics class. On reflection, the better, if paradoxical, answer
to the above question (whether all this flackery influenced the Court's decision)
would appear to be both "yes" and "no." True enough, members of the New York
Establishment had to be far too sophisticated to think that the Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court would permit themselves to be publicly depicted as being consciously swayed by these public relations antics. Still, when the likes of Jackie
Onassis and a mob of political celebrities march in front of the Supreme Court
building, compleat with picket signs, clowns, and balloons, that cannot fail to have
some impact, if only subliminally.
Babcock and Siemon quote Margot Wellington, one of the leaders of the Grand
Central Terminal preservation movement, as explaining that, though its leaders did
not think their public relations campaign would sway the Justices, they were aiming
their efforts at
these brilliant young clerks that come out of law schools, all of
whom are a great deal closer to young passions and youthful
67. The publicity efforts expanded even broader when Penn Central reached the
Supreme Court, with the Municipal Arts Society traversing the North Atlantic coast on a
special train known as "The Grand Central Express."
261 Id. at 67.
262 Id. at 69.
26I
Id. at
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thinking than the gray eminences. The knowledge of a national
sentiment for preservation and the knowledge of a national
sentiment for the preservation of Grand Central is something
that will have an effect on the Clerks and it's going to creep into
the decision somehow.... And, in fact, there was a recognition
in the decision.263
Babcock and Siemon agree; they observe that "this tale may be one of those
instances where lay efforts did, in fact, have a significant impact on the opinion of
the courts."2"
Three observations seem pertinent at this point. First, we have evidently come
a long way from the days when Finley Peter Dunn's fictional Irish publican, Mr.
Dooley, famously observed that irrespective of whether the Constitution follows the
flag, the Supreme Court follows the election returns.265 Penn Centralwas not even
a case of election returns, but merely the kind of hoopla that can sway elections, yet
at least in the opinion of participants in the process as well as knowledgeable and
prestigious gents like Babcock and Siemon, it appears to have had some influence
on the Court's end product. Second, Ms. Wellington's observation revealed an astute
perception on the part of the City supporters of the greatly increased if underappreciated role of clerks in the decision-making process in the Supreme Court.266
This is a subject that warrants considerable reflection and concern, because however
smart and diligent the clerks may be, they are not Justices, they lack real-world
experience in the practice of law generally and in the land-use field particularly, and
no one has legitimately invested them with the power to shape American law to the
extent they evidently do. Babcock and Siemon also report that while the Penn
Centralcase was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, "[t]here were numerous
telephone calls from clerks to the New York Corporation Counsel's Office inquiring
'
about how the Transfer of Development Rights worked."267
This seems like an
impropriety. Assuming that such calls were truly necessary, I fail to see why they
263 BABCOCK & SIEMON, supra note

68, at 69 (quoting Margot Wellington); see Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 109-10 (repeating the now familiar refrain that "burden[ing] the public
budget with costs of acquisition and maintenance" is "neither feasible nor wise").
'64 BABCOCK & SIEMON, supra note 68, at 63.
26 Satirist Finley Peter Dunn created his fictional Irish bartender "Mr. Dooley" as an
1890s Chicago newspaper columnist.
266 See Kanner, Hunting the Snark, supra note 3, at 333, 337-40, 345 (specifically
referencing the clerks' likely role in the formation of confusing regulatory taking law); Tony
Mauro, The Hidden Power of the Supreme Court: Justice Give Pivotal Role to Novice
Lawyers, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1998, at IA. See generally EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED
CHAMBERS (1998); John G. Kester, The Law Clerk Explosion, 3 LONG TERM VIEW 14 (1995);

Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Politicization:FromLaw School to the Courts, ACADEMIC QUESTIONS,
Winter 1993-94, at 9.
267 BABCOCK & SIEMON, supra note 68, at 274-75.
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could not have been made as three-way conference calls, with Penn Central's counsel on the line. One would like to believe that nothing of a partisan nature was said
in those telephone conversations to strengthen the City's case or weaken Penn
Central's. On the other hand, believing that might be a triumph of hope over the
realities of human nature. Whatever you may think about that feature of the controversy, it was not legal ethics' finest hour.
Finally, to the extent Ms. Wellington thought that the knowledge of a national
sentiment for preservation in general and preservation of Grand Central in particular
would have "an effect on clerks and creep into the decision somehow,"'2 68 it was an
accurate statement in the same sense one could say that Sherman crept into Georgia.
This was a massive, brazen, top-of-the-news, Establishment-driven, professionally
executed propaganda campaign overtly calculated to influence the Court and its
clerks, that gave the appearance of having worked. It also established an unfortunate precedent of giving respectability to demonstrations taking place before the
Supreme Court building when significant, controversial cases are argued - an activity that however well or ill intended, cannot help but detract from the perception
of the Supreme Court as an impartial tribunal that is above the fray and shuns even
the suggestion that it might be influenced by the cry of mobs milling in front of its
building.
XI. THE NEW YORK APPELLATE DivISION:
THE DEVIL IS IN THE ACCOUNTING DETAILS

The New York Appellate Division reversed the trial court's judgment. Unlike
the ideological Sturm und Drangthat animated the subsequent decisions of the New
York Court of Appeals and to a lesser extent the U.S. Supreme Court, the Appellate
Division based its decision on mundane matters of accounting that were tendered to
it for decision. The majority concluded that it was error for Penn Central to "improperly attribute a considerable amount of railroad operating expenses (and some
taxes) to their real estate operations. '269 This accounting error, said the majority,
was compounded by the fact that Penn Central failed to show an inability to increase
the Terminal's commercial income by transforming vacant or under-utilized space
to revenue producing uses, and that the unused transferable development rights
above the terminal could not have been profitably transferred to nearby properties.270
268 Id. at 69.
269
270

Penn Central,377 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
Id. at 28-29. Compare Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381,

387-88 (1976) (ruling that, unless the transferable development rights scheme identified the
specific "receiving parcels," the scheme is invalid), with Penn Central, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 29
(discussing a transfer "to one or more nearby sites" that were already occupied by substantial buildings). For a more realistic assessment of the difficulties with which such a transfer
would have been fraught, see Justice Lupiano's dissent, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 37-38. Eventually,
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The majority opinion contained two eyebrow-raising twists that warrant comment. First, it is the well-nigh universal practice that when an appellate court's
holding determining that an evidentiary rather than substantively fatal error occurred
at trial, the matter is remanded for retrial, this time on the basis of proper evidence.
But that is not what happened here. This was not a case in which the evidence
disclosed some fatal legal failing in the plaintiff's substantive case. On the contrary,
the court's majority found only that Penn Central's evidentiary presentation fell
short of demonstrating a deficit because Penn Central used a wrong accounting
procedure, had not attempted to prove what it could have done to improve its cash
flow with a more efficient utilization of the Grand Central building, and that Penn
Central's accounting failed to impute a rental from its railroad operations to its real
estate operations."" These lacunae were correctable evidentiary failings that Penn
Central should have been permitted to rectify on remand, if it could. The New York
Court of Appeals later disagreed with the Appellate Division on that point and, after
affirming its ruling, ordered that Penn Central be given an opportunity to present
additional evidence after remand.272 But the Appellate Division majority opinion
concluded with an order that the case be remanded to the trial court with directions
to dismiss the action and enterjudgment for the City, rather than afford Penn Central
a retrial in which it would have an opportunity to present the missing evidence in a
manner held by the majority as essential to a determination of this sort.273 There was
no explanation why the Appellate Division ruled that way, thus heading Penn
Central off at the pass, so to speak.
The majority ruling thus seems indicative of considerable result-oriented
jurisprudence. Justice Lupiano's dissent, factually uncontradicted by the majority,
indicated that the proceedings in the trial court did develop sufficient evidence of
a deficit, albeit a smaller one, even after using the approach preferred by the
majority. Thus, Justice Lupiano made clear that if Penn Central had been permitted
to retry its case using the majority's rules, it still would have prevailed, albeit the
amount of its annual deficit would be reduced from $1,902,467 to $1,089,672.274
Penn Central was able to sell some development rights to local developers, who then
presumably passed on the added cost to their buyers and tenants, thus distributing the cost
onto the public, albeit in a random, haphazard, and self-serving way. Transcript, supra note
56, at 316. See generally David W. Dunlap, A Battle Looms over GrandCentral'sAirSpace,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1989, at B3, for an insight into some of the problems involved in trying
to use the transferable development rights associated with the Grand Central Terminal.
271 Penn Central, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
272 Though the Appellate Division's decision was nominally affirmed by the New York
Court of Appeals, that court ruled that Penn Central should be given the opportunity on
remand to offer additional proof at the trial court level. Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1279
(remanding with directions to allow further proceedings, thus technically granting a new trial
rather than affirming the lower court's order of dismissal).
273 Penn Central, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
274 Id. at 34 (Lupiano, J., dissenting).
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Under the legal principles as to which the majority and the dissent did not disagree,
there would still be liability on a taking theory, because either way Penn Central had
been deprived of all economic return of its property and forced into a deficit
operation. Why on those facts the majority denied Penn Central the opportunity to
retry its case free of the correctible evidentiary error it perceived, is incomprehensible unless one surmises that the Appellate Division majority was more
interested in the result than anything else.
The second twist was the majority's assertion that in order to prevail, Penn
Central was obliged "to increase the Terminal's commercial income by transforming
'
vacant or under-utilized space to revenue-producing use"275
and to prove both what
it could have done to increase income to acceptable levels and what an acceptable
level of income entailed. Such a calculation would be inherently speculative,
bearing, "a close affinity to Lord Dundreary's famous question; '[I]f you had a
brother would he like cheese?"' 276 Such a calculation would also run counter to
what the courts normally consider to be permissible appraisal methodology.277 To
say that one could try to pursue more economically productive efforts is one thing;
proving that such efforts would be successful and a fortiori, how quantitatively
successful they would prove to be, is quite another story. Moreover, with regard to
regulated utility valuation, projections of future income may not be used."7 Had
such a showing been attempted by a property owner in an eminent domain valuation
case, it would have been excluded as speculative and violative of the familiar rule
that the property owner's intentions and plans for future use of the subject property
are inadmissible.279 The court did not explain why something that would have been
inadmissible in an eminent domain valuation trial should be essential in an inverse
condemnation case. There was no indication, at least none is noted in the opinion,
that Penn Central was deliberately failing to increase its rental income from the
terminal. In any event, under the arrangement between the City and Penn Central,
275

Id. at 28.

City of Oakland v. Pac. Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 153 P. 705 (Cal. 1915); see Sawyer
v. Commonwealth, 65 N.E. 52, 53 (Mass. 1902) (denying recoupment of lost profits for a
taking because business is "uncertain in its vicissitudes"); Community Redevelopment
Agency v. Abrams, 543 P.2d 905,912-13 (Cal. 1975) (finding business loss so "speculative
that proof of it may justifiably be excluded").
277 4 NICHOLS, supra note 11, § 12B.08[2]; 1 ORGEL, supra note 122, §
162, at 657; see
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (rejecting a loss of future profits as evidence of
compensation because "[p]rediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform").
278 2 ORGEL, supra note 122, § 218, at 148-50.
279 4 NICHOLS, supra note 11, § 12B.08[2]; 2 ORGEL, supra note 122, § 218, at 55-56.
Compare Penn Central, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 28 ((finding error in Penn Central's failure to
present such evidence), citing Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 200 N.E.2d
447 (N.Y. 1964)), with id. at 34-35 (Lupiano, J., dissenting) (distinguishing cited authority
and applying the Landmark Law's definition of "reasonable return").
276
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rents went to the City's Metropolitan Transit Authority,28° so it is not clear from the
opinion how an increase in rentals would have inured to Penn Central's benefit or
had any bearing on the economics of the matter.
To sum up, the difference between the opinions of the Appellate Division majority and the dissent was not really of a legal nature. Neither position was compelled
by black letter law. It was rather a question of choosing from two competing
accounting approaches that would enable a sound determination whether Penn
Central suffered an ongoing deficit, and if so, its amount. This was largely a factual
controversy that is usually decided by the trier of fact after hearing accounting
testimony. Moreover, even on the majority's premise, a reversal of the trial court's
judgment was not called for because had the case gone on to a valuation phase trial,
all this would have "come out in the wash," so to speak, as the parties presented
their competing valuation data and methodologies in accordance with the majority's
views. Penn Central should have been afforded a fair opportunity to present the
valuation evidence the majority thought to be essential, because this was a novel
case, and there is a sound basis for concluding that until the Appellate Division
spoke in this case, no one knew just what sort of economic evidence would satisfy
the courts to prove Penn Central's case. Had the case been remanded for a new trial,
and had Penn Central been unable to prove the existence of an ongoing deficit in
accordance with the majority's standards of proof, the case would terminate on the
merits in the City's favor. The City would thus not be prejudiced by a retrial. On
the other hand, if the dissenters were right, Penn Central would have been able to
satisfy the majority's evidentiary requirements and would have established a taking
even under the more stringent requirements of the majority, so that denying Penn
Central the opportunity to do so was prejudicial to it.
XII. THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS:
HENRY GEORGE RIDES AGAIN -

SORT OF

28

'

The arguments of both parties in the New York Court of Appeals were
essentially the same as those made below. Penn Central's first and foremost issue
280

377 N.Y.S.2d at 33 (Lupiano, J., dissenting).

See TDR Conference, supra note 72, at 86 (Judge Breitel crediting Henry George with
the idea applied by the New York Court of Appeals but also averring that "I am not
281

suggesting that this is the root of the Grand Central analysis at all."); BABCOCK & SIEMON,

supra note 68, at 66-67 (pointing out that at least some Supreme Court Justices agreed that
the New York Court of Appeals decision involved Georgist ideas); see also WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAW 197-98 (1985) (describing the Penn Central

decision as "neo-Georgist"). See generally JOHN FRED BELL, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC

THOUGHT (2d ed. 1967) (discussing the views of Henry George); Montgomery, supra note
27, at 850 (explaining George's belief that rent "belongs to the society whose labors
generated it, and its collection by private individuals impoverishes those who produce it").
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was whether, in light of the "incapab[ility] of producing a reasonable return," the
application of the Landmark Law constituted an uncompensated taking.282 The
City's response was that Penn Central's proof failed to establish that the economic
restrictions on Penn Central were so severe as to make them unconstitutional. 283 But
the court's opinion failed to resolve or even to address this issue. It went off in an
entirely different direction. It began by stating the central issue as follows:
The first [issue] is the extent to which government, when
regulating private property, must assure what is described as a
reasonable return on that ingredient of property value created
not so much by the efforts of the property owner, but instead by
the accumulated indirect social and direct governmental
investment in the physical property, its functions, and its
surroundings.2
It thus became clear that the Court of Appeals decided not to decide the
principal issue tendered by the parties and litigated in the lower courts, but rather
made up its own issue that it evidently found more congenial to the result it meant
to reach. In a nutshell, the court asserted out of the blue that the return on one's
property protected by the Constitution does not "embrace all attributes, incidental
influences, or contributing external factors derived from the social complex in which
'
the property rests."285
Rather the court thought that it would be sufficient if "the
privately created ingredient of property" 286 receives a reasonable return. It is that
privately created and privately managed ingredient that is the property on which the
reasonable return is to be based, said the court. "All else is society's contribution
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 3, Penn Central,366 N.E.2d 1271 (No. 77-444).
Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 2, Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (No. 77-444).
Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1272-73 (emphasis added). The other issue concerned
transferable development rights, a topic that is not delved into here because it was largely not
the subject of review but rather a passing mention by the U.S. Supreme Court which did not
analyze it, so that its pursuit here would, if I may say so, stick a harpoon into a whole other
whale. Suffice it so say that in the event, the business of transferring those rights turned out
to be nowhere as simple as sometimes supposed by fans of the Penn Central decision. See
Dunlap, supra note 270 (discussing transferable development rights in the context of the
Penn Centralcase); Penn Central,438 U.S. at 138 (finding that the proceeds of TDR sales
were intended to offset loss, thus only affecting the quantum of compensation).
285 Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1273. I cannot help wondering what would happen in a
New York courtroom if in a tax certiorari proceeding, the landowners were to make that very
argument and contend that their ad valoren taxes should be reduced accordingly. After all,
as the Supreme Court admonished, "[tihe principles governing the ascertainment of value for
purposes of taxation, are the same as those that control in condemnation cases." Great N. Ry.
Co. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 139 (1936).
286 Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1273.
282
283
284
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by the sweat of its brow287and the expenditure of its funds. To that extent society is
also entitled to its due.

If ever there was an argument that proved too much, this was it. First of all,
property that has value, particularly value in exchange used in eminent domain, can
have it only because people other than the owner find it desirable, and are willing
to pay fair market value for it. To that extent, all value of property is derived from
society because without society's demand for it, it would have no value in exchange." Moreover, the opinion conveniently ignored the risk element inherent in
private entrepreneurship. "Society" does not invent new products and services,
discern business opportunities, create business plans, raise and invest capital, take
the risk of entrepreneurship, pursue the profit-making ideas, and stand ready to
suffer the adverse consequences of prospective business failure. Moreover, society
does get "its due" by imposing and collecting taxes - not merely ad valorem taxes,
but also taxes on income and capital gains realized from private developments upon
their completion - as well as assessments, exactions, user fees, sales taxes, and
other monetary charges whereby those who do benefit from society's "contribution"
pay a quid pro quo for what they receive. 289 Beyond that, society also imposes
negative effects on entrepreneurship; it limits the owners' ability to profit by
imposing a variety of regulations and limits on the use of private property and on
287

Id.

288

See Kanner, CondemnationBlight, supra note 166, at 779.

1271 (embracing a form of neo-Georgism), with
Montgomery, supra note 27, at 850 (noting as a linchpin of Henry George's belief, that the
"fundamental mistake is in treating land as private property"). Treating land as public
property is a notion utterly inconsistent with the fundamentals of the American constitutional
system that expressly protects private property rights. As a vigorous supporter of the views
of the New York Court of Appeals had to concede, "[i]n [his] quasi-Marxist work, [George]
proposed a land value tax which replaced all other forms of taxation in order to permit the
289 Compare Penn Central,366 N.E.2d

public ratherthanprivate intereststo captureland value increments." Norman Marcus, The
GrandSlam GrandCentral Terminal Decision:A EuclidforLandmarks, FavorableNotice
for TDR and a Resolution of the Regulatory/Taking Impasse, 7 ECOL. L. Q. 731, 739 n.37

(1978) (emphasis added). In other words, George's purpose was to have the government
expropriate private property, an aim precisely forbidden by the Fifth Amendment's Just
Compensation Clause, unless the property owner receives 'just compensation." Douglas W.
Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L.

REv. 995, 1031 (1997) (explaining that George's ideas were "so greatly incongruous with
American common law tradition that [they] never took root").
A modem application of Georgist theories would lead to a dilemma. Modem
environmentalist views discourage loud development, but the Georgist view encourages, or
as one commentator put it, forces its development. Stewart E. Stark, Nollan, Henry George
and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731, 1732 n.6 (1988). Finally, if we ignore the entrepreneurial risks of land development, and assume that passive land appreciation should be
captured by the public, why wouldn't it follow as a matter of logic and fairness that when
values decline through no fault of the owner, land owners should receive compensation?
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business practices, which reduce the property's income-producing potential. This
is afortiori true in the case of heavily regulated enterprises such as public utilities
and railroads. But regulation of utilities aside, why property owners should be taxed
on thefull value of what they own, including the increment resulting from the social
contribution envisioned by the court, but be denied the right to a reasonable return
on that same full value, the court never got around to explaining. Moreover, and
more important if we are to deal with law (which is what the New York Court of
Appeal was supposed to be doing), the City's Landmarks PreservationLaw defined
return in terms of economic productivity - not as a return on value, but as the
excess of revenues over expenses,2 90 and no amount of pseudo-Georgist pettifoggery
could change the fact that Penn Central Terminal's revenues were below its expenditures so that sooner or later it would simply run out of money, and be forced to
cease operations, which under the law was not an option for a railroad, particularly
one in bankruptcy. Moreover, the New York Historical Preservation Law imposed
the duty on owners of regulated properties to maintain them (something that can be
quite costly in the case of old, historical structures), thus de facto conscripting Penn
Central to take care, not only of the "privately created" element of the property' s
value, but the "publicly created" one as well.
Thus, unless we are to take leave of the meaning of English words, an entity
experiencing an ongoing net deficit could not possibly be said to receive an excess
of revenues over expenses and thus enjoy a return as defined by the pertinent law.
The court's explanation was thus not an interpretation of the controlling law, but a
conveniently contrived verbal formulation intended to justify denying Penn Central
what it was entitled to under the law in issue. Significantly, this entire part of the
opinion is unblemished by any reference to any pertinent law, nor to any legal, or
economic treatises supporting this view.29 '

This was no small oversight on the court's part, for the legitimate task before it
was not an academic discourse on economic theory, but rather an articulation of
valuation rules under which real appraisers would have to form and testify to valid,
non-speculative, admissible, and factually supportable opinions of value of the

"public contribution" - something that I have never seen discussed in the countless

eminent domain valuation cases that I have read over the decades. I am sure that

some enlightening specifics would have been appreciated by members of the
appraising profession before being ordered to march off into a litigational battle
involving this novel theory of valuation. Nor was there any indication in the opinion that this contrived issue had been litigated below or raised in the briefing in the
New York Court of Appeals (it wasn't), or that the record contained any evidence
capable of supporting it. 292 It was a classic bit of judicial ipse dixit, or a real life
290 Penn Central, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 34-35
291 Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1273.
292 Id. at 1279; see also TDR Conference,

(Lupiano, J., dissenting).

supra note 72, at 147 (admitting that the court
was fully aware that it was deciding the "main pins" of the case, even though the parties

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:653

illustration of the old appellate lawyers' joke about an activist appellate judge who
grew tired of the mundane cases on his docket, and placed an ad in the local legal
newspaper that read: "Have opinion. Need case." Judge Breitel had the opinion, as
may be seen from his dissent in Keystone Associates, which he articulated as a
holding in French. The Penn Central litigation supplied the case.
Second, the court failed to address the fact that it was thus wielding a two-edged
sword. Private entrepreneurs may benefit from social economic contributions, but
the latter often cannot occur without the former, particularly on these facts. Without
the privately financed construction of the Grand Central Terminal there would not
have been anything on which society's contributions expounded by the Court could
have worked their economic magic. Judge Breitel later conceded as much at the
TDR Conference, when he observed that when Grand Central Terminal was built,
New York's 42nd Street was still "almost a semi-rural area" and "[t]he moment you
'293
These statements alone
put Grand Central there everything started to burgeon.
demonstrate that the flow of benefits was hardly the one-way street the opinion
glibly envisioned. Indeed, the opinion expressly acknowledged the circularity of its
own reasoning,294 but simply dismissed it as unimportant. Having embraced as the
premise of its decision the historical fact that Penn Central's predecessors benefited
from government largesse in the past, the court asserted that it was "of little moment" 295 whether the Grand Central Terminal or its surroundings came first. Though
this statement undermined the court's position296 and at best raised a chicken-or-egg
conundrum, the court took refuge in the fact that Penn Central, being a railroad, had
been the beneficiary of public subsidies and benefits over the years, and therefore
it was not unreasonable for it to be subjected to special burdens.
But even on its own premise, the principle thus posited by the court was deficient. The historical subsidy to railroads was not just a gratuitous government gift.
It occurred because of the prevailing and justified belief that construction and
operation of a railroad network was essential to the growing country's well-being
and its development in the nineteenth century.297 That government largesse was thus
never briefed or argued them). Thus, apart from Penn Central'sother deficiencies, the court
de facto denied Penn Central due process of law by depriving it of notice and an opportunity
to be heard on the dispositive issue actually being decided.
293 TDR Conference, supra note 72, at 147. For example, the reason Walter P. Chrysler
decided to finance the construction of the landmark art deco Chrysler Building in midManhattan was because of its proximity to Grand Central Terminal.
294 Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1275.
295 Id.
296 If indeed it was Grand Central Terminal that caused the intense development around
42nd Street, as suggested extrajudicially by Judge Breitel, then its primary benefit was
conferred on society, not by it, and the court's entire theory collapses.
297 See Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation,and Resource Allocation by
Government: The United States, 1789-1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232, 237-38 (1973); Bryant,
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not merely of benefit to the railroads, but to itself (as, for example, using railroads
as military transports in the Civil War and thereafter), and to society at large. Railroads opened up the West and contributed mightily to the country's commerce,
which is why construction of railroads was subsidized. Indeed, today as in the past,
railroads are vested with the power of eminent domain precisely because their
operation has always been deemed to be a beneficial public use within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment. In short, railroads may have been the recipients of government subsidies (as well as frequent abusers of condemnees), but they also conferred
reciprocal benefits on society.
Another reason why early railroads received such benefits was because they
were taking great risks (many of them failed), and the government wanted them to
succeed. Yet, recognition of the risk element is nowhere to be found in the court's
analysis. No rational investor would want to take on the risk of creating an enduring
project of the cost, scope, projected longevity, and magnificence of Grand Central
Terminal, and submit to government limitations of its operational income, with the
knowledge that at some unspecified future time the investment could become
subject to a confiscatory regime, not merely by reasonable regulation of rates, but
by manipulation of the very meaning of the term "return." And manipulation was
exactly what it was. As the court put it: "Reasonable return, however, is an elusive
concept, incapable of easy definition. For the reasonableness of the return must be
based on the value of the property, and the value of the property necessarily depends
on the return permitted or available. The inevitable circularity of reasoning is
obvious. ' 298 That was another argument that proved too much, because the same is
true of even the safest income-producing investments, i.e., Treasury bonds whose
market value fluctuates with their yield. Yet I have never heard anyone complain
that the task of ascertaining the return on those bonds is "an elusive concept." The
dominant determination of acceptability of returns is made by the market; unless the
return is acceptable to the market, investors won't invest their money to obtain it.
As the Supreme Court put it, "[o]ne of the elements always relevant to setting the
'
rate... is the return investors expect given the risk of the enterprise." 299
Besides, I am not aware of any law that puts railroads, utilities, or other highly
regulated businesses beyond the pale of constitutional protection. On the contrary,
it is because they dedicate their facilities to public use, are highly regulated, and are
geographically limited to the territory in which they are licensed to operate, that the
law has historically assured them a reasonable return on their assets, and a
reasonable profit from their operations as correlative with the law's limitations on
supranote 123 (describing how railroads were the object of state generosity because of the
prevailing expectation that their construction and operation would confer substantial benefits
on society, and so they did, even if the ethics of their conduct left much to be desired).
298 Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1275.
299 Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314 (1989) (emphasis added).

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:653

rates they can charge. Thus, though such entities may be the beneficiaries of the
government-conferred benefits, they are also a source ofpublic benefits, and subject
to government regulatory limitations on the return they may derive from their operations. The court's analysis was thus unbalanced because it looked only to benefits
conferred by government on purely private entities, but ignored the role of taxation
and of the privately-created benefits flowing to society from quasi-public entities
such as public utilities and railroads.
Third, it is also worth noting, if only in passing, that the New York Historical
Preservation Law required Penn Central to maintain its building in good repair at its
own cost, 3" a provision whose purpose was to impose the cost of maintenance of
historical landmarks protected by law on the landmarks' owners, making no excep3
tion for the "publicly conferred" component of the structure's value. "' Thus the
regulation in question not only locked Penn Central into an ongoing operational
deficit condition, but also required it to maintain the "public" increment of Grand
Central Terminal's value at its own cost while deriving no benefit from it. This was
no trifling concern, for as of 1972 the cost of necessary maintenance came to
$1,278,135.302
Moreover, this entire "social contribution" approach is conceptually an
argument that proves too much. I don't know of any business - from the local
bakery to the mightiest industrial empire - that is not dependent for its success on
benefits brought about by society at large, if only by protecting the enterprise from
lawlessness and providing paying customers for their goods and services. The baker
relies on roads that permit his suppliers and his customers to reach his shop, on
maintenance of public safety that encourages people to go about their business that
includes the patronage of his shop and the purchase of his baked goods, on regulation of utility rates that enable him to operate his baking ovens profitably, and on
government food regulations that assure him and his customers of wholesome
ingredients that go into his baked goods. So what? It has been said that taxes are
the price we pay for our civilization, and so they are. The people are taxed and thus
pay for the benefits they receive, as well as for the beneficial "social ingredient"
their property derives from the society they are a part of, and to which they in turn
contribute through their individual efforts as well as their taxes. But it is a far cry
from recognizing that reality, to the proposition that by virtue of fulfilling its duty
of providing general welfare that inures to the benefit of individuals, the government
has an interest in everyone's property and is thus able to deny its owners the full
measure of return on that property's fair market value.
More important, even if one were to disagree with what I say here, and embrace
the view advanced by the New York Court of Appeals, it would still be incontestable
300 Penn Central,377 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
301 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 109 n.6.
302

Penn Central,377 N.Y.S.2d at 33 (Lupiano, J., dissenting).
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that this aspect of its Penn Central opinion was not just an incremental evolution of
law of the kind that lies within legitimate, common law, judicial rule-making
powers, but rather a revolutionary change in government economics, an area in
which courts cannot legitimately claim special competence, and to which society at
large had never consented. In fact, it was not any kind of legal development; it was
an economic revolution. It was not constitutional in nature (where courts do have
special competence), but rather one admittedly dealing with valuation methodology
and economic philosophy (where courts lack special competence, are subject to
legislative enactments, and in order to make their decisions, have to rely on expert
witnesses who were conspicuously absent here).
That such a revolution should take place so casually, with no advance indication
that it was being considered by the court, at the hands of seven men making
tendentious arguments that were transparently (and indeed avowedly) intended to
protect New York City from an adverse judgment, without any broadly based
debate, or legislative input, and indeed without giving the parties advance notice and
a reasonable opportunity to address this novel issue by proper briefing, was
illegitimate, and an affront to a democratic society. There had been no widespread
dissatisfaction with the prevailing American system of property rights, so the court
lacked even the pretense of addressing a pressing social problem that the legislature
had failed to deal with. It was simply an idiosyncratic exercise of raw judicial
power that defies the core idea on which this country was founded, namely, that at
least on some bedrock level government derives its just powers from the consent of
the governed. And to the best of my knowledge, no democratic majority in the State
of New York had ever consented to the installation of Henry George's failed radical,
pseudo-Marxist philosophy as the linchpin of American law and economics. Such
monumental changes in the American economic order, assuming they could pass
honest constitutional muster, are the stuff of landmark legislative enactments, and
even then only after studies, debates, and intellectual contributions by diverse
segments of society that would be affected. 0 3 But Henry George's ideas never
gained traction with the populace; he was a democratic failure in New York when
he ran for Mayor of that city in 1886 and was soundly defeated. 3' His disciples
advanced his single tax initiative in California in 1910, and were defeated there
too.

3 05

Finally, the proof of the pudding is that to the best of my knowledge New York
courts have not applied this theory in valuation cases after Penn Central, whether

303 Judge Breitel stated later that "those decisions ought to be made legislatively," which
was tantamount to conceding that his decision was inconsistent with the separation-of-powers
doctrine. TDR Conference, supra note 72, at 115.
" Montgomery, supra note 27, at 850.
305 Id.
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for eminent domain or taxation purposes. °6 In several subsequent cases, the New
York Court of Appeals dealt with reasonable return on privately owned property in
the context of takings law, but in every one of them the court spoke simply of a
reasonable return and gave not a hint that such return applied only to some un3 07
specified "privately created" part of the subject property's value.
The Court of Appeals decision to remand the matter to the trial court only gave
Penn Central the limited right to put on evidence in conformance with those
"factors" that the court had already established.30 8 Penn Central was thus no longer
at liberty to try the far more important, fundamental issue - never tried before whether those "factors" should have been imposed in the first place on society in
general and on this litigation in particular. Thus, Penn Central was packed off to try
to present in a new trial a case that the author of the opinion granting it magnanimous leave to do so, recognized could not be won, thus putting in question the
court's good faith in so ruling.
Be all that as it may, with a beginning like that, the Penn Central opinion went
downhill in a hurry. The court went on to create a task for Penn Central that would
have been worthy of the Pharaoh commanding the Israelites to make bricks without
straw. This much is not subject to rational debate because later on in the opinion,
the court expressly conceded that the issues it asked Penn Central to address on
remand had "impenetrable densities," 3" and that the private and public components
of value are "inseparably joint."31 Nonetheless, the court invited Penn Central to
perform the "exceedingly difficult" task of separating the inseparable, or "to sort out
the merged ingredients and to assess the rights and responsibilities of owner and
society. ' And even accepting that as a legitimate premise for the sake of argument, no guide was provided as to how that was to be done, nor was any explanation
offered why the burden of proof on that novel and difficult point should fall on Penn

" Costonis, supra note 26, at 417 (suggesting presciently that it would be "a good guess
that future courts [would be] reluctant to become ensnared in the quixotic task of segregating
a site's public and private increments of value").
307 See Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1073 (N.Y. 1989); De St.
Aubin v. Flacke, 496 N.E.2d 879, 885 (N.Y. 1986); Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v.
Barwick, 496 N.E.2d 183, 195 (N.Y. 1986); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 332 (1980).
308 See infra Part I; see also TDR Conference, supra note 72, at 147 (Chief Judge Breitel
admitting that Penn Central's pursuit of the remand option would only result in a "mare's
nest" because Penn Central would be unable to satisfy the court's criteria.).
" Penn Central,366 N.E.2d at 1279 (conceding that Penn Central would inescapably fail
at a new trial, in part due to the "impenetrable densities" of the issues posited by the court).
310 Id. at 1276.
31 Id.; see also 2 ORGEL, supra note 122, § 216, at 138 (noting "the impossibility of
segregating for separate analysis an element of value inextricably entwined with the value
of the entire property").
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Central rather than the City, which created the problem by its regulation, stooa to
benefit from its implementation, and prima facie was better equipped to meet that
burden with tax, archival, and demographic records than a bankrupt private railroad
corporation.
Just how one would have go about performing the impossible task of separating
the inseparable, the court also did not bother to explain beyond offering the "elusive
concept" of correlating property value with reasonable return.312 With all due
respect, this was not legal analysis, nor was it a coherent statement providing any
insight into what Penn Central would have to prove on remand that would satisfy
the court. It was doubletalk, or as Wade aptly characterized it, a prime example of
the "analytically impoverished takings phraseology ' 31 3 that seeks to supplant
rigorous economic analysis with at best imprecise and at worst confusing words.
The only specific suggestion the court offered that even remotely touched on
valuation, was that value might be determined by looking to "assessed valuation
perhaps, as a basis for determining the reasonableness of return. 314 Here, the word
"circularity" fails to do justice to the resulting intellectual and moral hash. Penn
Central was thus told that in an effort to ascertain the reasonableness of the government regulation it was challenging as confiscatory, it should look to the very sum
at which the government had assessed its property.
What made the Penn Central opinion even worse was that a scant two
paragraphs after thus sending Penn Central off on this economic wild goose chase,
the Court of Appeals tipped its hand and made clear that its analysis had not been
intellectually honest. It did so by positing that in determining whether a private
property produced a reasonable return, it was of importance to note that "the
property may be capable of producing a reasonable return for its owners even ifit
can never operate at a profit. '315 Shorn of its context, this statement was not
unreasonable; businesses regularly fail to achieve or maintain profitability, which
Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1275.
Wade, supra note 8, at 307.
Penn Central,366 N.E.2d at 1275 (emphasis added) (ignoring the settled rule that assessed valuation is usually excluded from evidence in valuation litigation due to its notorious
unreliability); see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 822(a)(3) (West 2005); State v. Am. Support
Found., 100 P.3d 932 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing why ad valorem tax assessment
valuation techniques are improper in eminent domain law).
315 Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1276 (emphasis added). I cannot resist inquiring, if only
rhetorically, if judges of the New York courts would consider it a "reasonable return" on
their pension fund, were it revealed that the fund operations were losing money and could
never operate at a profit. I am not oblivious to the differences between the profit expectations
of a pension fund and a railroad operation - I only address the court's meaning, if any, of
the term "reasonable return," to inquire if the fund's negative "reasonable return" would be
deemed acceptable to judicial retirees, if the judges' retirement fund had been invested in
dare I say it? - railroad stocks and bonds.
312
313
314
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is a reasonable attribute of entrepreneurship. But when they do, they are free to
terminate their unprofitable operations. Penn Central did not have that option; as
a public carrier in bankruptcy, it was compelled to continue operating at a loss, and
under that ruling would inevitably run out of funds sooner or later.
16
It was that startling statement that, apart from ignoring governing law,'
inspired Wade's characterization of the court's efforts as "economic lunacy," and
rightly so. 317 It requires no further embellishment from me, except to observe that
an investor knowingly parting with large sums of money in exchange for a multimillion dollar commercial property, with the realization that he would never see any
profit from it, and indeed would suffer an ongoing loss for the indefinite future,
would be a proper candidate for a conservatorship proceeding brought by his family.
One need not speculate as to how the "social ingredients" notion found its way
into the Court of Appeals opinion because Judge Breitel explicitly provided the
proverbial "smoking gun." Apart from various statements in the opinion that leave
little to the imagination, he made it crystal clear in his extrajudicial public
expressions that the economic burden imposed by the New York Court of Appeals
on Penn Central, though one of the "main pins" of the case, as he put it, 18 was
neither presented nor litigated by the parties in the lower courts, nor briefed in the
New York Court of Appeals.319 Nor was it based on any economic or appraisal
evidence. Thus, consideration of this non-issue by the state high court was not only
substantively lacking, but also improper under settled New York law.320 The court
also denied Penn Central due process of law by deciding, not the case submitted to
it by the parties, but another case that it made up, to arrive at results that could not
be reached on the basis of the statutory or decisional New York law, and that Penn
Central never had an opportunity to address.
Judge Breitel's public concessions at the TDR Conference leave nothing to the
imagination. There he admitted that when he wrote about the need to "separate the
inseparably joint" elements of social and private value, he was sending Penn Central

316

Landmarks Preservation Law, N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, quoted in Penn

Central, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 35 (Lupiano, J., dissenting) (defining "reasonable return" as the
earned income yielded by the improvement parcel during a test year, which exceeds the
operatingexpenses).
317 Wade, supra note 8, at 282, 307. Because I am not an economist and Dr. Wade is, I
leave to him the task of dissecting the bizarre economics of the New York Court of Appeals's
decision, and explaining the proper valuation approach. See generally id. at 298-306
(explaining the economics behind the Penn Central controversy and suggesting a more
appropriate method of valuation).
318 TDR Conference, supra note 72, at 147.
319 Id. at 146-47.
320 See Feigelson v. Allstate, 292 N.E.2d 787, 788 (N.Y. 1972); Lindlots Realty Corp. v.
County of Suffolk, 15 N.E.2d 393,395 (N.Y. 1938) (following the prevailing rule that parties
not raising or litigating an issue in the lower courts are barred from raising it on appeal).
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on a "search for the Holy Grail" as he put it321 - a metaphorical expression that in
popular idiom means a futile search for the unattainable, pace Indiana Jones. He
also inferentially conceded that in deciding the Penn Central case the New York
Court of Appeals sent Penn Central on a task that more resembled the proverbial
"wild goose chase" than even a metaphorical "search for the Holy Grail," which at
least is a quest for something noble.322 Why? Because he expressly conceded that
if pursued in the trial court on remand under the rules laid down in his opinion, the
Penn Centralcase would only produce not a "Holy Grail" of doctrinal development
and orderly adjudication, but rather an intellectual "mare's nest. '323 He followed
that statement with the joke that he would not have to worry about that because were
the result of such a trial to come up to the New York Court of Appeals again he
would no longer be there. I doubt that it will be funny to the New York judges who
may be called on in the future to unravel such a "mare's nest."
This brings us to the "dark side" of the matter. If the foregoing shortcomings
of the opinion can be said to be intellectual and economic, we now have to address
the moral underpinnings of it all. First, the New York Court of Appeals' decision
contains revealing statements. It confesses:
In times of easy affluence, preservation of historic landmarks through use of the eminent domain power might be
desirable, or even required. But when a less expensive alternative is available, especially when a city is in financial distress,
it should not be forced to choose between witnessing the
demolition of its glorious past and mortgaging its hopes for the
future.324
One hardly knows where to begin in dissecting this statement, but since begin
one must, one should note if only in passing, that no one proposed to demolish
Grand Central Terminal. More important, we need to ask the question: "less expensive" to whom? When a loss is inflicted on an individual property owner in order
to benefit the public, that does not reduce the cost; it only shifts the cost away from
32

See TDR Conference, supra note 72, at 146; see also Conrad & Merriam, supra note

72, at 5 n.17.
322 See Costonis, supra note 26, at 417 (conceding that in spite of Professor Costonis's
admiration for Judge Breitel's handiwork, the judicial invitation to Penn Central to separate
the inseparably joint public and private components of value was "akin to christening a
search for the Holy Grail").
323 TDR Conference, supra note 72, at 147.
324 Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1278. Note that even New York City's counsel, the
beneficiary of this opinion, conceded later that "obviously, that's not a principle that can
work. Either you can regulate or you can't regulate; it cannot depend on the finances of the
city." Transcript, supra note 56, at 290.
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the public which benefits, and in whose name the regulation is imposed, onto the
affected property owner. Professor Arvo Van Alstyne dealt effectively with the
"costs-less" fallacy in a law review article,325 prompting the editorial staff to note
that the question "is not whether these costs will be paid; it is who will pay them, in
accordance with what substantive and procedural criteria, and through which
institutional arrangements.,"326 The court's embrace of this "less-expensive"
approach was thus no more than a pursuit of the proverbial free lunch. Naturally,
Judge Breitel later offered the customary judicial mini-Jeremiad about the unavailability of public funds to do what needs to be done, as a justification for plundering
the resources of private citizens, asserting that "there just isn't enough of that kind
of money. 3 27 But inflicting such losses on property owners is precisely what the
Just Compensation Clause of the Constitution is intended to prevent, by imposing
the burden on government to confine its acquisitory activities (whether de jure or de
facto) to what it can pay for.3"' Moreover, in this case history proved that there was
enough money. Grand Central Terminal was eventually restored to its former glory
with public, not private, funds.329
Second, as a matter of both principle and law, it is difficult to accept the notion
that the condition of the public purse delimits a specific constitutional provision
explicitly set out in the Bill of Rights. Are we to take it that an impecunious municipality can get a free pass to violate its constitutional obligations and acquire private
property for less than the law requires?33 ° Wouldn't that, by parity of reasoning,
also imply that a wealthy community enjoying a fiscal surplus should have to pay
325 Arvo Van Alstyne, Just Compensation for Intangible Detriment: Criteria for
Legislative Modifications in California,16 UCLA L. REv. 491 (1969).
326 Editorial Forward, 16 UCLA L. REv., at vii (1969).
327 TDR Conference, supra note 72, at 87. How could he tell? What makes such judicial
assertions particularly offensive is that in eminent domain cases, where condemnees challenge the right to take by arguing that the condemnor lacks the necessary funds to complete
the project, the judicial response is to refuse to entertain such arguments. See Thomas J.
Posey, This Land Is My Land: The Needfor a FeasibilityTest in Evaluationof Takingsfor
Public Necessity, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1403, 1403-05 (2003).
328 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (the public acquires only what it pays
for); Costonis, supra note 26, at 413 (conceding that "the implication that impoverished cities
somehow enjoy a lesser duty to compensate than affluent ones is dubious"). In other words,
there is no justification for an impecunious municipality shifting its financial problems onto
an innocent bystander, a fortiori when the straitened municipal condition is brought about
by the city's own profligacy, and where the bystander is insolvent due to large socioeconomic changes in society that are beyond its control.
329 See Herbert Muschamp, RestorationLiberates Grand Vistas, and Ideas, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1998, at B6, available at 1998 WLNR 2796497.
330 For a judicial articulation of a negative answer to that question, see Community
Redevelopment Agency v. Force Electronics, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(denying an agency whose redevelopment project failed, the right to pay the condemnation
judgment in installments).
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for all of condemnees' demonstrable losses including those that are ordinarily noncompensable under current law, plus perhaps a solatium payment, as has been done
at times in other countries? It seems to me that the definitive answer to arguments
of municipal poverty was delivered by the U.S. Supreme Court as a matter of constitutional principle, when it observed, in Watson v. City of Memphis, that "vindication
of conceded constitutional rights cannot be made dependent on any theory that it is
'
less expensive to deny than to afford them."331
Similar irresponsible government
arguments of unaffordability have been repeatedly rejected by courts in cases where
states that were sued for violation of prisoners' constitutional rights tried to plead
budgetary constraints as a defense.332 Indeed, as the California Supreme Court
sternly admonished, a defense lawyer's argument to a jury in general civil litigation
that it should bring in a low verdict because of the modest economic resources of his
client is a reversible act of misconduct.333 I fail to see how such misconduct rises
to the level of "sound policy" when engaged in by judges rather than lawyers.
Third, before simply accepting the court's justification for its holding on the
basis of New York City's financially diminished condition, it seems appropriate to
inquire how the City came to be in "financial distress" and whether the moral
aspects of the answer to that inquiry warrant consideration. They do. As it
happened, the unfortunate fiscal condition of New York City was brought about at
the time by its own reckless profligacy. If we say with Watson v. City of Memphis
that it is no defense for a defendant to raise its own diminished finances as a defense
to being ordered to meet its constitutional obligations, then it follows afortiorithat
where the assertedly threadbare condition of the public purse is the direct result of
municipal financial improvidence engaged in for base political reasons, this unmeritorious defense has even less substance. After all, New York's financial distress had
been caused by the fact that it had earlier frittered away its funds because the City
was exceedingly open-handed in pursuing its liberal social agenda, and its former
Mayor, John V. Lindsey, had been exceedingly generous with municipal employee
unions in anticipation of his run for President of the United States. 334 But however
motivated, spending its money elsewhere was an informed choice on the City's part,
hardly making it a sympathetic candidate for judicial solicitude when it proclaimed
itself to be lacking funds to compensate Penn Central for preservation of the Grand
Central Terminal.335 The court thus unwittingly provided us with another instance
31'373

U.S. 526, 537 (1963).
332 See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1321 (5thCir. 1974) (holding that inadequate
resources do not justify denial of constitutional rights).
311See Hoffman v. Brandt, 421 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1966).
114 It was New York City's fiscal improvidence that brought it to the brink of bankruptcy
and motivated President Gerald Ford to deny it federal aid, giving rise to the famous newspaper headline "FORD TO CITY: DROP DEAD", N.Y. DAiLY NEWS, Oct. 30, 1975, at 1.

...U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1977) (deeming it a valid government choice to spend funds for different things as it wishes, but not at the expense of the
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of chutzpah, whose classic illustration is the case of the convicted murderer who
killed both his parents and then threw himself on the mercy of the court on the
grounds that he was an orphan. 336 A city that recklessly spends itself into nearbankruptcy in order to gain a political advantage, and then cries poor mouth in court
when confronted with its constitutional compensatory obligations, does not appear
to be very far removed morally from that traditional chutzpah scenario.
Fourth, why not remind the City that if it wanted to meet its preservationist
goals, "mortgaging its future" was not a horrible alternative, but rather the customary, financially sound way to obtain funds with which to make large, long-term
capital investments? After all, the City was already deeply involved in the operation
of Grand Central Terminal.337 So why not do it the old-fashioned way: by borrow-

ing the necessary funds, issuing municipal bonds and then paying them off over a
period of time? In fact, Grand Central Terminal was eventually restored with
municipal funds, and therein lies a lesson. In the hands of the bankrupt Penn Central
Company, the "preserved" Grand Central Terminal (after Penn Central lost its case),
for all its architectural glory, was a shabby, dirty, smelly, neglected old building,
used in places as a public urinal for the homeless, thus raising questions as to
whether its preservation was worthwhile.338 But in the hands of New York City after

an infusion of public funds, it was renovated and became once again an aesthetic
landmark of a great city,339 thus illustrating the verity that things that are of value to
the community should be maintained by the community whose members thus get to
enjoy the benefit of preservation of significant historical structures while contributing pro rata to their preservation. I for one would call that good governance.
In sum, the economic reasons offered by the New York Court of Appeals for its
decision revealed a judicial motivation that is unsupportable by any respectable
economic, legal, or moral standard. It was evidently made up for the occasion in
order to save the City from its financial obligation to observe the provisions of the
Constitution. Wade may have been harsh in his choice of critical language, but he
was intellectually and economically on-target when he characterized that decision
as "the Breitel doctrine of legal-economic nonsense.'' O The idea that a property
rights of other parties). Municipalities are free to make fiscal choices, but those choices may
have constitutional consequences.
336 See Williams v. State, 190 S.E.2d 785, 785 n.1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); see also Gerald
F. Uelmen, Plain Yiddish for Lawyers, 71 A.B.A. J. 78 (June 1985).
311 See Penn Central, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 33 (Lupiano, J., dissenting) (noting that the New
York Metropolitan Transit Authority together with the Connecticut Transportation Authority
had leased Grand Central Terminal and were receiving all revenues from tenants and conces-

sionaires); see also David W. Dunlap, TransitAgency Seeking to Buy GrandCentral,N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1990, at B 1,available at 1990 WLNR 3003997.
331 See BABCOCK & SIEMON, supra note 68, at 71-75; see also infra note 446.
...See Muschamp, supranote 329. Also see a color photograph of the renovated terminal
interior. Id. at AI.
...Wade, supra note 8, at 283.
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may be producing a reasonable return for its owners even though it loses money and
has no prospects of future operating profit does indeed sound more like financial
double talk than an articulation of economic principle.
XIHI.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: PENN CENTRAL'S FATAL CONCESSION

The Penn Centralcase that was reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court bore little,
if any, resemblance to the legal issues tried below. Whereas in the New York state
courts Penn Central argued that the Landmarks Law forced it into an indefinite
deficit operation, thus denying it a return on its property, in the U.S. Supreme Court
Penn Central conceded that it was receiving a reasonable return. 341' How, in light of
what thus proved to be Penn Central's fatal concession, the Court undertook to
consider Penn Central's submission on the merits, is something of a mystery; it is
one of the ostensible pillars of Supreme Court practice that issues presented for its
review, that have not been raised or litigated below, will not be considered. 342 True
enough, at the time the U.S. Supreme Court still had appellate jurisdiction, and
technically Penn Central's cause was presented by appeal rather than by a petition
for certiorari. That, however, was an academic distinction. It was then the Court's
common practice to dismiss appeals it did not wish to consider, "for want of a substantial federal question. 3 43 Nonetheless, in Penn Centralthe Court noted probable
jurisdiction, in spite of the fact that both parties disavowed the lower court's
rationale for its decision, and that the Petitioner presented the Court with a new legal
theory never raised or litigated below.
Some light has been shed on this mystery by recent disclosures of participants
in the Penn Central Supreme Court litigation. To begin with, in spite of its victory
below, New York City was not eager to defend Chief Judge Breitel's bizarre
341

342

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129-30, 129 n.26.
See STERNET AL., supranote 5,at 165-66. The Supreme Court does consider, at times,

issues not raised below when they present plain error that requires reversal. Id. at 166-67.
In Penn Central, however, the Curt found no error and affirmed the decision of the New
York Court of Appeals. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104-06.
343STERN ET AL., supra note 5, at 241. The quoted phrase was a term of art and the Court
frequently used it to turn away issues that were plainly federal and important, but which the
Court for reasons best known to itself, did not wish to consider. A prominent and unfortunate
example of that practice was the dismissal of the appeal in ConsolidatedRock ProductsCo.
v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 342, 344-45 (Cal.), appeal dismissed,371 U.S. 36 (1962),
which on a fully developed evidentiary record and lower-court factual finding that the
property had been left with no use, squarely presented the question whether a regulation that
rendered any reasonable use impossible constituted a taking. In ConsolidatedRock, the
regulation zoned the bed of an arroyo as single-family residential (a practically impossible
use), while denying the Consolidated Rock Products Company a conditional use permit that
would enable it to extract sand and gravel from the dry river bed, thus leaving the property
with no permitted use. Id. at 344.
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opinion, much less ask the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt it,3" and wanted to get back
to the question of reasonable return as decisive.345 Similarly, Penn Central wanted
to get away from having to deal with the Breitel opinion and wanted to address
instead the issue of whether the City took Penn Central's air rights above the Grand
Central Terminal. 3 6
Penn Central presented four issues.347 The Court declined to consider two of
them because their premise was that a taking had occurred, raising matters of
compensation.34 Only the two issues that inquired whether a taking had occurred
would be considered.349 Of these, the first one, which dominated the second one,
raised the question whether Penn Central was entitled to compensation for the air
space above the Grand Central Terminal, which - it contended - had been taken
by the regulation in question. 350 The remaining issue was rather hard to follow; as
restated by the Court it asked,
[does] a finding that Penn Central has failed to establish that
there is no possibility, without exercising its development rights,
of earning a reasonable return on all of its remaining properties
that benefit in any way from the operations of the Grand Central
Terminal warrant the conclusion that no compensation need be
35
paid for the taking of those rights? '
Translated into English, that issue stated as a triple negative, appeared to be directed
to the transferable development rights aspect of the controversy - whether the
availability of the transferable development rights kept Penn Central's predicament
from becoming a taking. Thus, Penn Central's new principal legal submission was
a far cry from the accounting matters (having to do with calculation of the deficit
resulting from operation of the Grand Central Terminal in its regulated condition)
that were tried below and reviewed by the Appellate Division. Nor did it deal with
3" See Transcript, supra note 56, at 290. As the City's counsel Leonard Koerner said,
"[w]e wrote a piece in the [City's] brief in which we completely objected to Judge Breitel's
position." Id. at 291. Koerner went on to proclaim himself to be "extremely pleased" with
the fact that the Supreme Court rejected the doctrinal basis of his own victory in the New
York Court of Appeals. Id. at 296. So pronounced was the City's disavowal of Judge
Breitel's opinion that the City's counsel, concerned with the impact of that change of heart
on Judge Breitel's perception of the matter, wrote to him, explaining "that while we loved
what he did we really couldn't urge it on the Supreme Court. [Laughter]" Id. at 291.
3'5 See id. at 292.
346 See id.
341 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 122 n.24.
348 id.
3" id. at 122.
350 Id. at 122 n.24.
351 id.
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the matters decided by the New York Court of Appeals. It now raised entirely new
issues.
As a mere mortal, I have no means at my disposal that might enable me to
fathom why Penn Central was permitted to reach the merits of an issue that was
neither raised nor considered below and why its appeal was not dismissed when it
tried to do so. 352 This is a fortiori so because the Court did not intend the Penn
Central decision to be an important addition to the jurisprudence.353 Perhaps consideration of Penn Central's submission on the merits was only an application of the
ancient Roman principle quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi, which translates into George
Orwell's dictum that some animals are more equal than others.5 Or perhaps the
Court fell victim to the "have opinion, need case" syndrome355 and seized on this
opportunity to address the important, and at the time, novel subject of historical
preservation and its limitations in cases where the regulations arguably render
private property economically unviable 6
In some ways Penn Central's decision to shift theories was understandable. I
don't envy Penn Central's appellate counsel the task of having to make the decision
whether to present for review the New York Court of Appeals' strange economic
theory and its pseudo-Georgist redefinition of "reasonable return" without a developed record - a formidable and unpromising task indeed. The Court could then
simply say that Penn Central should have developed such a record after the New
York Court of Appeals gave it the opportunity to do so. 3 57 And so, Penn Central's
principal argument became the contention that the City of New York took its air
352 Evidently, Justice Brennan felt that sooner or later the Court would be called upon to
decide a historical preservation case, so it might as well do so then. See Transcript, supra
note 56, at 291 (noting that Penn Central "was one of those decisions that just called out for
Supreme Court review" (quoting Stanford Professor Thompson, who at the time clerked for
Justice Rehnquist)).
...See Transcript, supra note 56, at 295, 305.
...GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 92 (Harcourt Brace 2003) (1946). Compare the
plight of the property owner in Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992), where the
Court declined to consider an issue that had been raised by the owner, on the grounds that
it had not been properly stated. Or take the case of Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997), where the court, over the dissent of Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and O'Connor, declined to address the vexing, long-standing problem of constitutionality of
the use of transferable development rights, as going to liability or to compensation after
liability is found.
...See supra note 218.
116 See, e.g., Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d
305, 307
(N.Y. 1974) (discussing the City's refusal to let a private charitable organization alter its
landmark-status building, which had become inadequate for the organization's needs, without
providing compensation to the organization).
117 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 121 n.23, 122 (noting that Penn Central did not
avail
itself of the opportunity granted it by the New York Court of Appeals to develop the factors
discussed by that court).
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rights above the Grand Central Terminal. 35' Before commenting on the U.S.
Supreme Court's opinion, one should reflect on the bizarre fact that of the four
levels of courts that considered the Penn Central controversy, the last two decided
the case on legal grounds that had nothing to do with the grounds on which the first
two courts made their decision, and the three appellate courts decided issues that had
nothing to do with each other, thus permitting one to wonder what was really going
on here.
The Supreme Court opinion began with a review of inverse condemnation cases
decided by the Court in the past, and then turned to the specifics of the Penn Central
case. It is here that we get a glimpse of the Court's perception of this case because
the opinion repeatedly states that Penn Central submitted its case on the premise that
"any substantial restriction imposed pursuant to a landmark law must be
accompanied by just compensation."35 9 Actually, Penn Central's submission was
not so extreme; it argued below that the restriction that caused the taking was not
just any restriction, but rather a catastrophic one that denied it any reasonable return
on the property to which it was entitled under the Historical Preservation Law, and
forcing it into an ongoing, deficit-generating condition.
As noted, in the U.S. Supreme Court, Penn Central changed theories and
conceded that its property was capable of earning a reasonable return. Instead, it
sought to establish that its air rights over Grand Central Terminal had been taken,
analogizing to cases of takings of avigation easements.3" Under Penn Central's
view of the situation, it did not matter whether the City flew aircraft through the
airspace over Grand Central, or whether it forbade Penn Central to use that airspace.
Either way the airspace was taken from Penn Central and became unavailable for its
private uses.36 ' Though it is the prevailing view that it is the deprivation of the
owner, not the accretion of any interest to the taker that constitutes the taking,3 62 the
Court looked to the property interest that was left to Penn Central. It drew a
distinction between physical invasions of property (including its superadjacent air
space) and regulations that in the name of the police power serve to protect public
health, safety, welfare, and morals - in this case promoting historical preservation,
a proper object of governmental regulation. The Court and Penn Central thus talked
Transcript, supra note 56, at 292.
U.S. at 129 (emphasis added); see also id. at 119 n.20 (ascribing a
similar statement to the trial court); id. at 131 ("Appellants' position appears to be that the
only means of ensuring that selected owners are not singled out to endure financial hardship
for no reason is to hold that any restriction imposed on individual landmarks.., is a 'taking'
requiring the payment of 'just compensation."').
31 Id. at 130 (discussing the impairment of air rights); cf United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that low-flying aircrafts over one's property constituted a taking);
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (finding an air easement resulting from lowflying county-owned planes).
361 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
362 United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
358 See

359 Penn Central,438
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at cross purposes; Penn Central spoke of a de facto regulatory imposition of a
servitude on the air rights above its property, which is inherently a partial taking
both qualitatively and quantitatively, while the Court spoke of the property as a
whole still retaining some utility to Penn Central, which was not inconsistent with
Penn Central's legal argument. The Court thus evaded Penn Central's point, by
giving no consideration to the argument that the City de facto took an easement
above the Grand Central Terminal building, which is axiomatically an interest in
land that is less than the property as a whole, but whose taking requires
3 63
compensation.
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Penn Central has it that the question of
whether a regulation works as an uncompensated taking of property is determined
by consideration of three factors: (a) the character of the government action, 364 (b)
the economic impact on the property owner, and more particularly (c) the extent to
which the regulation interferes with the owners' "distinct investment-backed expectations. 3 65 This sounds to me like another way of looking at the economic impact
on the property owner. The "character of the government action" goes primarily to
the question of whether the interference with private property is physical or nonphysical, a matter that was not in issue in Penn Central, and that was definitively
settled a short time later in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.366 in
favor of a categorical rule that permanent physical invasion and occupation of
private property is a taking. Obviously, this is not a decisive factor because if it
were, only physical takings would be compensable. In any event, on the facts at
hand the "character" part of the test was not in issue. That left the question of
impact on the owners' economic condition caused by the regulation that, as noted
supra,was catastrophic.
The last factor, or its variations - such as "investment-backed profit expectations '311 - has been repeated by the Supreme Court a number of times, with no
attempt by the Court to explain what it intended this phrase to mean, how it fits into
the scheme of constitutionally protected property rights, or how it is to be applied

363

See JACQUES

B. GELIN & DAVID W. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN

§ 4.2(M)(7), at 336 (1982).
31 See Eagle, Character,supra note 52, at 459.
36- Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The quoted phrase was appropriated, in somewhat
truncated form, from Frank I. Michelman, Property,Utility and Fairness:Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1233 (1967).
Professor Michelman's actual phrasing was "distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized,
investment-backed expectation." The individual who served as Justice Brennan's clerk at the
time, confirmed in a telephone conversation with me (on Feb. 24, 2004), that he was
acquainted with Michelman's article, having studied it in law school, and he was the one who
inserted the "expectations" phrase into the draft of Justice Brennan's Penn Centralopinion.
366 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
367 MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986).
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in land-use controversies.368 The Court thus provided an excellent illustration of
Dwight Merriam's immortal dictum that when the Supreme Court coins a new term
in the land-use field, land-use lawyers will be buying new cars in the next three
years. 369 I suppose we all should be grateful to Justice Brennan's clerk for not
inserting Michelman's entire phrase - "distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized,
investment-backed expectations" - into the Penn Central opinion. God only
knows what Byzantine intellectual horrors we and our clients would have been
subjected to if we also had to parse "distinctly perceived," and "sharply crystallized"
along with the other imprecise terms in that phrase. On the other hand, if Merriam
is right - as he appears to be - had "distinctly perceived" and "sharply crystallized" made it into the Penn Central opinion, inverse condemnation lawyers
would probably be driving Aston-Martins by now.
It is also interesting to note that when Justice Brennan, the author of Penn
Central, summed up his handiwork three years later in his celebrated dissenting
37
opinion in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, he noted only two
of Penn Central's three factors as being particularly relevant: (a) the economic
impact on the owner, and (b) the character of the government action. 37' He did not
mention the expectations element, thus justifying the surmise that perhaps he was
no longer committed to it, or perhaps he no longer saw it as sound, or at the very
least, that he no longer saw it as particularly significant in the same way he did the
other two factors. Possibly, it only signifies that Justice Brennan's new clerk in the
San Diego case was unable to fathom the meaning of that phrase, so he simply
ignored it. If so, who could blame him?
The Court's failure to define or otherwise explain the "expectations" phrase is
no small oversight. Established constitutional doctrine has it that not all private economic advantages constitute constitutionally protected "property" in taking cases,
and that it is only those economic advantages that are protected by law that enjoy
the status of compensable property.372 Historically, it had been believed that only
See Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of "Investment Backed Expectations",32 URB.
LAW. 437 (2000); Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court
EstablishesNew GroundRulesfor Land-Use Planning,20 URB. LAW. 735,765-70 (1988);
Robert M. Washburn, "ReasonableInvestment BackedExpectations" as a Factorin Defining
Property Interest,49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 63 (1996); Daniel R. Mandelker,
Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 WASH. U. J. URB & CONTEMP. L.
3 (1987). For a humorous treatment of this subject, see Bruce W. Burton, Post-Lucas
Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court'sRiddle ofR.I.B.E.: Where No Mind Has Gone
Before, 25 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 155 (1994).
369 Dwight H. Merriam, A Planner'sView of Dolan, in TAKINGS, supranote 236, at 212.
370 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
371 Id. at 648 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
372 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945) (finding that
368

economic interests in property require compensation for their taking when the courts "compel
others to forbear from interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion").
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recognized interests in property or vested rights to proceed with an improvement of
land, as opposed to subjective economic expectations, enjoy legal and hence constitutional protection. But if we say with the U.S. Supreme Court that there are other,
investment-backed expectations out there that enjoy constitutional protection, then
it follows that under Willow River, they too are constitutionally protected "property." This was obviously a matter of moment, crying out for some elaboration or
explanation that the Court did not provide. To make matters more confusing at the
present time, the Penn Central multi-part test is different from a later, two-part
regulatory taking test articulated by the court two years later in Agins v. City of
Tiburon, whereby a government regulation is deemed a taking when (a) it fails to
advance a legitimate state interest or (b) imposes severe economic hardship on the
regulated property's owners.373

Besides, apart from the fact that the "expectations" test is at best confusing, it
is at times meaningless because - at least as used by the courts - it presupposes
the existence of a would-be developer out to build on the subject land, who acquired
it by paying for it (thus making his interest "investment-backed") with an expectation to do so. But this is neither an accurate nor a complete picture of reality.
Land is owned by many different kinds of people with different motivations, plans
and hopes. What if the land owner is not a developer, but rather has acquired the
property by inheritance, or as compensation for services rendered, or in settlement
of litigation, or bought it at a foreclosure sale, or won it in a card game or a lottery,
thus acquiring it with no prior expectations, one way or another? Are such landowners non-persons whose constitutional property rights are less worthy of
constitutional protection than those of a developer? If so, why? Must one establish
some sort of "correct" provenance before one's property becomes constitutionally
protected? What if the owner bought land as a long-term investment (without any
initial intention to improve it), following the wisdom of Will Rogers who famously
opined that one should buy land as a long-term investment because it's the only
thing they ain't makin' any more of? In fact, under eminent domain valuation law,
owning and holding land for future appreciation may be in itself its highest and best
use.374 More important, why should an aggressive developer with a lot of money to
invest and high expectations supported by a track record of successful building in
spite of occasional temporary regulatory obstacles, get a better break from the law
than other people who may not be eager to develop, or who may favor less intensive,
more phased-out development, or who may want to hold land for the long term
Unfortunately, this formulation is circular. Courts protect economic interests when they are
deemed "property," but Willow River has it that they are "property" when the law protects

them.
...447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
...State v. Whitlow, 52 Cal. Rptr. 336, 341-42 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Comm'r of
Transp. v. Bakery Place Ltd. P'ship, 849 A.2d 896, 898 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (appraisers
for both sides agreed that the land's highest and best use was to keep it vacant).
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hoping for a high return in the far future when they retire, or just want to leave it to
their progeny? There is nothing unreasonable about any of these scenarios or about
the owners' expectations that arise from them. It seems plain to me that whatever
may be said about the motivations and visions for the future of any of these people,
they all harbor the incontestable and perfectly reasonable expectation that their
constitutional rights will not be violated,for it is those rights, not one's subjective
hopes or expectationsfor future use of one's property that are - and should be constitutionallyprotected.
Moreover, given the new environmental ethic that deplores aggressive development of land and lauds those who refrain from doing so, at least for the time
being, why should environmentalist "good guys" be penalized by receiving lesser
protection from the Constitution than their "bad guy" counterparts who, in the
fashionable parlance of environmental activists, are out to rape the land in a quest
for quick profits, and whose quite reasonable investment-backed expectations reflect
that, certainly in cases where the land is already zoned for uses contemplated by the
developer? In any event, the property owner in such cases is not complaining about
the loss of expectations, but of a taking of the property to which the expectations
may attach.
The Court's use of the "expectations" phrase in the Penn Centralopinion bears
the earmarks of having been adopted by its original author as a rhetorical rather than
an analytical effort. It has been believed widely - correctly, as it turns out - by
specialized land-use lawyers deeply involved in this subject, that this phrase was
inserted into the Penn Central opinion by Justice Brennan's clerk who consulted
Professor Michelman' s prestigious article375 (that has throughout enjoyed something
of an iconic stature in the pertinent literature in spite of its dense academic prose),
and in the process came across the phrase "distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized,
investment-backed expectations," which seemed apt for linguistically ornamental
use in the task at hand, though hardly a manageable statement of a black letter rule
of law capable of being applied in litigation before trial court judges who are rarely

"' Michelman, supranote 365, at 1233. When read in context, it seems clear- orat least
as clear as anything in Professor Michelman's article is - that he was not trying to create
a new standard of a taking vel non, but rather drawing a distinction between a regulatory
diminution in value and complete destruction of a property interest. Id. at 1232-33.
Michelman's entire sentence reads:
More sympathetically perceived, however, the test poses not nearly so
loose a question of degree; it does not ask "how much," but rather (like
the physical-occupation test) it asks "whether or not": whether or not
the measure in question can easily be seen to have practically deprived
the claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation.
Id. at 1233. For an insight as to how the "expectations" phrase found its way into the Penn
Centralopinion, see Transcript, supra note 56, at 308-09.
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willing or, with all due respect, capable of plumbing tenuous linguistic metaphors
articulated in dense academic prose even when incorporated in Supreme Court
opinions.376 It seems likely that once the "expectations" phrase found a home in
Penn Central, it was noted by subsequent Supreme Court clerks who likewise
proceeded to use it, not only rhetorically, but also precedentialy in the sense that
they could now look to and cite prior opinions containing it. Unfortunately, like
their predecessor, they did not explain its meaning either. It all brings to mind the
line of California's Chief Justice, the late Roger Traynor, who once observed that
there are notions embedded in the law that have never been cleaned and pressed and
might disintegrate if they were.377 Penn Central's "expectations" phrase would
seem to provide a prime candidate for such intellectual "cleaning and pressing."
The imprecision of the "expectations" phrase inspired regulatory extremists to
argue that landowners' expectations were not reasonable in cases where regulatory
agencies were known to be contemplating future regulations, and hence, went the
argument, the owners' right to build somehow vanished, notwithstanding the ostensible availability of remedies under the substantive regulatory takings doctrine. This
approach had it that because land purchasers were on notice that the government
will or merely may regulate their land in the future, their development expectations
in purchasing it were not reasonable, and their right to redress for regulatory takings
eventually inflicted on them, somehow became unenforceable. Notwithstanding that
this nonsense found its way into court decisions, such as Good v. United States,37 8
which went so far as to sweep within the "notice" concept the mere "regulatory
climate" prevailing at the time of the purchase of the subject property, it remained
nonsense, not only because of the intellectual flimsiness of this approach, but if
nothing else, because the U.S. Supreme Court had already indicated that vendees of
regulated land are as protected by the Constitution as the sellers,379 a fact that the
Good court simply ignored.
One would have thought that where public functionaries announce in advance
This brings to mind the criticism of the Supreme Court's performance in Bator, supra
note 57, at 686 (charging that the Supreme Court fails to fulfill its central function of providing usable law to the consumers of its output, creating "instability and uncertainty and
confusion" instead). That article is of particular significance because Professor Bator, who
was well-credentialed in his own right to express his views on the subject, died before
completing it, and his article was finished and edited by Professor Charles Fried, former U.S.
Solicitor General and Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, id. at 673 n.*,
who would appear to be even more highly qualified to voice a critical assessment of the
Supreme Court's performance.
...Roger Traynor, No Magic Words CouldDo It Justice,49 CAL. L. REV. 615,621 (1961).
378 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the "regulatory climate" at the time of
purchase was enough notice to invalidate a land purchaser's expectation that he would be
permitted to put the land to lawful uses).
...Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987) (citing Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)).
376
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that they intend to act in ways that will impair or violate the constitutional rights of
citizens, including the current landowners' vendees, that would be a factor in
aggravation of the constitutional wrong, not a defense. Try to imagine what would
happen in an analogous situation in which a municipality were to announce that it
meant to enforce racially restrictive covenants in future land transactions, and hence
vendees of other than the Caucasian race buying houses in the regulated community would be deemed on notice and thus unable to enforce their equal protection
rights and their right of occupancy of their new homes, the substantive rule of
Shelley v. Kraemer380 notwithstanding. Absurd? Of course. But I am hard put to see
the logical difference between that risible "reasoning" and the reasoning of the
"notice" argument in which local government functionaries let it be known that
some time in the future they may adopt regulations that may give rise to takings
claims and thus violate the constitutionally protected property rights of newcomers
lawfully purchasing land in the community. In other words, the question is whether
the regulation is unconstitutional, not whether the government announces in advance
that it will or may impose that regulation. Indeed, it is settled law that when
property is slated for condemnation or even in the process of being condemned, it
may nonetheless be freely bought and sold, with the constitutionally required just
compensation payable to the persons who owned it at the time of the taking when
38
it occurs. 1

Fortunately, the Supreme Court blew the "notice" deformation of the law out of
380 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that restrictive covenants excluding persons of a certain
race or color violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
381 It has been a perfectly logical and long-standing rule of eminent domain law that, in
the words of the California Supreme Court, "the right to recover [just compensation for a
taking] remains in the person who owned the property at the time of the taking or damaging,
regardless of whether the property is subsequently transferred to another person." City of Los
Angeles v. Ricards, 515 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1973) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus the
transfer of title to the subject property whether before, during, or after its taking, is irrelevant
to the question of whether just compensation is payable for the taking; it only determines
who receives the compensation, and that turns on who owns it at the time of the taking, rather
than at some other time. Moreover, the law is clear that, notwithstanding government plans
to condemn, the owner retains the right to put his property to any lawful use until such time

as it is formally taken, including the time afterthe government hasfiled a slow-take condem-

nationproceedingin which the taking does not occur until after the finaljudgment is entered
and just compensation paid. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984); see
Matthews v. Md. Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 792 A.2d 288 (Md. 2002) (holding
that property must be valued considering the owner's improvements created after commencement of condemnation proceedings, up to the point of actual taking). Additionally,
government expressions and regulations of property based on a prognostication of a future
taking, far from providing a defense, are illegal, Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 327 P.2d
10 (Cal. 1958), and may under some circumstances give rise to inverse condemnation
liability, Klopping v. City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345 (Cal. 1972). See generally Kanner,
Condemnation Blight, supra note 166.
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the water in Palazzolov. Rhode Island.38 2 Justice Kennedy aptly observed that Une
cannot thus put an expiration date on the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on
uncompensated takings,383 although Justice O'Connor, who concurred, was unwilling to give up this unsound idea altogether, arguing that the property owner's
"investment backed expectations" should retain a role in deciding whether a taking
has occurred.3 84 She thus demonstrated her lack of understanding that there is a
perfectly proper market in distressed properties that are regularly sold and bought
by buyers who buy them with a clear understanding of their flaws, whether
utilitarian, physical, or regulatory, which, at least in the buyer's opinion, have the
potential of being remedied.3 5 People active in this market are risk takers and that
fact in no way makes their expectations unreasonable, whether they succeed or fail
in their effort to achieve their investment objectives in a lawful way, whether trying
to repair physical faults of the property, or trying to get the property rezoned, or
obtaining the necessary entitlements for construction. They take risks in the hope
of attaining high returns, and that is why they pay less. But this is not the kind of
risk taken by the purchaser of a lottery ticket, as has been suggested. On the contrary, a lottery, even when honestly run, is inherently a random, arbitrary process.
On the other hand, government-administered land-use regulations, one would
fervently hope, are made of more principled stuff than that, and a showing of
regulatory arbitrariness is usually tantamount to a showing of invalidity of the
challenged regulation. The risk that investors in land take is that they may fail in
achieving their investment objectives when lawfully exercised government discretion goes against them, not that the government will resort to illegalities and go
"too far" by imposing unconstitutionally confiscatory regulations on their holdings.
They no more take the risk of being treated in an unconstitutionally confiscatory
fashion than they risk being imprisoned without cause and trial, or being compelled
by the government to embrace a particular religion. Whether or not the government
gives prior "notice" of its intentions or plans to act in an unconstitutional fashion is
382

533 U.S. 606 (2001).

383 Id. at 627.

Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
properties are commonly advertised and bought with the avowed expectation that
the buyer will be able to obtain the necessary entitlements to build, including rezoning to a
higher use in appropriate cases, or will otherwise remove flaws in title or condition. Such
efforts by the buyer may succeed or fail, but there is nothing unreasonable about seeking the
entitlements necessary for development. There is nothing exotic about any of this; it is very
much a part of the conventional property valuation process. See State v. St. Charles Airline
Lands, Inc., 871 So.2d 674 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (allowing appraisers to consider the
probability of obtaining a wetlands permit in valuing land). In fact, appraisers may consider
potential use as an attribute of a property's fair market value, properly assigning an additional increment of value to the subject land where such a probability exists. GELIN &
MILLER, supra note 363, § 3.2, at 114-18; see Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings
Notice Rule, 24 U. HAW. L. REv. 533, 553 (2002).
31

38.Thus,
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simply beside the point, except to the extent it tends to show that the constitutional
deprivation was intentional, thus making liability clear.
On principle, their investment strategy is no different than the case of people
who pay low prices for securities of companies experiencing business reverses. The
risk these investors undertake is that the market may turn against them, or that their
hopes of being able to succeed under discretionary, but lawful, regulations will not
succeed, not that the government will steal their assets in violation of the Constitution. There is nothing wrong with such expectations. They are very much a part
38 6
of the real estate market as Justice Scalia correctly pointed out.
Turning back to Penn Central, even under its reasoning the expectations
element should not have been an obstacle because it was a part of Penn Central's
quite reasonable expectations at the time Grand Central Terminal was built in 1913,
that at a minimum, a twenty-story tower would be eventually constructed directly
above the terminal, 87 leaving only the question whether building a structure taller
than that would be unreasonable over a half century later after midtown Manhattan
had been transformed into the heart of one of the world's greatest cities, widely
noted for the prevalence of high-rise buildings. The suggestion implicit in the
notion that the "expectations" of an owner must be immutably frozen as of the time
when the investment-backed purchase is made, and that they do not encompass the
buyers' visions or future developments in the area, makes no sense. Apart from
being contrary to the prevailing motivation of real property buyers and of market
reality, it implicitly embraces community stasis as the summum bonum of urban
planning; i.e., that individuals who may have bought property in 1913 for a buggy
whip factory thereby become locked into buggy whip manufacturing as the
property's use extending into the indefinite future as their sole "reasonable"
expectation. Reality is to the contrary: people who buy commercial real estate do
so with an eye to the future. Often, they forego immediate return precisely because
they anticipate future appreciation or future development opportunities, usually
both. Indeed, it always has been a staple of eminent domain law that property is
valued not only considering its current use, but also uses to which it is reasonably
adaptable,388 even where the latter involve probability of future rezoning or of
securing other land-use entitlements necessary for development.
Penn Central's original design of the Grand Central Terminal was also an
investment-backed expectation, because the contemplated structure's original steelwork was constructed, obviously at extra expense, to be strong enough to support
the. planned twenty-story office tower as well as the terminal. Though it was
perfectly reasonable for Penn Central to suppose that its expectation to be able to
build on top of the Grand Central Terminal matured as the area surrounding it
386
387
388

Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636-37.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115 n.15.
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1879).
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changed, the Court ducked the issue by hinting that perhaps Penn Central shouia
have kept on applying for permission to build, until it reached a point the City's
regulators would find agreeable, 3' 9 a clearly unreasonable prospect considering the
cost of architectural design of a forty-, thirty-, or even twenty-story building.390
Such a suggestion would have been unreasonable because of the cost and delay in
preparing successive architectural plans for high-rise buildings. Indeed, a few years
later, in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, the Court made clear that
pursuit of piecemeal multiple applications or other unfair procedures is not required
to reach finality of administrative decision making.39 '
Finally, as far as the economic impact on the owner test went, Penn Central's
U.S. Supreme Court submission was not promising because of its fatal concession
that it was deriving a reasonable return from its Grand Central Terminal building.
Though the Penn Central controversy was ultimately about whether Penn
Central or the City of New York should bear the cost of Grand Central's preservation, and though the courts resolved that issue by placing that burden on Penn
Central, in fact it was not the Penn Central Transportation Company but the City of
New York that eventually paid for the preservation of the Grand Central Terminal39 2
(which is what should have happened from the outset without the litigation that
deformed the law in ways that still bedevil us and that are likely to continue doing
so for the indefinite future). In terms of specific outcome at least, this would thus
appear to be an appropriate case for the invocation of Shakespeare's characterization
'
"as a tale, told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, [s]ignifying nothing"393
in the end,
as far as the physical outcome of this litigation actually went. Moreover, the case
did not explicate nor clarify taking jurisprudence. Instead, it confounded the law
and has made hash out of the economics underlying the controversy.394
Even though it passed over the creative economics of the New York Court of
Appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court also confounded the law by simply ignoring
"' Penn Central,438 U.S. at 136-37.
As counsel for Penn Central put it, "the idea that we could have had approval of a 20story building is pure fantasy." Transcript, supra note 56, at 310.
Eventually, the New York courts recognized the unreasonableness of such a course of
action on the part of property owners, and held in Spears v. Berle, 397 N.E.2d 1304, 1308
n.4 (N.Y. 1979), that in the analogous context of wetlands preservation, it was the duty of
the regulators to inform the would-be builders of what sort of improvement they would
permit, so that the development efforts could be directed to improvements with a likelihood
of being approved without wasting time and money submitting successive development
proposals that the regulators had no intention of approving.
'9' 477 U.S. 340, 349 n.7 (1986).
392 See Muschamp, supra note 329 (reporting that the City's Metropolitan Transportation
Agency had invested some $200 million to acquire a leasehold interest in and restore Grand
Central).
"' WlLLAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act. 5, sc. 5, 11. 26-28.
...See Wade, supra note 8.
390
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another fundamental doctrinal principle of eminent domain law. Instead of inquiring into Penn Central's loss, the Court focused instead on what Penn Central was
permitted to keep, in derogation of the familiar principle of eminent domain law that
'
"the question is what has the owner lost."395
Suffice it to say here that until the
Court spoke in Penn Central,it had always been a doctrine of taking jurisprudence
(i.e., of eminent domain law) that partial takings, whether direct or inverse, are
compensable and require payment of the value of the part taken, plus severance
damages to the remainder. 6 While in Penn Central the taking was said to be
regulatory rather than physical, one is at a loss to understand how the means used
by the government to deprive land owners of the benefits of ownership of a large
part of their property are determinative of whether compensation is payable. As
Justice Brennan wrote three years later, it simply does not matter whether the
government occupies the subject land and thus physically prevents the owners from
putting their land to economically rational use, or whether the government uses its
coercive regulatory power (i.e., its threat of fines and imprisonment) to prevent the
owners' efforts to make economically rational use of the property.397 It may matter
little whether their land is condemned or flooded or whether it is restricted by
regulations, if in all those cases the effect is to deprive the owners of all or nearly
all beneficial use of it.39s
Adding further intellectual insult to economic injury, the U.S. Supreme Court
asserted in Penn Central - without any effort to provide a logical, doctrinal, or
precedential basis for its assertion - that "' [taking' jurisprudence does not divide
a parcel into discrete segments, ' ' 399 when in fact, even as the Court spoke, the preceding century's prevailing, thoroughly settled takings jurisprudence held the
opposite. Much of the then existing takings jurisprudence involved government
partial takings, notably takings of easements, which are quintessentially partial
takings, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Even after Penn Central in Nollan v.

39' Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216,236 (2003) (quoting Boston Chamber
of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)); see Kimball Laundry Co. v. United
States, 338 U.S. 1, 13 (1949) (holding that the correct measure of compensation was the lost
rental and not the diminution of value during the temporary taking).
396 Of course, once it is recognized that property owners have been stripped of the
use of
a significant part of their property, the difference between the two modes of taking becomes
practically and economically insubstantial. The means used to effect the taking cannot
change the fact that a taking has occurred in the sense that the regulation has gone too far,
leaving the nominal owner of the overregulated land with no viable economic use. See San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Either way, the owners' most important interest in their property, i.e., the right to use
it, has been taken.
...Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
398 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
399 Penn Central,438 U.S. at 130; cf United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180 (1911).

20051

MAKING LAWS AND SAUSAGES

California Coastal Commission, ° the regulatory taking in issue involved me
imposition of an easement over a part of the Nollans' land, but the Court had no
difficulty finding the Commission's unlawful effort to obtain it through the use of
its regulations to be a taking."' Indeed, in his Penn Central dissenting opinion,
Justice Rehnquist followed prior law explaining that "[p]roperty is taken in the
constitutional sense when inroads are made upon an owner's use of it to an extent
that, as between private parties, a servitude has been acquired." 42 Of course, it is
hornbook law that a servitude, or easement, can be either passive (requiring no
physical entry onto the servient land) or active (allowing the dominant owner to use
the servient owner's land).
Why a taking of substantial rights in the subject land, effected by nonphysical
means, should be treated differently than a taking effected by physical means, or by
the compulsion of a court judgment rendered in an eminent domain action, when all
three have the same impact on the property's owners who, ironically, are assessed
for taxes on the basis of the land's highest and best use, is something that the Court
likewise did not bother to explain. Either way, the owners are deprived of the ability
to put the affected part of their land to economically rational uses, leaving them only
with a residue of what they once owned, able only to look at nominally "their" land,
take a stroll on it, keep others from trespassing, as well as pay taxes and bear other
burdens and liabilities of ownership. The nonphysical attributes of a partial taking
may involve different property interests, or criteria of compensation, than a physical
taking of title or possession, and in some situations - such as setback cases - may
invoke the de minimis concept or confer offsetting benefits on the usable part of the
regulated land, but it makes little sense to say that two modes of government action
having precisely the same substantial, adverse impact on property owners' ability
to derive benefits from ownership of their land, should result in directly opposite
legal consequences. The problem here is the Court's refusal to reconcile its prior
holdings that (a) constitutionally protected "property" consists of rights rather than
things, and (b) that it is the deprivation of the owner rather than a gain for the taker
that constitutes a taking. 3 After all, passive easements (such as sight easements for
highways, or scenic view easements) are condemned regularly, 4°4 but no one that I
know of has had the chutzpah to suggest that just compensation in such cases should
be denied altogether.

400 483
401
402

U.S. 825 (1987).
Id.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 146 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.

Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947)).
403 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324
n. 19 (2002).
o See, e.g., Kamrowski v. State, 142 N.W.2d 793 (Wis. 1966) (upholding condemnation
of a scenic easement for just compensation).
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As for singling out physical takings as uniquely requiring compensation upon
their taking, those situations represent only the easy case. Any effort to differentiate
between physical and non-physical takings of property rights runs head-on into
what, for a long time, has been a bedrock concept of modern property law; i.e., that
"breaking the close"4 5 as a precondition to taking of property is an outmoded
concept that no longer limits the characterization of government activities as takings.
Noted scholars have derided the notion of property as being limited to its physical
4
manifestations, as "anachronistic"'" and "outmoded,"4 7 as well as "primordial""
'
'
and "primitive."
The U.S. Supreme Court expressly agreed with this concept of
property in United States v. General Motors Corp., where it explained that the
"property" referred to in the Fifth Amendment's Eminent Domain Clause denotes,
not physical things, but a "group of rights inhering in a citizen's relation to the
physical thing," such as "the right to possess, use and dispose of it."' 0 In fact, this
Hohfeldian view4 ' of property as a complex of rights, privileges, duties, and
obligations, rather than dirt and bricks, goes back to the nineteenth century.4" 2
Therefore, while physical occupation or invasion of the subject property is clearly
a taking of the "I-know-it-when-I-seize-it" variety, Tahoe-Sierra'seffort to cabin
the physicality of the taking as categorically different from non-physical takings is
inconsistent with modern principles of property law and makes little pragmatic
sense. To say that physical taking cases are inappropriate as precedents in cases of
regulatory takings, as mistakenly asserted by the Supreme Court majority in TahoeSierra,4 3 only creates another thought-proof compartment in an area of law that has
too many inconsistencies in it as it is. Put another way, the mechanism of the taking
does not make the taking any less a taking.
The correct standard came from Justice Holmes when he explained that "the
405

"The unlawful or unauthorized entry on another person's land; a common-law

trespass." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 184 (7th ed. 1990).
4'

Arvo Van Alstyne, supra note 16, at 2 n.5 (1970).

407Id.
408 William B. Stoebuck, Condemnationby Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect
and Prospect,71 DICK. L. REv. 207,210 (1967).
41 Jacob H. Beuscher, Notes on the Integrationof PolicePowerand Eminent Domain by

the Courts: Inverse Condemnation, in
USE
410

JACOB

H.

BEUSCHER

& ROBERT R. WRIGHT, LAND

72 (1968).
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945).

41 WESLEY HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 39 (1919).
412
413

Thompson v. Androscoggin River Improvement Co., 54 N.H. 545, 551 (1874).
535 U.S. at 323. A good example of the interrelation between physical and non-

physical factors giving rise to a taking may be found in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Canal Co.,
80 U.S. 166 (1872). There, even though the taking was physical (flooding of the owner's
land), the Court analyzed the problem almost entirely in terms of the deprivation of the
owner's rights to the use of his land; i.e., the question was not whether the land had been
flooded, but rather how the flooding affected the owner's right of user.
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question is what has the owner lost."4" 4 The owners can lose the benefits of
ownership of their land just as effectively by being forbidden to put it to economically rational uses, as by its physical taking - certainly in those cases where as
a result of the use-stultifying regulation they lose their property by foreclosure or
through bankruptcy.4" 5 Thus, the question should be whether the owners have lost
all or most of their land's utility or value; i.e., whether the regulatory impact on the
owners is unreasonable. The word "unreasonable" is firmly established in the law,
including constitutional law, and no reason appears why it cannot be used in cases
of claimed regulatory takings by inquiring as a matter of fact whether the regulation's impact on the affected property is unreasonable."1 6
Returning to Penn Central, the Court obviously had the raw power to rule as it
did. That much has to be recognized as a reality of governance. But that does not
change the fact that the novel Penn Central rule, pretending that takings jurisprudence does not recognize partial takings, lacked any precedential or doctrinal
foundation, and it stands until today solely on the basis of the Court's ipse dixit.
One would think that so revolutionary a ruling that was inconsistent with prior law,
would rest on something more than merely a one-sentence, casual assertion that for
all we know may have been inserted into the opinion by a harried clerk executing
an "all-nighter."
That the Court failed to provide a respectable, intellectual basis for its ruling on
this point either then or thereafter, is yet another reason why Penn Central leaves
much to be desired as principled law. It is a manifestation of a growing problem
within the Supreme Court jurisprudence whereby the Court appears more interested
in shaping policy rather than deciding issues of law - in governing, rather than in
resolving legal disputes in a principled and consistent manner. 417 To that end, under
the leadership of Justice O'Connor, resolution of these important issues on a
factually ad hoc basis survives as a process that fails to provide proper guidance to
parties in future litigation, and de facto transfers power of ultimate approval of
almost anything of substance that goes on in society into the hands of appellate
judges who, at least in the case of land-use regulations, usually lack the necessary
knowledge and experience.
Not only does the ad hoc approach give rise to problems engendered by the
Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
See cases collected in Berger & Kanner, Thoughts, supra note 258, at 741 n.255.
Thus, in the law of eminent domain it is a common question in precondemnation blight
cases whether the government has delayed the condemnation for an unreasonable period of
time, or has otherwise acted unreasonably. See Klopping v. City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345,
1355 (Cal. 1972) (requiring just compensation when the government has delayed condemnation for an unreasonable period of time). This is a factual inquiry for the trial courts that
is freely made without any undue doctrinal difficulties.
417 See Bator, supra note 57.
414
415
416
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Court's unfamiliarity with land-use issues and its limited time to decide that is
compelled by its case load, but land-use law often involves decisions that are not
really legal in nature, but rather implicate land-use policy, local concerns, and
politics, and, in the real world, a good deal of parochialism. However much the
philosopher-king model4" 8 of judicial performance may be admired by some,
judges - who are often former prosecutors or other government functionaries
lacking experience in the private sector - are not uniquely qualified to make such
decisions on an ad hoc basis.4 19 Those of us who get our hands dirty laboring in
these legal vineyards in the lower courts know that, at least as one moves down the
judicial pyramid, it becomes apparent that many judicial "kings" are not very
philosophical, and many judicial "philosophers" are not very intellectually regal.
Judges are frequently not intellectuals, but rather pragmatists who achieved their
position through politics, not legal scholarship, and who think of themselves as
decision makers, not philosophers. These lower-level judicial decision makers are
usually disinclined to parse vague language of lengthy Supreme Court opinions.
They see their function as disposing of cases on their dockets, not poring over the
dense prose of Supreme Court opinions that has given intellectual fits to
knowledgeable commentators on both sides of the issue, much less discerning how
the Court's vague language may be nuanced by the familiar dense prose of academic
commentators. That being the case, these factual ad hoc decisions may as well be
made by juries,42 the same way other factual decisions are made in fact-bound
controversies such as those prevalent in regulatory takings cases where the Supreme
"
' At least in jury
Court tells us that decisions are made on an ad hoc, factual basis.42
is the
controversies
these
of
the
core
lie
at
said
to
trials the factual decision that is
product of twelve minds whose diverse outlooks and biases tend to balance each
other, and appellate review focuses on whether there was sufficient evidence capable
418

PLATO, REPUBLiC 47 lc-474b (G.M.A. Grube ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1992) (380 BC).

Moreover, as the California Supreme Court pointedly observed, there is often a close
relationship between local government functionaries and local judges. Garrett v. Superior
Court, 520 P.2d 968, 970 (Cal. 1974).
420 See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687,703-07 (1999). The idea is
prevalent in American law that there is no right to a jury trial in eminent domain because
419

there were no juries at common law in British eminent domain - or as the British call them

"compulsory purchase" cases - and therefore juries are not available under the Seventh
Amendment, which preserves the right to trial by jury only in cases where such a right
existed at common law when the U.S. Constitution was adopted. This is a myth. See Eric
Grant, A Revolutionary View of the Seventh Amendment and the Just CompensationClause,

91 Nw. U. L. REv. 144 (1996). Juries were used in British valuation trials until 1845. 2
ORGEL, supra note 122, § 252, at 268-71. The pertinent legal history is explained by the
British Court of Appeals in De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Ltd. v. The King, 2 Ch. 197, 222
(1919). See also Keith Davies, The Jury in Eminent Domain, in EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND

VALUATION 151 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Jan. 4-6, 2001).
421 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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of supporting the verdict, rather than having each appellate judge decide what
verdict he or she would have returned at trial.
XIV. THE $64 QUESTION: SHOULD PENN CENTRAL
HAVE WON IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT?

The answer to the above question is "yes," but not necessarily for reasons
contained in Penn Central's submission. I have already expressed my views on the
deficit operation theory that Penn Central originally presented at trial and on appeal
in the New York Appellate Division, and that theory alone provided a sound basis
for ruling in Penn Central's favor. It fit into the parameters of Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 22 as well as those of public utility law. Unfortunately, Penn Central did
not rely on Nectow and did not press that issue, choosing instead to rely on the
deficit operation into which it had been forced. Nectow was not even mentioned in
its briefing before the New York Court of Appeals, so one cannot very well fault the
Court for not addressing it.
Readers of this Article - if they have read this far - must by now understand
that I take a dim view of the New York Court of Appeals decision for the simple
reason that it did not honestly address the issues tendered by the parties; it relied on
no applicable precedent or legal doctrine, and its handiwork was not an adjudication
of law, but rather an idiosyncratic policy decision that amounted to a back-door
importation of some of Henry George's failed ideas that even its beneficiaries
disowned when the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court.4 2 3 It focused on the

benefit-to-the-owner feature of the failed Georgist system without giving consideration to entrepreneurial risk, or the benefits to society generated by the
construction of Grand Central Terminal, to say nothing of the increased taxes of all
sorts imposed on property owners and generated in the surrounding area.
As for Penn Central's U.S. Supreme Court submission, I leave the task of
defending it to Justice Rehnquist's dissent, 4 noting only that once the Court chose
to address the issue of taking of Penn Central's air rights in spite of the fact that it
had not been raised below, I believe there was merit to it. I see no substantial
difference between the government saying to property owners "You can't use your
airspace because we mean to fly aircraft through it," and saying "You can't use your
airspace because we like it the way it is." Either way, the owners have lost the
utility of their airspace - it has been de facto taken from them. The utility and
value of such air space may be trifling in a rural area, but in the high-rise environs
of mid-town Manhattan it is of great value - a fact that should have received
careful consideration in the Court's ad hoc factual inquiry calculus.
422

277 U.S. 183 (holding that property regulations that deprived the subject land of

reasonable return were constitutionally invalid).
423 Transcript, supra note 56, at 290-91.
424 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Be all that as it may, my view is that once the New York Court of Appeals ruled
as it did, it provided Penn Central with a new, meritorious theory on which Penn
Central should have won in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals decision
unquestionably revolutionized the New York law of property, de facto transferring
an important attribute of ownership (i.e., the right to receive a return on the full
value of one's land) from its owner to the government. Thus, Penn Central would
425
have been within its rights to invoke the teaching of Hughes v. Washington,
holding that it is unconstitutional for a state to effect a sudden, unanticipated change
in private property rights, whereby rights that were deemed private before the lower
court's decision become public afterwards. In Hughes, state law effected a sudden
change whereby beachfront land that had traditionally been private became public
by judicial fiat. And Penn Central was surely deprived of a substantial, valuable
property right by the New York Court of Appeals decision which abruptly declared
that significant elements of private property from which land owners were historically entitled to derive a reasonable return, de facto ceased to be private, and their
nominal owners were no longer entitled to derive a retum from their ownership, thus
violating a long-standing principle of property law.
Of more immediate interest to the subject at hand was Justice Potter Stewart's
concurring opinion in Hughes. He posited that "retroactive transformation of
426
'
private into public property - without paying for the privilege of doing so" is a
taking. He reasoned that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids such confiscation by the state, no less by its courts than through the
427
legislature, and no less when the taking is unintended as when it is deliberate.
More recently, the Court observed in the context of a taking case that "a State, by
ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without
compensation. 4 8 It seems clear that putting all else aside, under this approach Penn
Central suffered just such a judicial taking of its property at the hands of the New
York Court of Appeals, irrespective of whether the impact of the municipal
regulation on Grand Central Terminal could be otherwise characterized as a taking.
Moreover, because this judicial deprivation or taking occurred when the New York
Court of Appeals, acting without warning or opportunity to be heard, abrogated the
right to a return on all of one's property, and transferred that right to the public, this
was the first time Penn Central could address this issue, and doing so in the U.S.
Supreme Court would have been proper. However, Penn Central did not raise it, so
its mention here is academic.
389 U.S. 290 (1967) (finding it unconstitutional for a state to convert private beachfront property to public property with compensation).
426 Id. at 298 (Stewart, J., concurring); see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76
425

VA. L. REv. 1449 (1990).

427 Hughes, 389 U.S. at 298 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753
F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 902 (1986).
428 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980).
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CONCLUSION
43
429
With the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra, 1
which have limited the availability of the categorical taking option as a means of
relief to property owners complaining of confiscatory property regulations, the
quarter-century-old, controversial Penn Central case has assumed added significance and has unwittingly become the "polestar" - the principal standard of
regulatory taking law in most cases in which the non-physical taking is said to occur
by way of regulations that have a severe economic impact on the regulated property
owners, but fall short of total deprivation of their rights. Which is to say, most
regulatory taking cases. Except for the comparatively rare categorical takings situations, 43' the cobbled together Penn Central three-part test of a regulatory taking
contains the principal standard for determining whether or not a regulation is a
compensable taking of property.432
But any way you slice it, Penn Central is an opinion that can be fairly characterized as a result in search of a rationale. As Judge Oakes wrote, the decision
allows judges to reach whatever results they choose, with Penn Centralproviding
a convenient makeweight.433 With all due respect to all concerned, whatever that
may be, it isn't law.
The preservationists were right when they demanded the restoration of Grand
Central Terminal as the architectural and cultural icon of New York City. That it
is, and I, a Californian, yield to no New Yorker in my admiration of the grandeur of
that fine structure. 34 But saying that does not address the critical issue of what
means should have been used to preserve it. Here, as is often the case with the

429 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).

Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CTV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (finding that a
categorical taking arises when the government physically occupies private land); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (enacting regulations that permitted third parties
to enter private land); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (denying a
property owner an economically viable use of the property).
430

431

432 See, e.g., Friedenburg v. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 767 N.Y.S.2d 451 (N.Y. App.

Div. 2003) (applying the three-part test of Penn Centralto find a taking).
"' See Oakes, supra note 40, at 613. As Justice Rehnquist's former clerk (who drafted the
Penn Centraldissenting opinion) put it: "[Penn Central]appears to offer refuge for virtually
everyone - and in the process maybe doesn't say anything at all." Transcript, supra note 56,
at 308. Well said.
"' I suggest that next time you find yourself in New York City, you go over to Grand
Central, stroll around, take in the sights, particularly the Grand Central Market, and raise a
glass to toast your good fortune in being there. I did on October 1, 1998, when the newly

restored Grand Central Terminal was formally rededicated. And a fine spectacle it was. By
the way, while you are at it, seize the occasion and treat yourself to a meal at the Grand

Central Oyster Bar. Have the oyster pan roast to make the cultural experience complete.
Trust me.
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environmentalist movement's other antics, land-use jurisprudence was treated to an
unfortunate public spectacle of willful confusion between ends and means. And
while that confusion prevailed in court and found a home in the decisional law where it bids fair to consume judicial resources, vex land owners, and enrich lawyers in the years to come - it is doctrinally, economically, and morally defective.
Raise all the lawyers' wiles, quiddities, and pettifoggery you want; talk all the
academic double-talk about "distinct investment-backed expectations" ("sharply
crystallized" or otherwise); discourse on "non-segmentation," "conceptual severance," the "essential nexus," and the search for "the denominator" or the "Holy
Grail" all you want, but after all is said, there is something very, very wrong with
a supposed legal doctrine under which the highest court in the land, with over a halfcentury history of decision making in the regulatory taking field under its belt,
proclaims itself to be "simply unable" even to state the elements of a regulatory
taking cause of action. Worse, under Penn Central,what passes as law in this field
allows the government to plunder most of a citizen's wealth, with the courts inquiring only whether something of value, anything at all, has been left to the victimized
citizen.435 Paradoxically, when the roles are reversed and the Court favors the
about-face and has it that
government's litigational position, it executes a doctrinal
436
lost.
owner
the
has
"what
is
question
the decisive
The nightmarish procedural complexities of this field of law, even before they
reached their current nadir, rightly inspired Fred Bosselman, one of the country's
foremost and best informed (and significantly, most regulation-minded) land-use
practitioners, teachers, and commentators to express his concern that the takings
remedial regime had become so Byzantine as to deny due process of law to property
owners, not by too little process, but by too much.437 Since the time Bosselman
spoke, things have degenerated into a wasteful, destructive game that consumes
kings' ransoms in litigation expenses, but produces no discernible, much less
reliable, substantive criteria applicable to future cases, nor effective remedial procedures, nor relief for genuinely aggrieved citizens, but often only shuttles them
between courts in a manner that not too long ago was deemed the stuff of legal
satire.43 The upshot is that what we have on our hands can be fairly characterized
...See, e.g., William C. Haas & Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1118-19
(9th Cir. 1979) (finding no taking when 95% of value of the owner's $2,000,000 parcel was
destroyed by regulatory maneuverings). Though this does not appear in the opinion, Haas
lost its property by foreclosure and was almost driven into bankruptcy.
436 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
...Fred Bosselman, Land Planning and Regulation of Development (A.L.I.-A.B.A.
COURSE OF STUDY, Mar. 18, 1976), quoted in DONALD HAGMAN & DEAN MISCZYNSKI,
WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS 12 (1978). Bosselman is a co-author of THE TAKING ISSUE

(1972).
438 Berger, Bait & Switch, supra note 199, at 112 n.54 (retelling Arthur Train's vintage
bit of classic legal satire about the wily Mr. Tutt who managed to persuade a federal court
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at times as some sort of intellectual judicial jihad against property rights of
Americans.
If that is supposed to be a principled legal regime, that by invoking "political
'
ethics"439
implements the Constitution's solemn promise of protection of private
property rights against government overreaching, it is certainly making its appearance in a convincing disguise.
There are seven specific lessons and one broader lesson to be learned from the
Penn Centralintellectual, economic, civic, and moral disaster:
*

The common sense lesson is that if the City wanted the
Grand Central Terminal saved and restored, it should have
done just that in the first place, or worked out a compromise
with Penn Central to accomplish the restoration by some
sort of public-private arrangement, instead of assuring failure by trying to fob off the entire, financially unworkable
task on a bankrupt corporation that lacked the spirit and the
means to do the job even if it wanted to. Ironically, the
restoration of Grand Central was eventually paid for with
public funds anyway, so this whole intellectual and moral
calamity was for naught.
"
The civic lesson is that things that are of value to the
community should be nurtured and preserved by the
community. Preserving heritage and great artifacts of its
civilization is not a cost-free process, and it becomes an
odious one when a community's "haves" try to foist its cost
onto the "have-nots," particularly when they enlist the courts
in so immoral an enterprise.
"
The social lesson is that while the do-gooder antics of
influential members of New York's high society may have
been a factor in the Penn Central saga and made for an
entertaining spectacle as it unfolded, at the end of the day
the "Beautiful People" went home to their posh East Side
penthouses, ultimately leaving the taxpayers holding the
bag - again.'0
that jurisdiction in his client's case lay in the state courts, and then persuaded the state court
that it lay in the federal courts - a farcical situation that has become all too real in today's
regulatory taking law).
...United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949).
"4 Such was also the case with New York's Metropolitan Opera House. There, New
York's Beautiful People used their clout to persuade the legislature to prohibit temporarily
the demolition of the Old Met building to give them time to raise money for its purchase. Of
course, as usual, they talked a good game but in spite of their conspicuous wealth they never
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The moral lesson comes to us from Justice Black's admonition in Armstrong v. United States,44' that the purpose
of the Just Compensation Clause is to protect citizens from
an overreaching government that would force individuals to
bear public burdens alone, which "in all fairness and equity
should be borne by the public" 2 that benefits from government acts.
The economic lesson is captured by the old line that
"there ain't no such thing as a free lunch," or as New
Yorkers tend to phrase it in their quaint patois, "for nuttin'
you get nuttin'." To put it in a more dignified way as did
Justice Holmes in Mahon, the public, the same as private
individuals, is entitled only to what it has paid for, and even
when it wants something very much, it is not entitled to
achieve its desire by a "shorter cut" than paying for the
change.4 3
The legal lesson is that while the "great body of the law
consists of drawing ... lines," as Justice Holmes put it,'
the supposed "lines" judicially drawn in Penn Central, and
now embedded in the law of inverse condemnation, are like
the lines drawn in the blue skies by skywriters - attentionarresting when first appearing on high, but fuzzy to begin
with, and quickly distorted or dissipated by shifting winds.
The law, particularly decisional law, derives its legitimate
strength from adherence to structure and process, every bit
as much as from the substantive results it achieves in large
controversies that capture public attention, as well as from
the impartiality of its application. For if the "correct" results
(politically or otherwise) were all there were to it, we would
not need judges learned in the law to render decisions that
shape public policy - any fair-minded, intelligent person
would do nicely." 5 The courts are entitled to institutional

raised the necessary funds. In the ensuing inverse condemnation action for a temporary taking, the citizens of New York wound up paying the tab in the Keystone Associates litigation.
Keystone Assocs. v. City of New York, 307 N.E.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
"'

364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).

442

id.

4"

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).

Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
As a colleague of mine (who went on to become a judge) is fond of joking with the
insight that experience and humor bring, insofar as results are concerned, most lawsuits could
probably be resolved quickly and fairly by the nearest gas station attendant, the problem
4"
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respect by virtue of the great civic importance of their
function, but their handiwork must earn respect for itself in
the market place of ideas by its impartiality, the soundness
of its doctrinal reasoning, its adherence to the rule of law,
the strength of its moral fiber, the intellectual integrity of its
output, and the pragmatic effect of its adjudication.
Application of these factors must ultimately produce the
results, or something like them, that were contemplated by
the law that inspired the adjudication in the first place.
Otherwise, when the litigational outcome is at variance with
the law's promise, and bears no relation to the facts on the
ground, the litigation becomes a costly, wasteful charade.6
On that score, the Penn Centralmess was an abject failure.
0

The fiscal lesson is that contrary to the disingenuous
cries of municipal poverty that rent the air and were swallowed whole by the courts that decided Penn Central, the
sky did not fall. Grand Central Terminal was eventually restored and continues to be rebuilt with public funds, and it

being that going in, it is hard to tell which cases fall within that majority and which do
require legal learning.
446 BABCOCK &SIEMON, supra note 68, at 73 (describing the Grand Central Terminal that
was "saved" by the force and majesty of the law as a dirty, neglected, "forlorn remnant of
past magnificence now used to house a newsstand and a candy store," which reeked of stale
urine in places, raising the question of whether it was worth saving); see also Editorial,
Playing Chicken with the Homeless, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1985, at A30. Its restoration was
ultimately paid for with public funds in spite of the City's ostensible legal victory. Today,
Grand Central Terminal is operated by the Metro-North Railroad that, like Penn Central,
operates at an annual deficit, albeit a much higher one, at circa $300,000,000. See MetroNorth Railroad Financial Performance, at http://www.mta.info/mta/ind-finance/month/mnrfinancial.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
Thus, one finds it hard not to conclude that the courts' performance in lending the
prestige of their office to facilitation of the City's immoral and ultimately unsuccessful effort
to plunder Penn Central's already depleted resources in order to shirk its civic and moral duty
produced nothing by way of the law's stated objectives; i.e., the preservation of Grand
Central at Penn Central's expense. That criticism is particularly warranted when one bears
in mind Penn Central's infliction of serious, lasting damage on the institution of private
property and on the law protecting it. In other words, for all the result-orientation displayed
by the courts in Penn Central, the results on the ground were irrelevant to the courts'
decisions. In the end, Grand Central Terminal's preservation and restoration were accomplished through public efforts (which is what Penn Central contended should have been the
case from the outset), and they still are publicly funded. Michael Luo, Lifting Grand
Central'sShroud, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2004, at B 1(reporting on the ongoing city restoration
of Grand Central Terminal and noting that following the City's victory, "[w]hen Metro-North
took over Grand Central in 1983, almost nothing had been spent on maintenance in years").
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was Penn Central, not the City of New York, that went
bankrupt.
The broader lesson that transcends the specifics of the Penn Centralcase is that
the distressing conclusion drawn by Professor Allison Dunham over forty years ago
(that judicial efforts in the takings field have been a failure), remains as sound today
as it was then." 7 The problem is not that judges are "simply unable" to make
reasoned judgments in this field of law, as they would have us believe. They are
much smarter than that. It is rather that too many of them are unwilling to face the
constitutional implications of the taking issue, and others are determined to find a
way to deny American landowners the full scope of their constitutionally protected
property rights on the basis of sometimes articulated and sometimes concealed
ideological notions and unwarranted fears of prognosticated but usually unfounded
fiscal consequences." 8 Paradoxically, in other fields of law, the same courts unhesitatingly issue enormously costly decrees and hand out huge monetary judgments
against defendants, including government defendants, claiming to do so as a matter
of justice and sound public policy, to make the victims of government mistreatment
whole and to provide economic disincentives to government illegalities. They do
so without judicial lamentations that the fisc is about to be reduced to a state of
Carthaginian ruin.
Moreover, the question of affordability of just compensation payable by the
government for takings of private property cannot be viewed in isolation. One must
at least take note of the subject of government "pork" - huge legislative appropriations for the construction of public works and civic projects that though
advanced in the name of public use, often serve no substantial or even legitimate
public purpose, but are nonetheless funded profligately to reward political supporters in the legislators' home districts 449 - at times, corruptly so. Here, the bitter
4" Dunham, supra note 132, at 106.
"g See supra note 154.
"9 See Robert Pear, Lawmakers' Favored Projectsfrom Home States Lay Deep Inside
$388 Billion Spending Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 24, 2004, at A19 ("The projects are so
numerous, so diverse and so scattered through the legislation that no one - not even
Congressional aides responsible for the programs - knows all that has been stuffed into the
bill."); David E. Rosenbaum, Call It Pork or Necessity, but Alaska Comes Out FarAbove
the Rest in Spending, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 2004, at 28, available at LEXIS, News Library,
N.Y. Times File.
The foremost current example of such practices is Boston's "Big Dig," an underground
freeway running beneath the city that was pushed through by former House Speaker Tip
O'Neill as a purely political tour deforce, and, though estimated to cost $2.6 billion, has so
far consumed $14 billion and counting. Butterfield, supra note 142. Now that the underground freeway has been opened to the public, it turns out that the tunnels have hundreds of
breaches and leaks. Elizabeth Mehren, Leaks and Flooding DrainBoston's Faith in the Big
Dig, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 22,2004, at A12 availableat LEXIS, News Library, L.A. Times File.
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irony is that often such wasteful, pork-laden projects involve government financeu
or subsidized construction requiring appropriation of private land by eminent
domain. But in such cases, not only can the project itself be wasteful and the funds
spent on it squandered, 50 but adding insult to injury, the owners of the homes and
businesses acquired to make room for it are told that in order to facilitate the
wasteful project, they must go without the full extent of the constitutionally
promised just compensation, lest an "embargo" on public works descend upon us.
This is not to say that courts should involve themselves in passing judgment on
the wisdom and economic soundness of the creation of public projects, however
improvidently conceived, or on the wisdom of appropriations demanded (and often
frittered away) by the executive branch of government after they are voted in by the
legislative branch in an effort to gain political advantage for its members. I mention
this subject only because the practice of handing out generous amounts of "pork"
demonstrates conclusively that if funds for such civic frivolities are available to be
spent with abandon, funds for genuinely needed public works and for demonstrable
economic losses inflicted on unoffending land owners being bulldozed aside to
make room for them, are also available - it is only a matter of priorities, not of
availability of funds.4 ' In the face of that fiscal reality the least the courts should
For an egregious example, see the unfortunate case of the "Intercontinental" Los
Angeles Airport proposed to be built in the high desert, near Palmdale, north of Los Angeles.
This boondoggle, for which a total of 17,500 acres of land was taken from private owners
in the 1970s, was pursued even though there was no direct freeway or rapid transit
connection between the airport site and the population centers it was supposed to serve, and
there still isn't. Unsurprisingly, after frittering away $100 million (more likely three times
that amount in today's dollars) on land, the city of Los Angeles has never been able to
establish a viable airport on that site, managing only occasional service by one airline. The
thirty-six square miles consumed by the planned "intercontinental" airport site have been
leased to sheepherders and growers of pistachio nuts. T. W. McGarry, An Airport Waiting
to Happen; Desert "Superport" to Ease LAX Traffic is 2-Decade Dream, L.A. TIMES, May
2, 1988, pt. 2, at 8; Sharon Moeser, Skywest Plansto Pull Out ofPalmdale,L.A. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1993, at B9. As I write this, the latest dispatch is that only one short-hop local airline
contemplates a return to Palmdale, and to entice it, Los Angeles is offering it free rent.
Jennifer Oldham, Daily Flightsto Resume at Palmdale- After Six Years, Airport Will Start
Service to North Las Vegas, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 8, 2004, at B3. Your tax money at work.
"' As I write this, two news dispatches have put the problem of misallocation of public
funds into sharp focus.
First, the U.S. Senate has decided to blow $12 billion (later reduced to $10 billion) on
payments to tobacco growers to compensate them, not for loss of their businesses, but for the
loss of federal subsidies they have been receiving. This payment, plainly in the nature of a
tobacco subsidy, is being advanced even as the federal government unceasingly natters about
the evils of tobacco and is suing cigarette manufacturers, whom it charges as purveyors of
this health-endangering product, for hundreds of millions of dollars. Simon Romero, In
Tobacco Country, GrowersKeep Their FingersCrossedforaWindfall, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
2004, at A10; see Editorial, The Stinky Tobacco Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2004, at A20.
Second, perhaps more incredibly, obesity is being declared a medical condition subject
450
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do is refrain from transparently absurd judicial lamentations that a full and fair
measure of genuinely just compensation for demonstrable economic losses, paid to
victims of forceful private property acquisition, will bankrupt the government. Such
judicial assertions become morally grotesque where beneficiaries of use of the
eminent domain process are private redevelopers, mass merchandizers, automobile
manufacturers and dealers, as well as gambling casinos, whose hoped-for successful
pursuit of large amounts of money the courts solemnly, if absurdly, proclaim to be
the linchpin that makes their private profit-making activities the equivalent of
"public use," on the theory that some of the prognosticated bonanza will trickle
down into the community.452 It is long overdue and it would be most appropriate for
some courageous judges confronted with such schemes to call a spade a spade and
proclaim that these are simply private profit-making endeavors.4" 3 It would also be
nice if an occasional intellectually honest judge were to confront condemnors'
lamentations about imminent fiscal doom and professions of government penury, 4 4
to point out that if the government has hundreds of millions of dollars to fritter away
on grandiose public and at times private projects, or to spend on subsidizing displays

of antique farm machinery in East Overshoe, Nebraska, or some other such civic
frivolity, 455 it surely must have enough money to pay the full market value for the
to Medicare payments. Gina Kolata, Health and Money Issues Arise over Who Pays for
Weight Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at A 1;Gina Kolata & Denise Grady, Weight-Loss
Field Awaits Change in Medicare Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2004, at 27. While a

slimming down of America may be desirable, it is, at least in the vast majority of cases,
something that is within individual cost-free control, and nowhere in the Constitution can I
find a "fundamental right" to be made fashionably slim at government expense, that trumps
the explicit constitutional requirement of providing "just compensation" for taking of private
property.
Gibeaut, supra note 141; Edward D. McKirdy, The New EminentDomain: Public Use
Defense Vanishing in Wake of Growing Privatizationof Power, N.J. L.J., Mar. 15, 1999, at
1; Dean Starkman, Take and Give: Condemnation Is Used to Hand One Business Property
of Another, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at Al; see Editorial, Eminent Thievery, WALL ST. J.,
452

Jan. 17, 2001, at A26 (noting that what distinguishes the United States from the world's
kleptocracies is respect for private property rights and their protection by a rule of law).
"' For one such judicial effort (by California Court of Appeal Associate Justice Macklin
Fleming), see Regus v. City of Baldwin Park, 139 Cal. Rptr. 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). See
also 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D.
Cal. 2001). Other than these, such judicial profiles in courage have been rare.
4" For a prime example of such arguments, delivered by a condemning agency to a
California Court of Appeal in positively baroque prose, foreshadowing "self-strangulation"
of "urban civilization" if fair compensation were to be paid to property owners for demonstrable economic losses, see Gideon Kanner, When Is "Property" Not "Property Itself' A CriticalExamination of the Bases of Denial of Compensationfor Loss of Goodwill in
Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W. L. REv. 57, 79 n.96 (1969).

"' I originally wrote this sentence intending it to be a sarcastic/rhetorical flourish. Since
then I have learned that it is too true; the federal government has actually spent $67,000,000
on an old locomotive display in Scranton, Pennsylvania, House Reaches Compromise on
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property it acquires for the display grounds, and to compensate justly the displaeu
land owners for their demonstrable economic losses, proximately caused by their
forcible displacement from their homes and businesses. Or at least it would not be
amiss for the courts to point out that having persuaded the judiciary to view the
feasibility of public projects as within the sole decision-making powers of condemning agencies, or altogether nonjusticiable, those agencies should also be required to
confront the fiscal consequences of their own political and engineering decisions.
It is immoral for courts to proclaim themselves legally powerless to pass on
condemnors' statutorily required determinations of public necessity (which includes
economic feasibility),456 and yet simultaneously de facto involve themselves in just
such fiscal deterninations by asserting, without the benefit of any evidence whatever, that creation of proposed public projects will be impaired if property owners
receive compensation for demonstrable economic losses inflicted by the impact of
government plans whose necessity and financial feasibility, we are told, are beyond
judicial ability to consider. Put another way, when deciding statutory issues going
to necessity for and feasibility of takings, courts tend to write a blank check to
condemnors, but then expect the condemnees to cash it when the time comes for the
condemnor to confront the full cost of the project, resulting from its own unfettered
decision making.
No one, to the best of my knowledge, has yet improved on Professor Frank
Michelman's observation that society cannot instigating projects whose cost

Steam Locomotive Park, N.Y. TtMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at A13, which the Times characterized
editorially as "[a] second-rate collection of trains on a third-rate site," Editorial, Steamtown
Steamroller,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1991, at A20. This bonanza of federal funds was squandered even though the National Park Service had earlier rejected this "park" as "having no
historical significance." Id.
I hasten to add that there is nothing wrong with subsidized displays of antique
machinery, and that I am as fond of old choo-choo trains as the next fellow. Perhaps more
so, being a former mechanical engineer. But there is no reason why such displays should be
lavishly funded with public money on the backs of unoffending property owners for whom,
it is said - with what purports to be a judicial straight face - there just are not any funds
with which to compensate them fully for their demonstrable economic losses when their
property is taken and their businesses destroyed.
456 See supra note 165; see also Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700
(1923) (holding that a condemnor's determination of necessity of a taking is conclusive, even
as against charges that the proposed public project is a wasteful effort to expend public
funds); Rosenthal & Rosenthal v. City of New York, 605 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y.), afftd, 771
F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.denied,475 U.S. 1018 (1986) (refusing to consider condemnees'
charge that the boundaries of the redevelopment project in question were corruptly drawn to
confer improper economic benefits on the Mayor's political allies); People v. Chevalier, 340
P.2d 598 (Cal. 1959) (holding that the issue of project necessity and feasibility is nonjusticiable even where it is charged that the decision to take was procured by fraud, bad faith,
and abuse of discretion). See generally Michael V. Mclntire, "Necessity" in Condemnation
Cases - Who Speaks for the People?, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 561 (1971).
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(including the cost of full compensation) exceeds their utility, so that projects that
45 7
society cannot create without full compensation, it cannot afford at all.
As for regulatory takings, it is no excuse to say that the task of formulating
inverse condermnation criteria is difficult, though in truth it is not as difficult as it is
made to appear in too many cases. High Court Justices, whether state or federal, are
chosen for their conspicuous intellects and accomplishments (and so are their elite
clerks), so it is, if nothing else, disrespectful to them to say that they are unequal to
the intellectual task of judging difficult cases in this one field as opposed to others,
even as they demand of lawyers that their regulatory takings submissions meet the
required judge-made standards of proof, without providing a clear or at least a
manageable answer to the question "proof of what? 45 8 To quote Professor Dunham
again, "[t]hat the problem is difficult of rational statement is no reason not to try."4'59
But the courts have not really been trying to resolve the doctrinal problem. Rather,
they have strived to advance the cause of one side or the other on a case-by-case
basis, and in doing so have been content to repeat unhelpful catchphrases that are
extracted from previous opinions by litigants and lobbed at their adversaries in the
hope that the court will find one of them more appealing than the others. James V.
DeLong has aptly termed that process "a battle between competing aphorisms."' 0
It is time for a change in judicial attitudes. If nothing else, courts of law should
lay down rules of law. The policy concerns that have inspired courts to interpret
constitutional law to meet the exigencies of changing times, in favor of those who
exercise government powers over private property,46 cut both ways and require the
nurturing of balanced law that recognizes the social importance and constitutionally
protected nature of private property rights, as well as reasonablelimitations on the
inroads being made into them. That needs to be done in fact - not merely by
occasional lip service, but also by balanced rules that recognize constitutional as
well as regulatory interests of both sides to these controversies. 62 On a policy level
it must also be candidly recognized that the fallout of the prevailing judicial
disparagement of private property rights of landowners has been conducive to
reinforcement of an extremist regulatory culture that has become instrumental in
7 Michelman, supra note 365, at 1181.
458 See Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Rd., 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal. 1997) (listing
at least ten factors that aggrieved property owners must present to the court in order to
prevail). Significantly, the courts have not indicated which of these items would be decisive
if proven.
459 Dunham, supra note 132, at 105.
460 DELONG, supra note 11, at 291.
461 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
462
In this conflict between the ecological and the constitutional, it is
plain that neither is to be consumed by the other. It is the duty of the
department of conservation to look after the interests of the former, and
it is the duty of the courts to stand guard over constitutional rights.
Comm'r of Natural Res. v. S. Volpe & Co., 206 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Mass. 1965).
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bringing about a housing shortage that is rapidly approaching a crisis, with a marKet
bubble for the haves and a draconian housing shortage for the have-nots. While the
use of extrapolation to predict the future is risky business, enough dark clouds are
appearing on the economic horizon to justify serious concerns on that score,
particularly given the huge private debt being incurred by Americans in all walks
of life, which is heavily contributed to by inflated home prices. 63 In this climate,
continuing judicial commitment to a course of action that de facto disregards
legislative policies that favor construction of housing while viewing favorably local
practices impairing it, not only subverts those policies, but also poses serious
economic dangers for the future.
Even on the environmentalists' fervently voiced, though occasionally shaky
premises, 464 we no longer live in the bygone days when the polluted Cuyahoga River
caught fire, or when Rachel Carson's plea for an environmental awakening first
stirred the country into action. Today's environmental regulators are no longer
supplicants for overdue reform. They often make their appearance on the scene as
part of an intrusive, oppressive government apparatus that can make unreasonable
demands and impose draconian penalties on citizens for unintentional, trivial, and
basically harmless acts." 5 Thus, no matter how well inspired many regulations may
be, one must still take into account not only their efficacy vel non but also their
impact on citizens' constitutional rights and economic interests. In other words, the
need for housing, too, is an important national policy that has received strong
legislative endorsement and should weigh heavily on the scales of adjudication, even
though it is largely ignored by the courts in takings controversies.4
In short, ends and means need to be distinguished, and the price of the beckoning "free lunch" must be assessed, if the process is to work honestly. As the usually
reliable Justice Holmes put it:
[Tihe state has an interest independent of and behind the titles of
its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the
last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their
463 See Motoko Rich, Boom in PricesBrings Investors to Home Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
1, 2005, at Al (reporting a recent emergence of an orgy of speculation in which homes and
condominiums are eagerly bought and promptly resold at substantial profits, earning the
speculators six-figure gains in a matter of months or even weeks); Daniel Gross, The Next
Shock: Not Oil, but Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, § 3, at 1; Gretchen Morgenson, A
Coming Nightmare of Homeownership?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2004, § 3, at 9; Gretchen
Morgenson, Housing Bust: It Won't Be Pretty, N.Y. TIMEs, July 25, 2004, § 3, at 1.

464 BJoRN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE

OF THE WORLD (2001).
46'

466

Berger & Kanner, Need for Reform, supra note 11, at 876-81.
Delaney, supra note 10; see REPORT OFTHECALIFORNIA L1rLEHOOVER COMMISSION,

REBUILDING THE DREAM: SOLVING CAuFORNIA's AFFoRDABLE HOUSING CRISIS, available

at www.novoco.com/Research-Center/califhooverreport.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
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forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air. It might have
to pay individualsbefore it could utter that word, but with it re4 67
mains the final power.
Unlike members of the other two, politically-driven branches of government that
historically pander to their constituencies, judges have a duty to be more than
appeasers of popular clamor and facilitators of one trendy government policy at the
expense of others. Their job is to reconcile if possible, or at least balance, the
diverse policy demands and the competing public and private interests. That's what
judging is all about. If nothing else, judges need to understand that land owners who
plead for vindication of their constitutional property rights in the courts, may be
right or wrong in their submissions, as are all litigants in all cases in all fields of
law. But win or lose, they are our fellow Americans, and not some sort of legal
pariahs whose plight is subject to being judicially viewed with thinly disguised
contempt, as Judge Alex Kozinski aptly put it." 8 If the courts can formulate a body
of jurisprudence in which anti-social individuals convicted of heinous criminal
misconduct are nonetheless beneficiaries of a punctiliously fairjudicial process, they
should also be able to provide a modicum of fairness for faultless Americans whose
"sin" is their desire to enjoy the benefit of the use of their land which is ostensibly
constitutionally protected and on which - adding insult to injury - they are taxed
on the basis of its highest and best use.
Finally, irrespective of what I have said here, judges are in the business of
judging; that is what they are paid to do. If lawyers have to understand what passes
for law in the field of regulatory takings to the extent necessary to explain the
litigational prospects to their clients, marshal pertinent evidence, formulate coherent
trial strategies, and structure competent legal arguments, then perhaps judges can
manage to adjudicate the controversies tendered to them for decision without going
to sometimes grotesque extremes in their search for ripeness, and hiding behind the
smokescreen of ad hocery they have so often offered as a substitute for reasoned law
that citizens can rely on. Perhaps, after a quarter century of dissembling and confusion, the time has come for judges to earn their pay in this field, to make
doctrinally sound judgments that can move toward a principled body of reliable
decisional law, and to cease playing intellectual "hidden ball" games in which - as
" Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (emphasis added).
's Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 1331, 1346
(9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), cert.denied, 499 U.S. 943 (1991). For an egregious
example of such unfortunate judicial behavior, see the nasty opinion in Chongris v. Board
of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987), turning away
deserving plaintiffs and taunting them in the process, in spite of the fact that they had
presented a plainly meritorious case of unlawful denial of use of their property. In the
underlying state litigation, the position of their opponents was so frivolous that the latter
were sanctioned by the Massachusetts Court of Appeals. See id. at 39.
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Justice O'Connor would have it - there is de facto no precedent that can be relied
on, and everything is up for grabs on a case-by-case basis.46 9 Whatever that may be,
it is not a process that is consistent with a rule of law or that can command public
respect. In Justice Scalia's words, to have a rule of law we must have a law of
rules. 470 In the long-run the present intellectual mess can only deliver random
injustice, cause economic disruption and social instability, and contribute further to
bringing the courts as well as the law administered by them into widespread and
justified political controversy and general public disrepute.471
[W]here an appellate judge says that the . . . issue must be

decided on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, or by a
balancing of all the factors involved, he begins to resemble a
finder of fact more than a determiner of law. To reach such a
stage is, in a way, a regrettable concession of defeat - an acknowledgment that we have passed the point where "law,"
properly speaking, has any further application. And to reiterate
the unfortunate practical consequences of reaching such a pass
when there still remains a good deal of judgment to be applied:
equality of treatment is difficult to demonstrate and, in a multitiered judicial system, impossible to achieve; predictability is
destroyed; judicial arbitrariness is facilitated; [and] judicial
4 72

courage is impaired.

469 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326 n.23. Justice O'Connor's approach is not confined to

regulatory taking cases. See Jeffrey Rosen, Make Up Our Mind, Justice O'Connor,N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 26, 1995, at A21 ("Rather than being guided by consistent legal rules, lawyers
and judges must try to read her mind before they can be confident about what the law
requires.") It cannot go without notice that when it comes to a subject deemed important by
her, Justice O'Connor has had no trouble insisting that the law be clear and certain, because,
as she put it in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992), "[l]iberty finds no
refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."
470 See Scalia, supra note 59, at 1187.
41' The courts' decline in stature was

spotlighted by California's former Chief Justice
Malcolm Lucas, who noted with alarm that over fifty percent of Californians rate courts as
"poor" or only "fair." Malcolm Lucas, Introduction to Special Report on California
Appellate Justice, 45 HASTINGs L. J.419, 421 (1994).
472 Scalia, supra note 59, at 1182; Steven Eagle, The Development of PropertyRights in
America and the Property Rights Movement, 1 GEO. J. L. & PUB.POL'Y 77, 99-100 (2002)

(observing that balancing tests are attractive to those who lack understanding and are afraid
to expose their own deliberations to scrutiny); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad
Hocery:A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV.1697, 1700 (1988) (arguing in favor

of predictability in the law and pointing out that any consistent, articulated approach to the
taking problem is better than none); Charles Fried, Courting Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,

2004, at A29 (voicing the concern that the Court's efforts are an "incoherent prolongation
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We of the legal profession exhort our fellow citizens to submit to a rule of law
as their civic salvation. We promise fairness, justice, judicial even-handedness,
protection from governmental overreaching, and principled dispute resolution.
Symbolically, we adorn our courthouses accordingly with images of revered historical lawgivers and with quotations from laws laid down by them. But when it comes
to the subject at hand, aggrieved property owners quickly learn that the "law"
administered by the courts adjudicating their dispute with their government is
something less than a principled body of jurisprudence. It is rather an unjust and
incoherent system in which, in Justice Scalia's words, equality of treatment is indeed
difficult or impossible to achieve, the inscription above the entrance to the U.S.
Supreme Court -

"Equal Justice Under Law" - notwithstanding.

Americans deserve better. The intellectual integrity of the law deserves better.
The Constitution deserves better. And the courts deserve better even if - God help
us - some of them do not seem to care.

of a fin-de-sikle jurisprudence, where the court serves as nothing more than an ad hoc
arbiter of issues it finds too difficult to decide in a principled way).

